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ABSTRACT 
Picturing the Damaged Mind: Film and Techniques of Visualization in the 
Modernization of WWII Military Psychiatry 
Kaia Scott, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2018 
Over the course of World War II, psychiatry went from being a specialized 
discipline addressing the very ill or the very rich, to one looked to by institutions and 
industry for expertise regarding the management of ordinary people’s labour and 
behaviour. Adopted by the US military as a strategy for “conserving manpower,” the 
astonishing growth and re-orientation of psychiatry in response to institutional demands 
has been documented in histories of psychiatry and sciences of social engineering. This 
project adds to these histories by identifying the key role played by film and what I call 
“techniques of visualization” in enabling this growth and modernization. A few familiar 
works of propaganda including the Why We Fight films and Let There be Light, are 
situated within a much larger institutional framework containing many unfamiliar films, 
all put to work within broader strategies to optimize the labour of personnel, and in the 
process acquainting millions of people to psychiatric discourses for the first time. Using 
extensive archival research of military documents and psychiatric literature, this study 
proposes that the work done by these films can only be understood by contextualizing 
them within institutional strategies for managing issues of concern such as morale, 
“combat fatigue,” and preventative psychiatry.  
The chapters of this study examine film and techniques of visualization at work in 
screening, training, preventative psychiatry, therapeutic treatments, and discourse 
management, by mapping them along stages of a military career from selection and 
training through military service and discharge. Psychiatrists used film to try to manage 
men’s minds en masse, attempting to inoculate the mind to fear, make mental health 
“visible” so that it could be monitored and self-managed, standardize and automate 
aspects of treatment—in particular triggering repressed traumas, and manage discourses 
 iv 
about war and mental health. Techniques of visualization adapted imprecise and time-
consuming practices such as psychoanalysis and personality profiling to make them 
appear efficient and reproducible on a mass scale. The visual technologies and 
therapeutic modes that characterized the modernization of the psychiatric discipline 
evolved within a strict institutional environment that expected minds to adapt to the 
circumstances of war. 
 v 
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Chapter 1.  
 
Introduction 
1.1. Visual Techniques on the Front Lines 
In the Tunisian desert in 1943, Roy Grinker and John Spiegel, two psychiatrists 
deployed by the American military, set up a makeshift psychiatric hospital in a small, 
open tent within earshot of the bombs and blasts coming from the fighting between the 
Allied and the German and Italian forces.  The American military had shipped these two 
psychiatrists overseas along with the usual soldiers, officers, and medics as part of a 
corps to join the North African Campaign with the Allied forces.  It was the first time 
during World War II that the United States had sent psychiatrists to the battlefront, and it 
was part of a desperate attempt to cut down on the alarming number of soldiers who were 
leaving the battlefields with “neuropsychiatric” diagnoses—the military’s official term 
for incapacitation due to mental rather than physical reasons.  While scrounging around 
for medical supplies to set up their facilities, Grinker and Spiegel discovered a large 
cache of a popular intravenous anaesthetic, sodium pentothal, and used it to invent a 
treatment they called “narcosynthesis.”1  During this treatment, once patients were 
heavily drugged, the psychiatrists would use their bodies and voices to act out battle 
scenes to make the patients believe they were back at the scene of their trauma. The 
psychiatrist might mimic the sounds of bombs and gunfire, pretend to be dead comrades 
or officers, or perhaps shout out orders to a stoned soldier, or yell, “Look out! Incoming!”  
Grinker and Spiegel recorded that as a result of the drugs and the theatrical prompting 
from the psychiatrists, their patients would often dive under their cots for cover, scream, 
cry, and try to dig themselves into the ground, among other actions, each of which in turn 
                                               
1 Alison Winter, “Film and the Construction of Memory in Psychoanalysis, 1940 – 
1960,” Science in Context 19, no. 1 (2006), 116. 
2 
performed a visible and audible version of a traumatic memory for the psychiatrist to 
see.2   
Narcosynthesis was a significant mutation of the lengthy, symbol-laden process of 
psychoanalysis, where patients’ dreams and reminiscences are analyzed and pieced 
together to build a psychiatric biography.  Narcosynthesis used drugs and audio-visual 
triggers to try to create a shortcut to access repressed traumatic memories that became 
visible as the patient reacted in front of the psychiatrist.  While the bodies and voices of 
the psychiatrists were the audio-visual triggers in the above example, psychiatrists 
quickly began to experiment with the use of film screened in rooms full of patients in 
order to make this therapeutic technique more efficient.  The very things that 
differentiated narcosynthesis from psychoanalysis—that it was quick, cheap, and 
produced a dramatic, visible effect—were what made it part of a new crop of psychiatric 
treatments generated during the war that used drugs and visual technologies to try to get 
soldiers back to work and keep them working longer and more effectively.  Despite the 
lack of significant proof of their efficacy, this and other widely reproducible treatments 
helped to structure the extraordinary growth of military psychiatry throughout the war, 
helping to build the foundation upon which it would become one of the most powerful 
social sciences in post war United States.  Though this ritual of psychiatrists and 
narcotized soldiers acting out battles in a tent may sound like a strange relic of the past, 
narcosynthesis was a formative moment in military psychiatry.  It initiated a lineage of 
treatments using film and other media in military psychiatric treatments during WWII 
that has continued through to the contemporary use of video games and Virtual Reality 
environments to treat soldiers with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).3 
                                               
2 See the section “Narcosynthesis” in Grinker and Speigel’s chapter “The Management of 
Neuropsychiatric Casualties in the Zone of Combat,” in The Manual of Military 
Neuropsychiatry, eds Harry C. Solomon and Paul I. Yakolev (WB Saunders Company: 
Philadelphia and London, 1944), 528-539. 
3 The Virtual Iraq therapy program uses virtual reality environments in order to mimic 
situations soldiers were likely to have encountered while serving in Iraq.  It operates on 
the principle that returning to the scene of trauma over and over again under the guidance 
of a therapist will reduce PTSD symptoms such as flashbacks.  See Pasi Väliaho, 
“Affectivity, Biopolitics and the Virtual Reality of War,” Theory, Culture & Society 29, 
no. 2 (2012): 63-83. 
3 
Narcosynthesis is one example of a family of practices using film, audio-visual 
tools, still images, and performance deployed by military psychiatrists in order to 
modernize and expand their discipline from a relatively marginal one whose work took 
place predominantly in asylums, to a discipline that was entrusted to administer the 
mental health of an institution comprised of millions.  Together, what I am calling  
“techniques of visualization” were both vital to the expansion of military psychiatry and 
shaped the psychiatric treatment and knowledge disseminated to soldiers who were often 
encountering these ideas for the first time.  The term “techniques of visualization” used in 
this study is indebted to media scholar Nicholas Mirzoeff’s revisitation of “visuality.”4  
Mirzoeff defines visuality as that which has been classified and organized into a 
seemingly self-evident set of norms by those with the authority to look at and to 
“visualize” the perceptible and the imperceptible.  He writes that visuality is a “discursive 
practice that has material effects,” and it is “formed by a set of relations combining 
information, imagination, and insight into a rendition of physical and psychic space.”5  In 
this study the rendition of physical and psychic space constitutes a spectrum of mental 
health/illness mapped out by the military psychiatric apparatus onto the minds of civilians 
and personnel.  The techniques of visualization explored in this study made the minds of 
soldiers see and be seen in institutionally useful ways.  The psychiatric expert’s “right to 
look” was structured by their power within the military institution and organized a 
visuality of the mind that shaped both the discipline’s practices and the way that it was 
understood by experts and non-experts alike.   
Among the techniques of visualization employed in WWII military psychiatry 
were image interpretation (such as inkblot) tests that sought to sort people efficiently on 
the assumption that the images could conjure up information from inside the mind that 
would otherwise remain hidden.  Many training films provided soldiers with images of 
combat with the hope of provoking memory images in their minds that would lessen the 
shock of being in combat for the first time.  Didactic films on military psychiatry and 
mental health named certain behaviours and patterns as psychiatrically significant, 
                                               
4 Mirzoeff identifies “visuality” as “an early-nineteenth-century term meaning the 
visualization of history,” and elaborates this usage in his book The Right to Look: A 
Counterhistory of Visuality (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 2. 
5 Mirzoeff, The Right to Look, 3. 
4 
making them visible to laypeople so that they could be monitored within the networks of 
military surveillance.  Narcosynthesis used performance, and later on films, to uncover 
repressed memory images of trauma.  As a result of the process, the patient reciprocated 
with performances of their trauma, which helped doctors to classify them as “making 
progress” in treatment.  Addressing the public, military-made films on mental health and 
psychiatry set the terms of what mental health and veteran reintegration looked like, and 
proudly displayed the techniques that had made psychiatry modern, efficient and able to 
administer to mass publics.  Together, films and techniques of visualization created a 
family of visual technologies that produced systems of classification, practices, and 
knowledge about mental health.  These were in many ways an improvement over other, 
more archaic ideas and practices, but they were always structured by the authority of the 
military to look and to determine what was being seen. 
This dissertation examines the role played by film, audio-visual tools, and 
techniques of visualization in the military’s use of psychiatry to try to optimize the labour 
of soldiers during WWII, and how this contributed to the extraordinary rise of psychiatry 
in the military and, subsequently, well beyond it.  This project aims to demonstrate that 
film and visual technologies played a particular kind of role in psychiatry’s 
modernization in the military context by:  
1. Operating as a privileged tool understood by psychiatrists as capable of provoking 
institutionally useful images inside the minds of viewers and generating desired 
effects, 
2. Creating shortcuts in the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment of soldiers, 
3. Teaching soldiers and other personnel protocols of mental health treatment of 
others as well as self-management, making both specialists and generalists 
responsible for the mental labour of warfare’s effects, and in principle, more 
efficient workers, 
4. Selling the idea of psychiatry to skeptical audiences, and  
5. Enabling a uniformity of messaging about psychiatry and mental health directed 
at audiences of soldiers, and subsequently, civilians. 
This project identifies the spectrum of film, audio-visual tools, and techniques of 
visualization that were used to adapt psychiatry into a program for military efficiency.  It 
5 
contextualizes their use and the rhetorical strategies associated with them within the 
understandings and goals expressed in contemporaneous writings by military personnel 
and psychiatrists in official military and psychiatric publications.  The modernization of 
military psychiatry included the promotion of discourses of empathy around fear’s 
normalness and its effects, and generated infrastructure and resources to provide 
treatment for suffering soldiers.  The military context in which this modernization 
occurred, however, meant that such gains were strictly structured within institutional 
imperatives for efficiency and optimization as well as by bids for disciplinary growth and 
power, which inflected their practice and rhetoric.  This study, therefore, presents an 
institutional critique of the military by documenting the media tools enlisted to make 
military psychiatry more efficient, and a discourse analysis of how film helped to bind 
questions of mental health to those of labour productivity. 
 
Over the course of World War II, psychiatric discourses evolved from circulating 
among a small group of specialists and devotees to becoming one of the most influential 
explanatory paradigms at work in public policy, private industry, and media and 
communications in the United States.  The US military’s heavy investment in psychiatry 
as a strategy for “conserving manpower,” facilitated in part by the use of film and visual 
technologies, played a significant role in psychiatry’s astonishing institutional growth 
throughout the war and into the post war period.  By making imprecise and time 
consuming practices such as psychoanalysis and personality profiling appear efficient and 
reproducible on a mass scale, techniques of visualization helped to give the once-
marginal discipline of military psychiatry a foothold that it seized aggressively, growing 
into a vast and indispensable apparatus, within the military and beyond.  Film was used to 
apply psychiatric ideas en masse, preparing men’s minds to fight in training, teaching 
them to manage their own mental health and how to be good patients, and doing some of 
the heavy-lifting in therapeutic settings, easing the burden on the limited number of 
psychiatrists.  At every turn, images demonstrated their usefulness by purporting to make 
order of the messy business of cataloguing, disciplining, and treating the soldier’s mind.  
Visual technologies were, as much as anything, tools used to try to simplify what was 
highly complex: they were employed to communicate complicated ideas about the mind 
6 
and mental health in a series of unified and endlessly repeatable messages, and seemed to 
make coherent information appear from the shadows of grey matter, providing both 
doctors and soldiers with a story or an image that could stand for the totality of the 
trauma of war, or as a starting point for remedying its effects. 
The claim that communication technologies could effectively improve manpower 
by motivating, educating, managing, and curing soldiers quickly was repeated again and 
again by top military psychiatrists and officials throughout the war who wanted to show 
that the rising profession could be modern and adaptable.  Still and moving image 
interpretation tests were an early aid to the daunting task of screening, testing, 
diagnosing, and categorizing the mental fitness of millions of people who signed up or 
were drafted into service.  Films also introduced military audiences to carefully tailored 
ideas and techniques of psychiatry via didactic and instructional films.  These films were 
sometimes understood to act as preventative therapy that would keep soldiers from 
suffering neuropsychiatric breakdowns during service, and also as a public relations tool 
to sell the then-unsavoury subject of psychiatry to the millions of military personnel who 
viewed them.  
In addition to educational and training uses, visual technologies also became key 
in adapting clinical practice to a wartime context, as seen in the example of 
narcosynthesis.  Historian of American psychology Ellen Herman quotes prominent 
World War II military psychiatrist Edward Strecker when she writes that working for the 
military,  
Forced clinicians to devise a menu of creative psychotherapeutic 
alternatives and shortcuts “which [gave] promise of returning a maximum 
number of men to duty within a minimum of time and with techniques 
which are feasible in the active theatres of combat.”6 
Screening combat footage to a room full of patients to initiate the process of 
narcosynthesis became one method of using films to make costly psychiatric treatment 
for the masses of soldiers who needed it more efficient.  Saving the scarce and expensive 
time of psychiatrists was key.  In addition to making treatment more efficient, and in 
                                               
6 Strecker as quoted in Ellen Herman, and Herman, The Romance of American 
Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), 112. 
7 
theory, more effective, films were also often used to quickly train doctors and 
psychiatrists in new techniques, to introduce new patients to psychiatric ideas and 
terminology, and to generate and direct discussion in group therapy.   
As can be seen above, categories of training, discourse management, and therapy 
were often blurred and overlapping in military psychiatry’s descriptions of a particular 
film’s function.  This is partly expediency—films were expensive to produce, materials 
were often scarce, and whatever was available might be used in a variety of contexts.  It 
was also due to the hope held by some psychiatrists that films were sophisticated media 
interlocutors, operating on multiple cognitive levels at once.  A single film might be 
discussed and screened as a straightforward training film in one instance, in another, it 
might be understood to be providing trainees with a form of sensory inoculation, 
preparing their nervous systems for the experience of battle.  In a third instance this same 
film may be shown to soldiers in a recovery hospital in order to save a psychiatrist time 
explaining common symptoms, and finally, it might be screened again to the same 
patients, now under sedation, in order to trigger expressions of their own distress.  The 
polysemy of these films arose from the multiple ways in which they were put to use and 
facilitated by the power of psychiatric experts to reframe them alongside a range of 
instructions, practices, messages, and complementary information.  While to a 
contemporary viewer, many of these films may appear to be not much more than 
amusingly outdated documents of psychiatric didacticism, their complex and polysemic 
nature can only be understood by carefully reading the institutional contexts and practices 
in which they operated.  For this reason, this study makes a case for understanding 
military psychiatric films and visual technologies as institutionally “useful” in a variety 
of ways that exceeded even their educational or propagandistic qualities.7   
As Haidee Wasson and Lee Grieveson write in their introduction to the collection, 
Cinema’s Military Industrial Complex,  
Although broadly deployed and seen regularly by millions, the military’s 
cinema was rarely designed simply as a mass medium, but rather as a 
highly strategic one, encompassing specific groups of varying sizes and of 
                                               




many disciplines and skills, with clear institutional procedures and desired 
outcomes.8 
While they sometimes reached large audiences, the films examined in this study 
functioned in targeted, direct, and strategic ways.  Shown variously to audiences of 
trainees, groups of officers, or a closed ward of psychiatric patients, these films together 
formed a coherent (though not homogenous) articulation of the methods and 
understandings of an increasingly powerful institution of military psychiatry.  
 
1.2. Historical Context 
1.2.1. Film in the Military 
The boost that film and visual technologies offered psychiatry owed a great deal 
to the investment that the military made in film and media industries more generally 
during World War II.  The enthusiastic integration of media technologies into the 
business of warfare generated a robust infrastructure for film production and circulation.  
As film historian Haidee Wasson has written, film was used in one way or another by 
“practically every activity of the armed forces.”9  Thousands of newsreels and bulletins 
provided regular information to troops and civilians at home and overseas; films were 
shown to orient new soldiers and build morale, they provided countless hours of 
surveillance footage and records of missions, and were even used as highly restricted 
personal communiqués seen only by top officials.10  The Army’s film production unit, the 
Signal Corps, had by 1945, produced over 1,500 training and orientation films alone.11  
Training and orientation films covered a huge range of topics from technical subjects 
with titles like “Filling and Handling of Airplane Spray Tanks - Part V - 
                                               
8 Haidee Wasson and Lee Grieveson, “The Military’s Cinema Complex,” in Cinema’s 
Military Industrial Complex, eds. Wasson and Grieveson (California: University of 
California Press, 2018), 8. 
9 “Report of the Film Survey Committee” as cited in Haidee Wasson, “Protocols of 
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Decontamination,” and “The Oil Filter Goes to War,” to important informational films 
such as “Military Sanitation - Disposal of Human Waste,” and “Trench Foot, Cause, 
Prevention, and Treatment.”  There were also films that trained soldiers in warfare, 
personal conduct, and hygiene, including “Introduction to the Army,” “How to get Killed 
in One Easy Lesson,” and “Figures Don’t Lie,” a film made for the Women’s Army 
Corps “designed to be shown to women interested in improving their figures through 
exercises.”12  As the war progressed, the US Army Signal Corps’ budget, which had 
totalled just under two million dollars in 1942, was increased to over ten million dollars 
in 1943, and grew throughout the war along with the enthusiasm for using film.13  This 
study shows that psychiatrists plainly shaped the activities of the Signal Corps—the most 
prolific makers of films during the war. 
One training film genre was the “mental hygiene” film, produced by the Signal 
Corps in consultation and collaboration with the military’s Neuropsychiatry Division, 
which was consulting on techniques for morale building across the military.  Within this 
genre were films designed to deliver psychiatric information to troops, improve morale 
(with the expectation that this kept men fighting longer), and as public relations tools that 
managed discourses of military psychiatry with both personnel and the public.  Many of 
these films employ a recognizable aesthetic of 1940s didactic black-and-white dramatized 
documentaries, with what appears to be now amusingly anachronistic subject treatments, 
performances, and paternalistic narrators that easily mark these films as obvious and 
unsettling propaganda relics of the past.  A few of the films shown as part of the mental 
hygiene program stand out due to the famous names associated with them, such as 
Combat Fatigue: Irritability (1946) which features a young Gene Kelly as a marine in a 
psychiatric rehabilitation centre.  Frank Capra’s Why We Fight series, and John Huston’s 
Let There Be Light, are well known in film studies thanks to their famous directors.  
These films often tend to be viewed as curiously well made propaganda that also help us 
to understand the oeuvres of great auteurs.  This project takes a different approach to 
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these films, situating them instead within the military’s larger psychiatric apparatus and 
asking why the military made these films?  What did they think they would accomplish?  
What disciplinary authority was motivating their decisions?  Prior to their release to the 
public, the Why We Fight series, while not psychiatric films per se, were made to be 
screened for all incoming troops as part of military-wide policy seeking to prevent 
“psychoneuroses among personnel within the army,” by disseminating motivational 
information and “induc[ing] healthy attitudes.”14  Let There Be Light was made at the 
request of the Neuropsychiatry Division as a public relations tool for managing public 
discourses about veterans and mental health.  Framing these and other more obscure films 
within an investigation of the institutional use of media by the military’s psychiatric 
apparatus reveals that they are not historical curios at all, but represent part of a highly 
coordinated communications effort directed at millions of viewers seeking to accomplish 
a range of goals.  
The institutional goals pursued by the military’s psychiatric film program can be 
broadly grouped into those of training and discourse management on the one hand (Ch 1, 
2, and 4), and the adapting and augmenting of psychiatric assessment techniques and 
clinical practice on the other (Ch 1 and 3).  Mental hygiene films and those made for 
training were much more widely seen than and have more indelible traces than those used 
as clinical tools, but a full catalogue of the films used in either category is not possible to 
achieve.  Dealing with incomplete archival records, casual mentions of films (often with 
incorrect titles) in psychiatric articles, and conflicting information in military documents 
makes it hard to know exactly which and how many films were a part of the military 
psychiatric apparatus.  Many documents in the Neuropsychiatry Department files at the 
National Archives contain suggestions or scenarios for films that may or may not have 
actually made it into production, or may have been reworked into films of different titles.  
Scanning the catalogue of military films from World War II contained at the National 
Archives for titles that sound like they might have psychiatric subjects is helpful, but still 
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incomplete.  Titles that have appeared in military documents from wartime do not appear 
in the catalogue and vice versa.  Films used in the clinical context are even more difficult 
to track down, as they were not subject to military-wide policy, but rather the whims and 
discretion of the psychiatrists using them.  Even getting a reliable title from a psychiatric 
article is challenging.  Only the military-made mental hygiene films that were repurposed 
for use in convalescent hospitals are relatively easy to find.  One exciting discovery in my 
research was a series of three short films containing footage from a naval attack found at 
the National Archives that I believe were used experimentally as “desensitization films” 
in the military hospital setting.  These are further discussed in Chapter 3. 
Glimpses into the scope of films screened to educate soldiers on psychiatric 
subjects can be gleaned from files such as the one put together in 1946 by General 
George S. Goldman, an analytical psychiatrist who was appointed full-time director of 
the Psychiatric Film Program run out of the Surgeon General’s office during the war.15  
Goldman’s “Training Films” dossier reviews the existing films available from the Army, 
the Navy, the Airforce, and the British military, and suggests others that should still be 
made to fill in the gaps.  He concluded at the time that a “relatively complete psychiatric 
film library” would include: twelve orientation films promoting proper adjustment to the 
challenges of becoming a soldier, being deployed, re-training, re-deployment, and 
returning home; two films for officers on how to manage the mental health of their troops 
and their own; eight training films for differing levels of medical workers from corps men 
to surgeons to psychiatrists presenting information on how to deal with psychiatric 
patients, treatment measures, and group therapy; and three treatment films for 
neuropsychiatric patients stressing the need to “overcome psychoneurosis and recover.”16  
While the document does not specify how the proposed film library would be made 
widely available, it provides a sense of what the essential tools of psychiatric training 
were understood to be and how film was foundational to their institutionalization.   
Logistical considerations (winning wars and paying disability pensions, among 
others) have always given modern military institutions huge stakes in how mental health 
is represented and managed. From strategic naming and re-namings of “Shellshock,” 
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“Combat Fatigue,” “Post Vietnam Syndrome,” and “Post Traumatic Stress Disorder,” to 
the training of new cohorts of psychiatrists and funding their research, war has indelibly 
shaped narratives of the mind.  Seeking not only to manage discourses, but the 
productivity of military labour as well, the use of film in military psychiatry during 
World War II set historical precedents for the contemporary use of digital imagery in 
military training, stress management, and therapy.17  Despite changing parameters of 
interpretation and contextualization, both World War II experiments that used films as 
“exposure therapy,” and contemporary uses of Virtual Reality to treat what is now 
diagnosed as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, work with the principle that moving images 
can produce psychiatric “habituation,” or the ability to desensitize patients to fear of 
particular stimuli.18  In an attempt to manage the unruly effects of fear on the mind, 
psychiatric films, seen by soldiers in both training and in treatment, became twin 
gateways of soldier production and release: asking them to wage war in one instance, and 
to return to peacefully productive citizens in the other.  In order to understand the work 
that film and media did to help turn people into soldiers and then back again, as well as 
the radical change and growth that occurred in military psychiatry during World War II to 
broker this transformation, it is important to understand some of the factors involved in 
how and why psychiatry became so important to modern militaries.   
 
1.2.2. Psychiatry and the Military 
The dramatic uptake of psychiatry in the US military during World War II was 
part of a widespread phenomenon of institutions increasingly turning to social sciences as 
tools of governance.  Militaries, criticized for being led by unqualified elites who ran 
messy slaughterhouse campaigns during World War I, began slowly adopting new 
techniques for selecting, organizing, and training personnel.  Germany, in particular, was 
known by British and American intelligence to be using psychologists and psychiatrists 
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to try to craft a modern, sophisticated military that applied developments in the human 
sciences to the optimization of fighting forces.  While the early years of the war still saw 
the British and American military keeping the role of psychiatrists to a minimum, by 
1936, the German military had a “central laboratory in the War Ministry, staffed by over 
80 psychologists, under whose direction worked psychological laboratories attached to 
every army corps.”19  Writing on the history of what he calls the “psy” sciences 
(psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis) as tools of Foucauldian social 
governance, Nikolas Rose describes the phenomenon that began to slowly take place in 
the context of powerful militaries at the start of the war as part of the broader 
psychologization of organizational life.20  No longer a strict application of disciplinary 
force to the bodies within the military institution, the psy sciences offered new methods 
for managing people’s behaviour and labour by producing a corps of specialists who 
purported to understand how people thought, felt, and were motivated.21  Militaries began 
to realize (more or less slowly) that they could “minimize indiscipline and the breakdown 
of troops, and … increase fighting efficiency, through the rational allocation of 
individuals to activities in light of a knowledge of their intelligence, personality, or 
aptitudes.”22 
The governance models provided by the psy sciences are not straightforward 
techniques of power.  As they build and disseminate models of human behaviour, they 
create new forms of connection between the way that people think about themselves and 
the way they behave as understandings are internalized.  Or, as Rose writes, the 
connections and effects that form “between the aspirations of authorities and the projects 
of individual lives.”23  It is therefore important not to simply endow the state or the 
military with some kind of rational and coherent power that it wields over individuals, 
but to carefully map out how this kind of power grows, identifies itself, and operates in 
order to understand the impacts on infrastructures and effects on individuals that it 
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enables.  Sometimes small innovations arise to deal with an immediate problem—such as 
the discovery of a cache of sodium pentothal by the psychiatrists Grinker and Spiegel—
that then grow into foundational elements of a comprehensive program of management.  
Here we begin by sketching some of the conditions in which media became a part of the 
growth of psychiatric management within the American military. 
Prior to World War II, the dominant model of mental health care in America was 
institutionalization in asylums or mental hospitals.  Almost all professional psychiatrists 
worked in hospitals and generally understood their patients to be long-term or lifetime 
wards with afflictions that were to be managed rather than cured.  Psychiatrists began 
formulating theories of trauma and the human mind during World War I, and soldiers 
suffering with what was called “shell shock” brought issues of psychiatry to the public’s 
attention.  Despite this, the general climate was still quite hostile to the idea of people 
having mental abnormalities, and indeed, while the British military eventually adopted 
more humane approaches, their initial method for coping with soldiers who showed 
symptoms of shell shock during World War I was to hang them for cowardice, which was 
interpreted as an act of treason against the army.24  While the work done by psychiatrists 
during the First World War had achieved a certain level of notoriety among artists and 
intellectuals, these ideas did not gain traction within a broader public sphere.  Historian of 
American psychology, Ellen Herman, writes that  
Before the war, psychotherapy had been associated largely with the elite 
office practice of psychoanalysis … or with a range of techniques 
employed by psychiatrists functioning in the institutional context of state 
hospitals.  In both cases, psychotherapy was an unusual experience for 
which the prerequisites were extreme wealth, avant-garde curiosity, or 
something close to insanity.  Psychotherapy was not relevant to ordinary 
people.  If anything, it was stigmatizing.25 
The beginning of a radical shift in the orientation of American psychiatry was catalyzed 
by a reduction in the quality of care for patients during the Depression, exacerbating a 
growing dissatisfaction with the palliative model of psychiatry. This spurred interest in 
what Gerald N. Grob calls “radical therapeutic innovations that seemed to hold out the 
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prospect of recovery for tens of thousands of severely and chronically ill persons.”26 
Curative procedures that targeted the body’s functioning rather than the patient’s 
biography, such as insulin shock, metrazol shock, electroshock, and lobotomies, were 
quicker to administer than ongoing psychotherapy.  They also resonated with a desire to 
adopt more bio-medical approaches to treatment as the psychiatric community re-branded 
itself from palliative asylum administrators to medical science professionals in the years 
leading up to and following the Second World War.27 
This burgeoning change in the discipline had two elements that lent themselves 
well to the military’s uptake of psychiatry in the upcoming war: first was the expectation 
that experimental therapies could produce radical results and efficiency, offering a 
curative rather than custodial model of care.28  Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely’s review 
of modern military psychiatry quotes an article written by military psychiatrists in 1941, 
that illustrates one extreme end of this spectrum when it states that there was a “tendency 
toward leucotomy [a form of lobotomy] when traumatized patients couldn’t face renewed 
military duties,” enabling any well-trained physician to treat patients suffering from 
psychoneurosis.29  The second element that made psychiatry well suited to adoption by 
military operations was how these therapies were sold to the public as advances in the 
discipline, as Grob notes in his study of this historical transition: 
The rapid acceptance of these therapies [in the absence of significant proof 
of their effectiveness] was also facilitated by the vast publicity accorded 
them in the popular media. Newspapers and magazines as well as radio 
disseminated information about these therapies and created the impression 
that they represented major breakthroughs.30 
Media of all varieties helped to modernize both the use of radical therapies and the ability 
to sell their effectiveness.  And both of these uses were embraced by the US Military’s 
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psychiatric program—the establishment of which became the single most significant 
catalyst in the change of the psychiatric profession in the United States.31 
While World War I officials had built many psychiatric hospitals to treat soldiers, 
military administration in the early years of World War II hoped to avoid repeating this 
costly manoeuvre.  Their initial strategy at the beginning of the war was to try to prevent 
losses by screening new recruits and draftees through psychiatric tests and interviews.  
The hope was that an aggressive investment in screening would make the need for 
psychiatric treatment virtually nonexistent by only admitting men with strong mental 
fitness into military training.  Despite this effort, the war produced vast numbers of 
psychiatric casualties, comprising between 26% to 40% of all medical evacuations, with 
numbers reaching as high as 75% in particularly brutal campaigns.32  As a result, the 
dominant view in the early war years, that one could distinguish between “weak” and 
“strong” men, changed to accommodate the idea that “everyone had their breaking 
point.”33 Following this, prevailing understandings of neuroses as products of 
“predisposition” due to childhood experiences expanded to recognize the role of 
contextual or experience-induced “stress,” reinforcing the ongoing disciplinary shift from 
a palliative model of care to one that sought to use psychiatry as a tool to prevent and 
manage “maladaptive” behaviour.  During World War II, the “environmentalist” view of 
psychiatry came to prominence because it accounted for the stressors of combat, but was 
frequently tempered by coupling it with a “developmentalist” view that measured a 
soldier’s ability to handle stress by the success or failure of his upbringing.  Military 
psychiatry adapted multiple, competing models of psychiatric theory to generate the most 
institutionally functional approach to dealing with the problem of “psychiatric 
casualties.”34 
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The institutionalization of military psychiatry during the latter part of the war 
greatly accelerated the ongoing shifts in the discipline’s orientation, and generated a 
dramatic change in the makeup and professional experience of psychiatrists themselves.  
When the United States entered the war, its entire psychiatric staff consisted of 25 
psychiatrists.35  An article in a 1946 issue of The American Journal of Psychiatry 
reported that “the armed services had approximately 3000 “psychiatrists”; of these 1700 
were in the army; 500 in the navy; 210 in the airforce; 475 in the Veteran’s 
Administration; and 15 in the Public Health Service.”36  This growth represented an 
effective doubling of the 2,295 total registered members of the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) prior to the war.37  This massive new cohort worked under a strict 
military imperative to get patients back to work, favouring strategies that provided quick 
and demonstrable successes over ongoing custodial care and costly psychotherapy.  
Herman observes that this incredible growth in the psychiatric as well as 
psychological sciences “began a radical process of ‘normalizing’ mental troubles, a 
process so comprehensive and far-reaching that it underlay the dramatic spread of clinical 
experience and clinician’s increasingly broad cultural appeal after 1945.”38  The fact that 
clinical treatment was now happening on a mass scale, and that it was predominantly 
being practiced on patients who were otherwise “normal” was the engine driving a 
radical shift in the discipline that “reorient[ed] theory and practice away from mental 
illness and toward mental health.”39  During the war, this new cohort of psychiatrists had 
a civilian army of 15 million soldiers at their disposal, generating an unprecedented 
laboratory and captive audience on which to develop new ideas and techniques.   This 
shifting orientation toward cultivating and maintaining the mental health of “normal” 
populations entailed a significant investment in “preventative” (Ch 1) and “forward” (Ch 
2) psychiatry, both of which relied heavily on film-based communications campaigns.   
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Preventative psychiatry involved building morale and trying to train soldiers to be 
ready for what they would face in battle.  Films such as Capra’s Why We Fight series and 
a military-made series of a dozen or so films called Fighting Men were central to this 
program.  Forward psychiatry sought to integrate psychiatric practice into front line 
medicine in order to limit losses from inevitable psychiatric casualties, getting soldiers 
out of beds and back to work by treating them as early and efficiently as possible.40  One 
of the main barricades to rolling out this program—which sought to make psychiatry a 
standard part of military medicine and personnel organization—were the deeply held 
taboos and scepticism that existed around psychiatry and discussions of abnormal mental 
health.  Tackling these taboos about psychiatry’s legitimacy as a medical practice was 
crucial to using forward psychiatry to address what the military termed variously as 
“combat fatigue,” “combat exhaustion,” or “operational fatigue.”41  Getting personnel to 
accept the normalcy of fear and learn techniques to manage its effects became an 
imperative of military efficiency and one of the significant motivators for adopting film 
into military psychiatric policy.  The ability to sell a version of useful psychiatry through 
media campaigns became a hopeful site for institutional modernization and was 
promulgated widely in books, pamphlets, television programs, radio, and films.42  
Psychiatrists Lieutenant Colonel Louis L. Tureen and Major Martin Stein wrote in a US 
Army Medical Bulletin from 1949: 
[D]elay in psychiatric treatment causes a preventable loss of manpower. 
Thus the nature of psychiatric disorders, as well as the basic task of every 
military medical installation—the restoration to effective duty of as many 
soldiers as possible—makes it imperative that psychiatric casualties be 
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handled quickly and expertly…  Audio visual aids can set the stage by 
quickly creating a receptive emotional tone.43 
Many military psychiatrists, including Tureen and Stein, hoped that films could be 
enlisted to teach people to recognize, diagnose, and treat the psychological effects of war.   
These shifts in psychiatric orientation from marginal to mainstream populations, 
palliative to curative models of care, and mental illness to mental health were nurtured by 
the uptake of psychiatry into military practices.  Beginning with screening and forward 
psychiatry, the integration of screens and moving images into psychiatric technique was 
integral to both providing the tools that enabled them, and disseminating new ideas to 
wide audiences.  The discussion that follows in subsequent chapters will show the 
process by which these techniques became an essential element in facilitating the changes 
in military psychiatry introduced here.   
 
1.3. Focus of study/Research Methodology 
This study’s primary focus is on the films made and/or used by the American 
military in conjunction with psychiatric practice or policy, including instructional and 
narrative films, experimental moving images made specifically to be screened as part of 
treatment and clinical experimentation, and re-purposed combat footage.  These films 
were projected during recruitment as aids to psychiatric evaluation, during training 
sessions as prophylaxis, during active duty as therapy, and as part of veteran re-
integration programs and their civilian counterparts.  This dissertation analyzes both the 
ways that the films create and circulate within discourses about mental health, and how 
therapeutic film practices coincided with the mandates of their institutional settings.  In 
doing so, I propose that military psychiatric film played a substantial role in shaping 
powerful and enduring ideas about mental health in a historical moment where a vast 
segment of the public was encountering these ideas for the first time. 
Developing a comprehensive picture of the practices of military psychiatrists 
during wartime—in particular their use of films—is not a straightforward task.  Many 
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military documents are classified; practices differ from psychiatrist to psychiatrist and 
were often improvised; films do not always survive.  However, in addition to critical 
ground work provided by historians of psychiatry and military, military documents 
housed at the National Archives, official publications from the psychiatric discipline and 
the military itself have been invaluable sources for filling in this picture. 
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) was one of the institutions that 
grew and changed utterly as a result of the wartime investment in psychiatry.44  The APA 
was the largest professional organization for working psychiatrists in the United States. 
The way that this organization represented its own work and that of its members in the 
pages of The American Journal of Psychiatry, thus provides a crucial resource for 
understanding how psychiatrists positioned their work and research vis a vis institutional 
constraints, trends in the discipline, and the larger public.  William Menninger, who 
served as head of the Neuropsychiatry Department in the latter years of the war and went 
on to become the president of the APA, published prolifically during the years critical to 
this study.  And while he rarely mentions film use specifically, his articles boasting about 
the growth of the discipline and its importance to both the war effort and the stability of 
post war society (both locally and globally), help to understand some of the ideas held by 
one of the most influential psychiatrists of this era and how they inflected both military 
and postwar policy.  Apart from a few wartime psychiatrists who specialized in the use of 
film as a clinical aid and therefore wrote a couple of articles with more comprehensive, 
synthesized information (namely Elias Katz and Howard Rome), mentions of film use in 
a therapeutic context had to be isolated out of documents that were generally much more 
wide ranging in scope.  Alongside more targeted searches for mentions of film use in a 
variety of psychiatric and psychological publications during and just after the war period, 
every issue of The American Journal of Psychiatry from 1940 through 1947 was scanned 
in order to see how discourses of military psychiatry in the most general sense and then 
film use in the more specific sense were characterized during this period.   
Official military publications were also crucial in terms of both elaborating a 
general picture of military psychiatry, and also for tracking down official policy with 
respect to psychiatric film use and production.  I have scoured thousands of pages of 
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military documents including records and post mortems of psychiatric practice and 
protocol (Combat Psychiatry: Experiences in the North African and Mediterranean 
Theatres of Operation American Ground Forces World War II published by The Bulletin 
of the US Army Medical Department was particularly useful), medically-focused 
publications such as the Bulletin of the United States Army Medical Department, and both 
public and classified documents housed at the National Archives, from the Department of 
Neuropsychiatry in the Surgeon General’s Office, and the Adjutant General’s Offices for 
the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
Putting together a comprehensive list of all films used for psychiatric purposes by 
the military is almost impossible.  Due to the nature of their production and circulation, 
and the informal way in which they are often included in documents, the titles of films 
might vary from one mention to another, or a film slated for production might be 
included in an article written by a psychiatrist acting as a consultant that was never 
actually made.  Film titles used for psychiatric purposes were often found in bulletins 
announcing a new film, in an article written by a psychiatrist who found a particular film 
interesting or useful, or updated lists of “army films on medical subjects.”  In this way, a 
partial list of films was patched together that could be verified by cross-referencing 
against the catalogue of films produced by the military during World War II at the 
National Archives.  The films themselves sometimes surfaced in online archives, in the 
National Archives, or not at all.  While it definitely would have been preferable and more 
interesting to be able to see all of the films that were used within the military psychiatric 
apparatus, it was more significant to this project’s thesis to be able to contextualize them 
by analysing the ways they were discussed by the people using and circulating them.  I 
have taken specific mentions of film use in military psychiatric practice and/or the films 
themselves, and mapped them along significant trends in disciplinary thought and 
military policy in order to show that the films are not merely odd or interesting objects, 
but instruments of a larger web of policy and practices. 
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1.4. Intellectual/Disciplinary Context 
This dissertation is an exercise in film history that is invested in questions of 
governance and labour—specifically, the institutional procurement of labour through 
discourse management as well as training and therapeutic apparatuses.  The dissertation 
aligns itself with film studies scholarship that is interested in questions of utility, which 
often means examining unglamorous films that do hard labour whether teaching, 
informing, or trying to influence their viewers.  It is less interested in artistry than in 
questioning how films become indispensable objects in systems of institutional 
production and circulation that work to shape discourse, policy, and practice.  While there 
are dozens of studies on Let There Be Light (1946)—a film with a famous director that 
was ultimately seen by very few people, there are virtually none on Introduction to 
Combat Fatigue (1944)—an institutional film seen by millions of soldiers.  This study 
joins the ranks of film scholarship that take unglamorous films seriously to better 
understand how they become sites in which meaning and inordinate power has been 
enacted and negotiated.   
Efforts to use film and media to manage populations—in this case, to shape and 
direct how people thought about mental illness—should not be confused with any direct 
or coherent results.  This is not a story about results.  This dissertation does not try to 
understand what effects films had on their viewers or their efficacy in making them better 
soldiers.  It does not suggest that the US military should have better represented gender or 
issues of mental health, nor does it focus on the mental health of soldiers in order to 
obscure their deep complicity in the atrocities of war that traumatize, most significantly, 
the non-military communities subjected to them.  And finally, it is not a story of a 
conspiracy authored by a group of unified and organized elites brainwashing the minds of 
hapless soldiers. This is an examination of how and why films and techniques of 
visualization were used as tools of institutional efficiency and discourse management.  In 
doing so it works to contribute to the ongoing mapping of media’s role in techniques of 
military power and social scientific mechanisms of labour governance. 
Film scholars interested in psychoanalysis and narrative studies have long 
invoked various concepts of the human mind, “madness,” and psychiatry/psychology in 
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relation to cinema, especially commercial Hollywood films.  There is substantial 
psychoanalytic film scholarship that has looked at popular post war film texts in order to 
better understand how power dynamics around mind, gender, and subjectivity operate in 
the cultural imaginary represented and figured by these texts.  A notion of “the gaze” as 
refined by feminist psychoanalytic theories often critique scopophilic relationships 
between medical practitioner and patient in films, sometimes bridging them to a 
Foucauldian understanding of institutional structures in which the power of this gaze is 
mobilized and internalized.  Janet Walker’s “Couching Resistance: Women, Film, and 
Postwar Psychoanalytic Psychiatry” uses readings of Hollywood films The Three Faces 
of Eve (1957) and Tender is the Night (1962) in order to demonstrates a link between 
psychoanalytic film narratives, and discourses of “re-adjustment” and conformity in post 
war American psychiatry.  She makes the case that postwar psychoanalysis promoted its 
capacity to adjust patients to the status quo, equating mental health for women with an 
adjustment (or re-adjustment) to patriarchal social norms.45  Kaja Silverman’s reading of 
The Best Years of Our Lives (1946) in Male Subjectivity at the Margins analyzes 
depictions of the historical trauma experienced as a result of WWII.  She focuses 
specifically on depictions of what she calls the “male castration” of veterans (their social, 
romantic, and physical failures) who she claims were no longer capable of reentering the 
dominant fictional modes after their return from war.46   
While these psychoanalytic approaches provide insight into psychiatric themes 
and discourses that made their way into popular post war film texts, this study’s focus on 
the institutional dimension of cinema and the mind means bringing in different models of 
analysis.  Questions of medical practice and institutional power are foregrounded, 
inspired by scholarly work in the areas of visual culture, media history, history of the 
social sciences in the management of publics, and particularly “useful cinema,” which, as 
Haidee Wasson and Lee Grieveson write in their introduction to Cinema’s Military 
Industrial Complex, reflects  
The growing interest in thinking about cinema less as an art or commercial 
entertainment and more as a deployment of particular technologies, forms, 
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practices, and spaces that have coalesced as “cinema” to forward 
particular social, economic, and political objectives.47 
William Friedman Fagelson’s article “Fighting Films: The Everyday Tactics of World 
War II Soldiers,” and his dissertation “Nervous out of the Service: 1940s American 
Cinema, Veteran Readjustment, and Postwar Masculinity” also focus primarily on 
Hollywood cinema, but it is contextualized by extensive research into its reception by 
soldiers in service, and intersections of institutional and public discourses around veteran 
mental health.  Issues of representation, particularly masculinity, are a key issue at stake 
in this and other film studies texts that focus on analyzing film narratives about and 
watched by soldiers in this era.  Eric Smoodin’s Regarding Frank Capra: Audience, 
Celebrity, and American Film Studies 1930 – 1960 examines how Capra’s films were 
screened in institutional settings including the military and prisons.  Smoodin shows that 
the films operated as tools of institutional management, with particular representations 
onscreen meant to procure desired effects from viewers relating to concepts such as 
masculinity or citizenship.  His chapter on the Why We Fight series of documentaries 
famously produced by Capra for the US military shows that these effects were not simply 
left to chance.  The military developed a sophisticated apparatus of film reception study 
in the hopes of “accomplish[ing] nothing less than chang[ing] the ways that certain 
populations thought and lived.”  Smoodin frames this within a larger phenomenon 
occurring during World War II, in which “the cinema became part of a medicalized 
discourse of education and persuasion,” reflected in the mid-century vision of 
technologies and techniques that could make both teaching and learning more efficient.48  
Smoodin’s work maps out how these films played a role in the increasing power of the 
social sciences as a source of expert discourse concerning the management of publics via 
mass media.  This study builds on his work by expanding beyond Capra’s films to 
include the family of films and techniques of visualization deployed by the military’s 
psychiatric apparatus.  I also argue, in a reversal of Smoodin’s formulation, that 
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representations of masculinity, while undeniably forming part of these film’s pedagogical 
strategies, were always subservient to the task of making labour more efficient, with the 
effect that such representations were sometime uneven.  I return to this issue below. 
Beyond being crucial sources of data, histories of the social/medical sciences—in 
particular Alison Winter’s Memory: Fragments of a Modern History, Ellen Herman’s 
Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts, Gerald N. 
Grob’s From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America, and Fred 
Turner’s The Democratic Surround—provide invaluable models for critical 
historiography.  These histories use meticulous archival research in order to show the 
complex interactions among important actors in the social sciences, their work and ideas, 
and the powerful institutions that facilitated the policy and public discourses that they 
contributed to or contested.  Using their work to trace particular social/medical scientists 
in this history nuances my analysis of larger intellectual trends and also allows a greater 
specificity when mapping out which actors rose to institutional prominence and the ideas 
they brought with them.   
Grob and Herman’s histories provide an overview of disciplinary and institutional 
developments, such as the growth of the American Psychiatric Association, and the 
debates and mandates that accompanied its major changes in leadership.  They also 
identify links between certain prominent military psychiatrists and the establishment of 
private and government-supported institutions and policies.49  Herman’s painstakingly 
researched history documents how “military conflict offered psychologists unprecedented 
opportunities to demonstrate the practical worth of their social theories, human sciences, 
and behavioural technologies in making and shaping public policy,” and examines the 
role of psychological experts in a range of policy-oriented positions including 
psychological warfare and public and military morale.50  While Herman’s text focuses 
primarily on psychology, the work done by military psychiatrists, particularly their 
clinical work with the mental health of soldiers, is integral to this history. 
Winter and Turner’s work trace the role of media within their respective histories, 
and both demonstrate parallels between the way that certain media were understood and 
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emergent models of the human mind.  Turner’s The Democratic Surround looks at how 
certain aesthetics and understandings of media and communication were mobilized 
during wartime and the postwar period as tools for fostering a particular kind of 
“democratic” personality.  He describes the logic of the “democratic surround” as an 
aesthetic that privileged the suturing of multiple screens or images together by viewers, 
which was believed to act as a kind of pedagogical tool, and even therapy, that could 
rebuild psyches fractured by the pressures of modernization.51  Turner pays attention to 
the institutional power of a class of social science experts who were called upon by 
museums, government, military, and philanthropists to provide insight into the “problem” 
of the public and engineer solutions that could foster the right kind of “democratic” 
personality.  The democratic surround became an ideal model of how the mind should 
work in a cluttered media landscape, weaving together information from a variety of 
sources in order to produce rational, democratic opinions and autonomous, democratic 
subjects.  
Alison Winter’s article “Film and the Construction of Memory in Psychoanalysis, 
1940-1960,” and her book Memory: Fragments of a Modern History look at the ways that 
memory and film were conceived of in mid century, showing that the films used and 
made by psychiatrists during World War II reveal an understanding of memory that is 
itself film-like in its function.  She shows how the promulgation of narcosynthesis and 
other wartime psychiatric techniques lent themselves both to portrayal in film (as a 
teaching/training tool), and comparisons to film, as if memory were a kind of internalized 
film reel.52  In his book Swift Viewing: The Popular Life of Subliminal Influence, Charles 
Acland observes that “innovations in media provoke[ ] new understandings of, and new 
ways to think about the working of minds,” and he documents this phenomenon in 
popular fears and fascinations with subliminal influence that emerged as people 
negotiated the “liminal zones” created in the overlaps between mind and new media.53  
While this project does not map out any unified model of the mind-as-media elaborated 
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by military psychiatrists, it takes inspiration from these histories in order to show the 
mutually constitutive relationship between psychiatric media practices and 
understandings of the mind. 
Scholarship that uses a visual culture approach to medical/scientific film and 
media covers important ground on the relationship between visual technologies and 
medical experimentation.  Kirsten Ostherr’s Medical Visions: Producing the Patient 
through Film, Television, and Imaging Technologies, Lisa Cartwright’s Screening the 
Body: Tracing Medicine’s Visual Culture, Tom Gunning’s “In your Face: Physiognomy, 
Photography, and the Gnostic Mission of Early Film,” and cognate works examine the 
visual technologies incorporated into scientific and medical practice beginning around the 
turn of the century and popularized by figures such as Jean-Martin Charcot, Étienne-Jules 
Marey, and Edweard Muybridge.54  With an emphasis on the relationship between the 
operators of the cinematic apparatus and its subjects, Cartwright’s Screening the Body, 
considers examples of the scientific application of visual technologies from the early 20th 
century through the 1940s as characteristic of a medical-cinematic gaze, which she 
analyzes as a form of Foucauldian surveillance.  Others in the field have characterized 
these kinds of technological uses more generally as part of the increasing 
biomedicalization of technological society.55  Cartwright and other scholars have also 
done work on films made during World War I by military psychiatrist, Dr. Arthur Hurst, 
to observe patients and better understand—or as she argues, discipline—the unruly body 
of psychiatric patients.  My study takes up this history and further considers the cinematic 
apparatus not only as a tool for surveillance in knowledge production, but also as an 
instrument of discourse management and treatment.  Using films to communicate ideas 
about mental health to military personnel (chapter 2) in effect worked to make mental 
health visible and thus something that could be monitored within the military’s 
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surveillance apparatus, while performance-based treatments appearing on film (chapter 3) 
taught practitioners to use these treatments furthering the institutional linkages between 
visibility and desired mental health outcomes.   
Cartwright also writes of struggles that arose from trying to find ways to integrate 
film into neurological practice, and the discovery that they were best used for teaching: to 
model signs of a disease to students and other researchers.56  She makes a fairly brief 
note, almost in passing, that an attempt was made to use films to create a kind of 
ontological order in the confusing world of mental disease, using them to encode 
distinctions between a disease’s provenance in “The Neurological Cinematographic 
Atlas” created in 1944.57  This mention of the use of film as a medical tool for creating 
order and ontological distinctions is an important insight that this dissertation builds upon 
by looking at how integrating visual technologies into the psychiatric treatment of 
otherwise ‘invisible’ diseases was directly related to the rationalization and 
systematization of the discipline in service of military mandates. 
An important scholar that this project uses to address this link between visibility 
and desired institutional outcomes is anthropologist Audra Simpson.  In Chapter 3, I 
frame patients’ visual displays of distress in treatment as a performance of trauma that 
signals to the psychiatrist that their techniques are working.  The concept of a 
performance of trauma takes inspiration from a talk given by Simpson in 2015 titled 
“Reconciliation and its Discontents: Settler Governance in an Age of Sorrow.”  In this 
work Simpson considers the Truth and Reconciliation Commission initiated by the 
Government of Canada, proposing that the performative nature of official 
“reconciliation” paired with the ongoing reality of violent indigenous dispossession 
presents “a simultaneous affective and extractive mode” of address that attempts to 
“make a break from a grievous past.” 58  She states that the spectacle of reconciliation 
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includes among other elements, performances of indigenous emotion that purportedly 
signal a “moving forward” and attempt to settle the unsettled co-existence of the colonial 
state and indigenous claims to sovereignty.  Simpson acknowledges the fact that these 
moments of official recognition on the part of the government can be extremely 
meaningful and healing for individuals participating in the event, as cathartic treatments 
likely were for many soldiers.  But she is simultaneously wary about the symbolic value 
that can institutionally extracted from a performance of emotion in terms of signalling 
closure and a contract fulfilled.  Simpson’s thinking has been very useful in helping me to 
articulate my interpretation of the institutionally useful nature of the visual performances 
of trauma solicited by techniques such as narcosynthesis.  I do not claim any kind of 
equivalence between the experience of military soldiers and that of violently dispossessed 
indigenous people, however.  The military has often been one of the most aggressive and 
violent means the state has used to dispossess Indigenous people of their land and lives, 
and state warfare is often a blatant act of taking control of land and resources.  While 
acknowledging the important difference between the subjects engaging with Canada’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and soldiers of the US military undergoing 
psychiatric treatment during World War II, I hope that using Simpson’s work to point to a 
similar technique of institutional power contributes to its ongoing documentation and 
critique. 
The institutional turn in cinema studies has generated scholarship that influences 
my approach to analyzing the discourses presented in the films themselves and how they 
are further framed by institutional circulation and discourse.  Using an analytical model 
of the institution, scholars have described how moving images have been deployed to 
promote particular visions of citizenship,59 productive labour practices,60 and the 
modernization and preservation of institutional structures themselves.61  An institutional 
perspective allows scholars to map flows of capital and power that determine how and 
                                               
59 Anna McCarthy, The Citizen Machine: Governing by Television in 1950s America 
(New York: New Press, 2010). 
60 Lee Grievson, “Visualizing Industrial Citizenship” in Learning with the Lights Off: 
Educational Film in the United States, edited by Oregeron, Orgeron, and Streible, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
61 Haidee Wasson, Museum Movies: The Museum of Modern Art and the Birth Of Art 
Cinema (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005). 
30 
why particular films are made, distributed, and shown in specific times and places.  In 
their introduction to the anthology Useful Cinema, Haidee Wasson and Charles Acland 
use Tony Bennett’s concept of “useful culture” as a tool that institutions deploy in the 
service of reproducing themselves and achieving particular ends.  In this formulation, 
cinema becomes a “body of films and technologies that perform tasks and serve as 
instruments in an ongoing struggle for aesthetic, social, and political capital.”62  They 
argue that attending to the “institutional location and deployment” of all genres of 
cinema, in addition to other forms of analysis, is the best way to develop a full picture of 
their lives in the public sphere and the power dynamics that play out within it.63   
Editors Devin Orgeron, Marsha Orgeron, and Dan Streible of the anthology 
Learning with the Lights Off: Educational Film in the United States, remind readers that 
one of cinema’s first and most powerful mythologies—that of its function as a “universal 
language”—was seized upon by the educational sector who spoke of moving images as 
able to engage and instruct anyone, including those who might not be able to access other 
educational tools.64  Acland has documented the efforts of various professional groups 
and social scientific researchers to modernize the classroom using audio-visual tools of 
all kinds.  He shows how their work was often motivated by the belief that technologies 
could eclipse the slow, labour intensive practices of conventional pedagogy, optimizing 
them and producing a public better able to navigate the mass media environment.65  
Though the motivations propelling the making and dissemination of educational moving 
images should not be construed as sinister by nature, a look at the institutional 
frameworks structuring them often reveal contests between vested interests vying to set 
the terms of the debate, for example the increasing ties between educational film and the 
military-industrial complex during the Cold War.66  Lee Grievson’s essay in this 
collection poses explicit concerns about incursions into the public sphere by institutional 
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films made by the Ford Company, who used film to educate an immigrant working class 
in the kind of conduct and ideology that supported productive labour and a particular 
functioning of political economy.67  Military psychiatry was also very interested in 
capitalizing on film and images as a “universal language” that could bypass issues of 
mixed levels of literacy in screening and training procedures.  This project builds on 
these discourses of compulsory film viewing in institutional contexts as a tool for 
education and the optimization of labour.  The US’ extensive civilian military in WWII 
created an ideal testing ground for experimentation with film, and supervision by 
psychiatrists provided further validation of these experiments and their results. 
Tracing cinema’s creation, distribution and projection provides insight into 
institutional structures for education, military, civic culture, governance, health and 
welfare and helps us to understand how powerful actors or groups promote their interests 
and in turn shape the both the discursive and civic terrain that the broader public 
encounters.  It does not, however, determine how a public engages with these terrains, as 
there is no straightforward relationship between institutional use of cinema and its 
impacts on a viewing public.  Cultural studies scholarship since the 60s has rejected the 
idea of a passive audience, insisting that a group’s experiences and interpretations of 
cultural objects are multiple, complex, sometimes subversive, and always inflected by 
personal histories.  Viewer agency and complexity is one part of why this study does not 
presume to make any claims about the efficacy of the film practices it analyzes.  And 
while there are surely interesting things to be discovered by pursuing these films from a 
Reception Studies perspective, the focus here is on how power shapes the horizon of 
possibilities with which agency must contend.  As Anna McCarthy writes in her 
introduction to The Citizen Machine: Governing by Television in 1950s America, the best 
way to grasp the power that the televisual medium was able to amass as a tool for 
promoting discourse and practice, is to go to the source of its power:  “If television 
helped implant the neoliberal program in United States political culture, it was not via its 
influence upon the so-called masses, but rather in its capacity to galvanize elites.”68  
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McCarthy speaks of “soft governance” to describe the power wielded by those who could 
shape television’s content.  She quotes Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose when she writes:  
If the world in which we live is not “a governed world so much as a world 
traversed by the ‘will to govern,’ fueled by the constant registration of 
‘failure,’ the discrepancy between ambition and outcome, and the constant 
injunction to do better next time,” this does not mean that the will to 
govern is impotent or ineffectual, particularly when it comes to the 
distribution of resources and access to power.69 
While films in the US military during World War II were used within a more 
authoritarian, or hard governance, structure than post war television sponsorship, 
governance takes on more diffuse characteristics when militaries seek to manage not only 
bodies but minds by influencing ideas and opinions via psy sciences, human resources, 
and communications, as Rose writes about in Governing the Soul.  Rose’s Foucauldian 
history of the psy sciences in governance lays out a genealogy in which “the extension of 
the apparatus of government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries should be 
understood in terms of a rise of a political rationality conceived in [terms of the 
‘condition of the people’],” extending to the “petty details of personal life.”70 
Using techniques of efficient sorting, management, and treatment, the psy 
sciences claimed that even soldiers who could no longer face battle could either be cured 
or put to work in an alternate capacity.  The traditional stoic soldier who had to be brave 
and smart was being recast to include anyone—even the “cowardly,” as modeled in films 
such as Shades of Gray (1947) and Combat Exhaustion (1943) where goofy, timid, or 
somewhat effeminate characters are shown to be amenable to military labour thanks to 
psychiatric intervention.71  Ideal models of masculinity were still an important military 
media export, but psychiatry and psychology opened up new territories for labour 
accumulation by suggesting that it could make anyone a useful worker, even those who 
didn't conform to the ideal.  While they engendered more humane treatment by 
promoting discourses of empathy, the powerful narrative of inclusivity promoted by the 
psy sciences that “every man had his breaking point,” ultimately benefited military 
productivity with the possibility of recuperating soldiers suffering from trauma.  For this 
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reason, this study pays careful attention to issues of labour management in the hopes of 
contributing to scholarly conversations on how and why ideas of mental health have been 
knit together with those of efficiency.  Public and institutional discourse that posits ideas 
such as “wellness,” “self-care,” “self optimization,” and “productivity” as the 
responsibility of late capitalist workers often contribute to obscuring important questions 
of structural inequity. 
In his article “Affectivity, Biopolitics, and the Virtual Reality of War,” media 
theorist Pasi Väliaho shows that many of these same themes of productivity continue to 
be at play in contemporary uses of media in military psychiatry.  Väliaho looks at ways 
that the Virtual Reality program developed to treat soldiers returning from Iraq with 
PTSD is surrounded by evolutionary/technological discourses that prioritizes 
neurological questions about how the brain reacts to fear over questions of how and why 
the soldiers themselves experience fear.  Väliaho pays careful attention to the 
evolutionary/bio-medical framing of human memory, affect, and distress that keeps the 
discourse squarely focused on the human brain’s neurological response to fear and how 
best to adapt these responses for optimal function in a military context.  He also considers 
how the Virtual Iraq program works together with video game play (the game Full 
Spectrum Warrior was originally built as a tactical simulation-training platform and 
subsequently became the source from which the graphics used in Virtual Iraq were 
derived), creating a multi-phased use of media, beginning with video games and 
simulation training in order to prepare personnel for duty, and ending with therapy aimed 
at returning the subject to a functioning state.72  Using digital images as “stress 
inoculation training,” or de-sensitization tools, these images work to disarticulate mental 
images of combat from emotional responses through repeated exposure.73  He critiques 
what he calls the “military-scientific and media technological assemblages” for using an 
evolutionary discourse in order to manage and evade questions of state-sanctioned 
violence and expansionism that generate the conditions of war and military activity.74  
My own project follows a similar line of critique in that it is not directly critical of 
wrongdoing on the part of military psychiatrists who were most often working to try to 
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help their patients.  Instead what I hope to show, and I draw on Väliaho’s work as a 
model, is that the fact that psychiatric techniques using media and visual tools were 
developed under military imperatives.  This meant that questions of efficiency and the 
procurement of military labour at all costs trumped other kinds of questions about mental 
well-being and warfare, eclipsing them with the discourse of experts. The principle of 
“desensitization” used in Virtual Iraq is more technologically sophisticated, but is 
ultimately a direct descendent of some of the therapies discussed in chapter 3 of this 
dissertation.  Väliaho’s work shows that the neurological discourses surrounding these 
technologies have also become much more sophisticated but ultimately follow the same 
basic lines of argumentation. 
 
1.5. Chapter Summary 
The first chapter will put a new treatment on well-known films and technologies: 
inkblots and propaganda films, re-contextualizing them as tools of a growing discipline 
trying to prove its might with modern innovations.  This chapter looks at the widely used 
image interpretation tests and identifies them as a technique of visualization that 
psychiatry used to sort and classify minds.  They were also used as proof that the 
discipline’s innovations could keep pace with those of other medical sciences, giving 
military psychiatry a foothold that it parlayed into more substantial responsibilities.  This 
chapter also examines writings of military psychiatrists on morale, paying particular 
attention to theories that it could be cultivated using communications media (film in 
particular), thus increasing the labour capacity of soldiers.  Some psychiatrists theorized 
that moving images could create mental inoculation against fear by populating the mind 
with images that would prepare it for combat, resulting in the Fighting Men series of 
training films.  Frank Capra’s famous Why We Fight series is examined here as training 
films representative of an alternate model of the mind that relied on rational arguments to 
stimulate morale. 
The second chapter will look closely at films that might easily be considered 
oddities from a different era: didactic mental health films for soldiers, officers, and 
doctors.  This chapter situates these films as the buttresses of a solidifying infrastructure 
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of military psychiatry, selling the concept of “forward psychiatry” to all levels of military 
personnel as a proposed aid or solution to the messy problems of “combat fatigue.”  
These films tried to normalize the taboo topic of mental health in ways that were 
specifically tailored for their audiences.  In the process, they became a technique of 
visualization, making mental health “visible” so that it could be monitored within 
existing frameworks of military surveillance.  The rhetoric of the films is examined to 
reveal how they sought to teach military personnel principles of self-management (for 
soldiers) and the management of others (for officers and medics) in a comprehensive 
program for conserving military manpower. 
The third chapter will introduce films and techniques of visualization that were 
being used to help standardize clinical therapeutic practice in order to deal with the vast 
numbers of soldiers with neuropsychiatric diagnoses for whom there were very limited 
therapeutic resources available.  Narcosynthesis and its “performances of trauma” are 
examined as techniques of visualization for making treatment efficient, providing clinical 
military psychiatry with tools to grow into a practice that could be administered en 
masse.  Films were used in experimentations to further standardize and automate 
narcosynthesis and other procedures of clinical treatment.  Experts used films as 
privileged tools that could trigger desired behaviours from patients in a variety of ways, 
including desensitization or exposure therapy, and subliminal soothing.  Experiments to 
try to automate aspects of therapeutic treatment led some psychiatrists to treat the mind as 
a kind of media object in itself from which memories could be accessed by applying the 
right cinematic and/or narcotic prompts. 
The fourth chapter will look at how film mediated psychiatry’s expansion into 
post war public discourses on mental health beginning with issues of veteran re-
integration.  It takes film texts known variously as a work of great authorship and out 
dated propaganda, and frames them as competing voices in a politics of post war power 
consolidation.  The rhetorical differences between John Huston’s famous film, Let There 
Be Light and the subsequently released Shades of Gray are examined to demonstrate the 
changing needs of military psychiatric communications as the war came to an end.  
Finally, the chapter looks at an episode of The March of Time on “The Nation’s Mental 
Health” in order to show the continuation of logics developed throughout the war to 
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argue for the continued relevance of psychiatry.  “The Nations’ Mental Health” proudly 
displays visual technologies and other practices as proof of the discipline’s modernization 
and its ability to administer to mass publics.  Psychiatrists are positioned as experts who 
are necessary for manufacturing the commodity of mental health in a post war climate.   
The chapters of this dissertation parse out the various uses of films—as training, 
preventative psychiatry, therapeutic treatments, and discourse management—by mapping 
them along stages of a military career, from candidate screening and training through 
military service and discharge.  These films and the history they are part of were vastly 
influential, shaping the wartime service and recovery of millions of men, and bolstering 
policies and procedures developed to administer the operations of a vast civilian military.  
Film and visual technologies formed part of the modernization of both the military and 
psychiatry—a modernization that enabled them to argue for their enduring 
indispensability for stabilizing society as it reconstructed itself after the war.  This study 
uses the writings of psychiatrists and military officials as found in military documents 
and disciplinary journals from World War II, along with careful attention to the rhetoric 
delivered by the films themselves, in order to place and understand a select and unique 
body of films within the institutional apparatus of military psychiatry.  In doing so, it 
sheds new light on familiar films, re-frames unknown and seeming oddities as part of a 
powerful apparatus, and uncovers artefacts—sometimes bizarre—of this institutional 
logic in full fruition. 
 
37 
Chapter 2. Cataloguing and Fortifying the Military 
Mind: Image Tests and Training Films 
 
Image interpretation tests were used widely by the US military during World War 
II as an aid to psychological/psychiatric screening and the sorting of draftees and recruits.  
They were also used as an evaluative/diagnostic aid in military medicine.  While a 
relatively simple component of a much larger system, these tests often acted as a 
gateway, introducing psychiatric and psychological concepts to a vast population of 
American citizens for the first time.  The consequences of this mode of introduction were 
sometimes trivial, but more often they were deeply significant, sorting people into 
occupations, branding them with diagnoses of mental illness, and gatekeeping access to 
military leave and/or therapeutic treatment.  The psy sciences were relatively unknown to 
most American citizens before the war, and were introduced via the military not simply 
as social/scientific disciplines, but ones shaped by military imperatives.  Image 
interpretation tests were a visual technique used to simplify complex disciplinary tasks 
and concepts (communicative and diagnostic).  In doing so, they also helped to bind the 
psy sciences to concerns for efficiency in modern labour practices in the US during a key 
phase of the disciplines’ growth.75  
The success of these image interpretation tests in simplifying various tasks acted 
as convincing evidence that visual techniques could be gainfully deployed and expanded.  
Putting film to work in the ever-expanding military-psychiatric apparatus was a natural 
follow up, and they were used to help train men’s minds for war in a variety of ways.  
Films were used in training to teach soldiers to understand concepts including how fear 
affects the mind, exposing them to sights and sounds that were also intended as a kind of 
sensory conditioning to reduce the shock of combat.  They were also used to boost their 
morale (and therefore their fighting capacities) by making them feel part of a group and 
                                               
75 The “psy sciences” is a term borrowed from Nikolas Rose that he uses to denote 
psychiatry, psychology, and psychoanalysis, specifically in the context of a Foucauldian 
analysis of their use in institutional systems of management.  See the introduction of this 
project for a more fulsome discussion of Rose’s theoretical framework in this study.   
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encouraging feelings of camaraderie, they also addressed them as rational thinkers, 
presenting them with socio-historical arguments about the validity of the war effort.   
This chapter explores some of the foundational elements of the military’s 
psychiatric apparatus, including: the widespread use of image-based interpretation tests 
and the films that were used during soldier training in an attempt to sort, classify, and 
prepare men’s minds and fortify their morale as they headed into war.  Relying heavily 
on primary evidence from military documents and psychiatric journals published during 
and shortly after the war, this chapter begins by looking at the image based tests that 
formed a foundational part of both the growth of the military psychiatric apparatus and 
the introduction of psychiatry to many Americans.  The second section follows by 
looking carefully at military and psychiatric writings and theories around morale, how it 
was understood to function as a tool for making soldiers better workers, and how media 
(and film in particular) was understood as a vital source for cultivating it.  Received 
histories describe screenings of Hollywood features and other films for entertainment as 
the way that films were used to generate morale. This chapter shows that while this is 
true, it is only one part of a bigger picture.  Morale, while an ambiguous concept, was not 
taken for granted as something that could be won simply by showing Hollywood movies.  
Military officials and psychiatric experts collaborated on filmmaking policy and 
techniques in order to create and screen films that would target the mind in particular 
kinds of ways in order to generate morale during soldier training.  They also did 
extensive testing and monitoring of soldier-viewers in order to understand what kinds of 
impacts these screenings were making.  The third section examines some of the films 
used to these ends, looking at how they sought to generate morale and the models of 
mind that they presupposed.  The final part of this chapter looks at some conclusions that 
were drawn from military-based studies assessing of the power of film as a tool for 
indoctrination and increased performance, and how these conclusions fed back into the 
larger culture of using film and media to support military goals of efficient soldier labour.   
Eschewing any consideration of the actual impact of these tests and films on the 
minds of their viewers, this chapter’s focus is on understanding the growth and 
implementation of an institutional logic regarding the usefulness of still and moving 
images in order to sort, diagnose, train, and motivate its workers.  The perceived 
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universality of the relationship between images and perception supported the hope that 
psy sciences could use images to somehow “unlock” the secrets of the complex human 
mind to both understand it better and make it work in particular ways.  These techniques 
sorted people into categories that were institutionally useful.  For example, interpreting 
an inkblot image by choosing the answer, “C) a butterfly,” may brand someone 
“neurotic,” thus leading them to be dismissed or placed in a particular range of jobs.  
Nicholas Rose, writing on the integration of the psy sciences into the Foucauldian 
management techniques of institutions, claims that the tools of assessment are 
constitutive of new subjectivities.  He writes that: 
The psychological assessment is not merely a moment in an 
epistemological project, an episode in the history of knowledge: in 
rendering subjectivity calculable it makes persons amenable to having 
things done to them—and doing things to themselves—in the name of 
their subjective capacities.76 
Still and moving images, in recruitment screening and training, began the process of 
teaching millions of people to understand their minds in ways that were institutionally-
shaped and beneficial.  Upon this foundation, visual technologies became part of 
increasingly elaborate methods of training, surveillance, diagnosis, treatment, and 
discourse management that would grow with the military psychiatric apparatus.  This 
chapter therefore works to make clear that from the beginning, image technologies were 
put to work supporting the most important goal of military psychiatry: making labour 
efficient.   
 
2.1. X-rays of the Mind: Psychiatry and Personality Testing 
At the beginning of World War II, it was still uncommon to actively include 
psychiatrists in front-line medical facilities and overarching medical policy. While their 
role grew substantially in both of these areas as the war wore on, they did in fact occupy 
a very important, if circumscribed, role right from the outset of the US’s involvement.  
                                               
76 Nicholas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (London: Free 
Association Books, 1999), 8. 
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By screening recruits and draftees for signs of “nervous or mental defect,”77 psychiatrists 
and psychologists acted as gatekeepers to military service, filtering out inappropriate 
candidates and positioning themselves as managers of the health and robustness of the 
fighting forces.78  In administering the enormous tasks of screening inductees and using 
psychological profiles to help sort soldiers into ranks and occupations, psychiatrists and 
psychologists became essential to the modernization of the military and key players in 
testing and adopting new techniques and technologies in order to carry out their tasks.  
Chief among the techniques used for screening were image-based personality tests that 
seemed to offer a standardized shortcut to wading through the murky territory of past 
traumas and buried neuroses. 
First World War officials had built many psychiatric hospitals to treat the vast 
number of soldiers who were discharged for mental trauma, and military administration 
hoped to avoid repeating this costly manoeuvre as they headed into the Second World 
War.  The initial policy, initiated by Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan, the military’s director of 
psychiatry at the beginning of the war, was to prevent future costs of treating psychiatric 
casualties and disability pensions for incapacitated veterans by rigorously screening new 
recruits and draftees with psychological tests and interviews.79  Historian of American 
psychology, Ellen Herman writes, 
It was widely publicized that psychiatric services and disability payments 
to veterans had cost close to $1 billion between 1925 and 1940 and it was 
estimated that each psychiatric casualty during World War II would cost at 
least $30 000.  If only screening were properly implemented, "human 
values will be conserved; a great burden of unnecessary disability 
compensation payments, hospitalization expenses, and pensions will be 
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avoided--and the prestige and effectiveness of psychiatry, greatly 
expanded.”80 
Screening tests were used extensively, and promised benefits to multiple parties: in 
addition to reducing expenses for the military, they could bring prestige to the psychiatric 
profession by providing services essential to the military’s basic functioning, and they 
could be used to convince a war-weary public that the army was modernizing and would 
fight this war efficiently and with lower risk than in the past.  Historian Ben Shephard 
writes that military psychiatry director “Sullivan and his collaborators saw a way of 
finally establishing … that psychiatrists had a ‘scientific ability to predict mental 
breakdown.’” And Sullivan’s vision of a psychiatrically engineered Army “containing 
only young men who would not be ‘broken down by any strains or stresses’ also appealed 
to politicians trying to persuade a sceptical and isolationist nation that the United States 
should once again involve itself in Europe’s wars.” 81  With all the unsuitable candidates 
screened out from the beginning, only “boys who won’t break down” would be sent to 
the front. 
The prevailing belief in American psychiatry at this time was that neuroses and 
mental illness were conditions determined in childhood, and were largely a result of 
rearing and early traumatic experiences.  Ego strength and emotional maturity were 
thought to be achieved by progressing successfully through various stages of 
independence from one’s parents.82  This meant that many psychiatrists believed that men 
who suffered psychiatric breakdowns in war did so because of a pre-existing condition, 
and effectively screening these men out was therefore imperative.  “Normal” and 
“healthy” men were presumed capable of withstanding the conditions of warfare.  
Historian of psychiatry, Hans Pols writes in “War Neurosis, Adjustment Problems in 
Veterans, and an Ill Nation” that 
Army policy dictated that soldiers diagnosed with mental illness had to be 
discharged and repatriated as they were suffering from preexisting 
conditions for which there were no effective treatments.  Psychiatrists 
argued that the stresses of warfare might enable these conditions to come 
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to the surface, but those stresses could not be considered to be the causes, 
in this way, ‘the Army can well be called the proving ground of man.’83 
There were therefore enormous expectations placed on pre-screening as a mechanism for 
nipping future problems in the bud and leaving only men who were assumed to be 
resilient to the stresses of war.  In order to fulfill these expectations, a correspondingly 
powerful administrative/technological apparatus was developed to apply psychological 
and psychiatric testing on an unprecedented scale.  
The formidable testing apparatus that emerged was meant to 1) protect the 
military from neurotic men by identifying them and screening them out, 2) effectively 
sort the remainder of men deemed acceptable into appropriate positions, and 3) diagnose 
the conditions of soldiers who nevertheless suffered from combat stress despite their 
initial screening.  It was through personality testing that millions of Americans were 
exposed to the psy sciences for the first time.  The testing apparatus administered sixty 
million standardized tests to twenty million individuals in 1944 alone, using the results to 
accept or reject registrants and draftees and to help place them into the “two thousand 
occupational and training categories that existed in the military.”84  These first two 
applications exposed the largest number of people to personality testing (over 15% of the 
male American population had taken some form of military personality test by the end of 
the war), though a significant subset of these people experienced ongoing testing as part 
of their treatment and diagnosis within the military medical system.85   
Despite the initial hope that aggressive screening (up to 1 in 4 draftees were 
excluded for psychiatric reasons) would eliminate the need for psychiatric treatment, the 
war wreaked havoc on the minds of American soldiers.  Between 26 to 40 percent of all 
medical evacuations were diagnosed as psychiatric, with numbers jumping as high as 
75% in particularly brutal campaigns.86  Faced with this reality, efficient psychiatric 
testing technologies became imperative to expedite the diagnosis and treatment of 
soldiers suffering from combat stress, and this third application of personality testing 
became a significant part of military medical operations, extending psychiatry’s reach 
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beyond merely screening and sorting to treating soldiers.  The administration of tests on 
all three of these fronts formed a crucial part of military operations and was done by 
neuropsychiatrists and psychologists trained by the military in the procedures of 
screening, sorting, and treating soldiers.87  The type of psychiatric and psychological 
knowledge that was being generated and introduced to the vast cohort of Americans 
taking these tests placed military goals at the centre of its mode of operation, profoundly 
shaping the way these disciplines were both practiced and proselytized. 
The breadth and expansion of the testing apparatus was in part thanks to the 
ability to sell image-based interpretation tests as an efficient and modern alternative to 
the labour-intensive work of building psychological profiles through individual 
interviews.  Given that an induction centre psychiatrist might see hundreds of draftees a 
day, and a psychiatrist at a military hospital generally had thirty minutes to interview, 
diagnose, and treat an incoming patient, image-based testing was an appealing, if not 
necessary, alternative.88  Tests using visual prompts such as the Rorschach Ink Blot test 
and the Thematic Visual Apperception tests were the most widely used for psychological 
testing in the army, implemented for all three applications. These tests were particularly 
important when considering a soldier for leave or treatment due to psychiatric trauma.89  
In addition to working with paper-based visual technologies, screens were also integrated 
into testing by projecting images to rooms full of test takers, and moving pictures were 
eventually incorporated into the arsenal of testing methods as innovations were sought to 
further modernize the process.  The military’s heavy investment in psychiatric and 
psychological testing as a form of preventative medicine and systems optimization 
entrenched these image-based technologies and techniques as standard practice.  These 
visual technologies became an inextricable part of the psychiatric discourse millions of 
enlisted Americans encountered for the first time via the military, and initiated an 
ongoing web of psychiatric mediation connecting their jobs, their minds, and the 
institution for which they worked.   
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2.1.1. Rorschach/Harrower-Erickson 
A standardized version of Rorschach’s ink blot test was developed for use with 
military personnel in 1943.  Called the Harrower-Erickson test, it was the most widely 
used diagnostic tool in their repertoire.  As comically-cliché as ink blot tests appear now, 
they were a trusted workhorse in military personality testing for screening, placement, 
and diagnostics in military hospitals.90  The Rorschach/Harrower-Erickson test shone 
when people needed to be diagnosed quickly and/or in large numbers, as they were easy 
to administer using paper and pencils or projected onto large screens at the front of a 
room for large groups.  The test was exactly as we might imagine it, with black mirror-
image ink splotches and strange, psychologically-leading multiple choice interpretations 
to go with each splotch.  An article from a 1944 issue of The American Journal of 
Psychiatry titled “The Use of the Multiple Choice Group Rorschach Test in Military 
Screening,” describes the test thus: “a series of photographic slides of the standard 
Rorschach cards […] presented on a screen before a group of individuals … [who] select 
responses which best fit [their] interpretation.”91  Sample multiple choice answers 
available for a test-taker to chose for a particular splotch were: 1) two birds, 2) meat in 
the butcher shop 3) two men 4) part of my body 5) red and black 6) a coloured butterfly 
7) spots of blood or paint 8) monkeys hanging by their tails 9) a red bow tie, or 10) 
nothing at all.92  Scoring the answer key not only allowed administrators to assign a 
numerical mental health rating to test-takers, but the particular answers chosen also 
served as indices that presumed to reveal the nature of the “neuroses or psychoses” that 
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he or she may possess, from depression to homosexuality to schizophrenia.93  Often 
projected on a screen to hundreds of recruits simultaneously, the ink blot test was a visual 
diagnostic tool that offered administrators a method of cataloguing the minds of draftees 
quickly.   
  
Figure 1: Two of the inkblot images from the Harrower-Erickson Rorschach test used by the US military 
during WWII.   
https://openpsychometrics.org/tests/HEMCR/ 
 
Figure 2: Group Rorschach used by the Office of Strategic Services for selection purposes during WWII.   
Reprinted from Herman’s The Romance of American Psychology, p. 45.   
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2.1.2. Thematic Apperception 
The Thematic Apperception Test was a visual technology used when a more 
detailed psychiatric/psychological profile was needed, including situations such as officer 
screening and placement.  Using a similar image-interpretation schema, this “story-telling 
test” contained 30 images of people and objects in unclear scenarios that were used to 
solicit free-association narrative interpretations from test takers.94  In this “test of the 
imagination,” a subject would be shown the series of pictures and asked to make up a 
short story about each one.95  Though they were more labour-intensive than the 
Rorschach, the Thematic Apperception tests were still valued when “speed and efficiency 
were of utmost importance,” and they were therefore prized in military psychiatric 
hospitals when “it was not possible to keep the patients […] for any great length of 
time.”96  While they were often praised for their speed, these image interpretation tests 
were also hailed as an innovation because of their ability to “reveal” the mind of the test-
taker without the troublesome work of having patients explain themselves.  Military 
psychiatrist Major Elliot Jacques, who did studies on soldiers in psychiatric hospitals 
using the Thematic Apperception Test, remarked on its ability to reveal hidden parts of 
the mind, describing it as an “x-ray of personality,” that “allows the clinician to peer into 
the emotional life of his patient.”   
 
Figure 3: Images from the Thematic Apperception Test 
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Figure 4: Officer candidates taking a Thematic Apperception Test, England 1944.   
Reprinted from Ben Shephard’s A War of Nerves, p. 230. 
Stating that image interpretation tests could open up a kind of visual access to the 
mind is a common trope in psychiatric literature from the time, with favourable 
comparisons to the x-ray being made by multiple psychiatrists.  Military psychiatrist Max 
Hutt draws a parallel between Rorschach tests used for personality assessment and the x-
ray’s contribution to modern medicine, suggesting that both technologies offer important 
new insights that had been previously unavailable.  He writes:  
Just as the modern surgeon insists on painstaking x-ray examination, the 
contemporary psychiatrist requires personality examination [using the 
Rorschach test] for more accurate diagnosis and for more efficient and 
more effective therapeutic efforts.97 
Visual technologies, in this case the interpretation tests, were a significant component of 
both modernizing and systematizing psychiatric techniques during the war by generating 
a kind of visual shorthand that could presume to cut through the chaos and make sense of 
the “neurotic” patient’s mind.  They could also be used to show that like doctors, 
psychiatrists too, had tools that made their work more efficient and precise, generating 
comparisons to breakthroughs in modern medicine. 
Building on the success of the image tests, and further entrenching the rhetorical 
connection between images seen by test takers and the corresponding “snapshot” of their 
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mind revealed to psychiatrists, a number of films were also made in order to experiment 
further with this diagnostic method.  Head of the navy’s psychiatry division, Dr. Howard 
P. Rome, wrote frequently and enthusiastically on the benefits of using film technologies 
in psychiatric contexts.  In an article published in 1945, he noted that films were used 
experimentally “as a projective diagnostic and screening test[] in a manner similar to 
Murray’s thematic apperception and Rorschach’s ink blot tests.”98  He described the films 
as deploying an image-interpretation schema, depicting a variety of ambiguous scenarios 
that were meant to generate psychiatrically revealing narratives from test-takers.99 
In addition to acting as an experimental tool for testing for more ambiguous 
markers of mental health, film reels were used extensively by the air force’s Aviation 
Psychology Program as a way of testing for particular aptitudes and qualities including 
reflexes, depth perception, and navigation skills.100  A precursor to the contemporary use 
of video game simulators to gauge a recruit’s mechanical skills and coordination, films 
with titles including “Estimation of Relative Velocities Fest,” and “Flying Orientation 
Test,” were used in the selection and training of men as part of the Aviation Psychology 
Program’s “Motion Picture Testing and Research.”101  While these kinds of 
proficiency/placement tests occupied different territory from the ones that aimed to 
identify and classify characteristics of mental health, they constituted a very significant 
branch of the extensive testing apparatus that applied still and moving images to the 
modernization of military technique. 
The image interpretation tests (Rorschach and Thematic Apperception) hold a 
particularly powerful place in the genealogy of visual techniques used in military 
psychiatry, and in the growth of the discipline itself, because they were so easy to use.  
This, coupled with the confidence that they worked, enabled their widespread uptake in 
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military operations, which subsequently brought psychiatric ideas to new territories and 
sizable new audiences.  According to Dr. William Menninger—who succeeded Dr. Harry 
Stack Sullivan as head of the military’s Neuropsychiatric Division—“the two image-
interpretation tests bore the largest burden of psychiatric [and clinical psychological] 
testing in the army,”102 and a 1947 Bulletin of the United States Army Medical 
Department confirms that the Rorschach “psycho-diagnostic” test was administered far 
more than any other personality test.103  The image-interpretation tests were believed to 
be so effective at classifying their takers that several articles written in the Bulletin of the 
US Army Medical Department both during and after the war suggest that Rorschach and 
Thematic Apperception Tests alone should suffice for testing both an individual’s 
intelligence and personality. As a result, the military’s special training program in 
Neuropsychiatry devoted a full 10% of its training time to clinical psychology and the 
administration of these two image interpretation tests.104  Their widespread use and 
popularity made these visual interpretation tests the point of introduction for most 
military personnel with psychiatric ideas and techniques.  They also taught many newly 
trained psychiatrists to experiment with the expedient power of images in diagnostics and 
treatment, as we will see throughout the chapters of this dissertation. 
While wildly popular, the tests were not immune to debate and criticism.  That is 
to say, they did not constitute an unchallenged trajectory from “inefficient” and 
“unmodern” to “efficient” and “modernized.”  Psychiatrists disagreed on the most 
convenient method to administer the test, and on the effectiveness of the test itself.  Some 
seemed to prefer the screen and slide projector, while others wrote that “the method of 
presentation, demanding a darkened room and slide projection apparatus, renders the test 
more cumbersome than the usual simple paper and pencil test.”105  Users debated the 
viability of the tests as useful diagnostic tools, with some psychiatrists declaring them 
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clumsy and unsuitable for effective diagnostics.106  Despite flaws and detractors, 
however, the image interpretation test reigned supreme, a fact that likely owes more to 
the military’s priorities of efficiency and convenience than to their actual powers to 
decode and categorize the human mind.     
Even after the Second World War, there are instances of military psychiatric 
research using Rorschach and Thematic Apperception Tests in studies with far-reaching 
consequences.  One large-scale study undertaken at the Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center in 1957 used them to try to identify which US Prisoners of War had collaborated 
with Korean forces, using the results “to determine what kind of adjustment [P.O.W.s] 
had made to prison camp and to determine whether there were systematic differences 
between men who had collaborated and men who had not.”107  This example is 
suggestive of not only the enduring legacy of the image interpretation tests used en masse 
by the military during the Second World War, but also of the high stakes that the 
interpretation of an inkblot or a strange mise en scène might hold for test takers. 
 
2.1.3. The Burden and Opportunity of Diagnosis  
The overall impact that these image tests had on the lives of their takers and their 
larger social context was not insignificant.  At the level of the individual, psychiatric 
evaluations sorted troops into jobs, determining their fates and careers, and before that, 
the tests allowed or denied entry into the forces.  This latter effect placed the stigma of 
mental illness on a vast population of Americans who were burdened with it when they 
returned to their families, communities, and employers after being rejected or discharged 
from the military.  Indeed, this label was handed out so frequently by military 
psychiatrists and psychologists that concern was expressed via both public and military 
channels that the country was facing a crisis of “emotional disturbance” that “constituted 
a threat to national security.”108  The early enthusiasm for using screening to prevent 
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future breakdowns meant that at the beginning of the draft in particular, up to 1 in 4 men 
were deemed ineligible for duty due to psychiatric reasons.109  Even though standards 
relaxed as the demand for men grew, a study done in 1946 calculated that “700,000 men, 
or 16.5 per cent were rejected from the draft for reasons included under the heading of 
nervous or mental disorders … and [ ] an additional 582,000 or 13.8 per cent were 
rejected for reasons that included mental defect.”110  Contemporary historians put these 
figures even higher.  Herman writes that a total of 1,846,000 recruits were rejected for 
“neuropsychiatric” reasons, constituting 38% of all rejections.  Even those who made it 
past the initial screening were not immune to the burden of a neuropsychiatric label of 
abnormality.  By the end of the war, 2.5 million individuals were either disqualified or 
discharged from military service as a result of “psychological malfunction,”111 and this 
volume of powerful classifications was facilitated by the enlisting of images in making 
personality tests deliverable on a mass scale.  
Labeling so many Americans with “psychological malfunction” had 
repercussions.  It generated frustration, questions, interest, and curiosity, all of which in 
turn fed a further expansion of psychiatric and psychological discourses throughout 
popular media.  The military’s use of personality testing opened a gateway that flooded 
psychiatric tropes and ideas onto both military and civilian audiences.  And while the 
volume of diagnoses presented a problem in the eyes of the public and the military, it 
presented an opportunity to psychiatrists to double down on promoting the value and 
validity of their profession.  Psychiatry was to be the answer to the national crisis of 
“emotional disturbance,” distancing the discipline still further from its rarefied origins in 
asylums for the insane and on therapy couches for the very rich.  Director of the 
Neuropsychiatry Division in the Surgeon General’s Office, and one of the most active 
proselytizers for the expansion of psychiatry into everyday life, William Menninger, saw 
this opportunity and seized it enthusiastically.  He made an address to a graduating class 
of psychiatrists where he boasted that:  
                                               
109 Shephard, 200. 
110 Winfred Overholser, “Mental Hygiene,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 90 no. 4 (Sept. 1946): 259. 
111 Herman, 88. 
52 
Almost from the outset, the number of rejections at the induction centers 
for neuropsychiatric reasons called for explanations.  The increasing 
number of men discharged for psychiatric reasons has called for more 
explanations.  The result has been a well-trodden path to our little division 
in The Surgeon General’s Office by writers from magazines and 
newspapers, from radio stations and motion picture producers.  Our Public 
Relations Officer has told me that … neuropsychiatry probably receives 
more newspaper column space, and he receives more inquiries about it 
than any other branch of The Surgeon General’s Office.112  
The smug pleasure with which he boasts that neuropsychiatry has become the media’s 
darling was due in part to the fact that earning a place in the Surgeon General’s Office 
had been a hard-won struggle.113  As noted at the beginning of the chapter, one of the 
reasons that personality testing had become such an enormous part of screening draftees 
was because the military had hoped to avoid having to cope with psychiatric casualties in 
war altogether, and thus avoid the cost and hassle of developing an infrastructure for 
psychiatric care.  It was initially hoped that psychiatry would play a small part in the war, 
basically creating a filter so effective that it would make the discipline ultimately very 
small and surgical in its precision.  The inevitably high rejection rates that this filter 
produced allowed ambitious psychiatrists such as Menninger to capitalize on the resulting 
interest in psychiatry to show how important and necessary psychiatry was to addressing 
the mental health “crisis” revealed by these tests.  The growing interest in the mental 
health of military personnel and draftees was leveraged in order to claim that psychiatry 
had an important role to play in the management of the military, and the nation’s mental 
health.   
Beyond a smug excitement about people’s interest in psychiatry, Menninger’s 
quote makes a couple of noteworthy points: first, that the initial investment in pre-
screening psychiatry did not pre-empt or avoid psychiatric casualties, and eventually 
proved to be an insufficient strategy.  Second, that the military-based encounter with 
psychiatric language and classifications was migrating into popular media as people 
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negotiated its meanings, creating a demand for further knowledge of the field and an 
elaboration of its concepts.  Menninger’s first point was the basis upon which military 
psychiatry stepped beyond pre-screening and into the realms of training and combat, a 
move which in turn reinforced the second point: the increasingly complex relationship 
between military psychiatry and popular media created a context in which psychiatric 
language and classifications were further normalized and rationalized as its increasing 
use continued to garner wide discussion.  Into this complex relationship between 
psychiatry, military personnel, and the public, the explanatory power of film stepped in as 
a tool that could be used to provide information while furthering psychiatry’s expansion.  
In the following section we will look at how film became increasingly incorporated into a 
“massification” of psychology via training films that were made to teach soldiers basic 
psychiatric information and/or build resilience to the stresses of warfare.  
 
2.2. Morale, Preventative Psychiatry and the Power of Media   
Despite initial attempts to weed out men of “weak mental fiber” as a catch-all 
solution to the problem of psychological war casualties, the numbers of psychiatric 
discharges remained alarmingly high, and as a result, the prevailing view that dominated 
at the beginning of the war—that one could clearly distinguish between “weak” and 
“strong” men—shifted to the widespread recognition that every soldier had his “breaking 
point,” and an etiology of neuroses shifted from “predisposition” to “stress.”  This was a 
key shift in the epistemology of American psychiatrists in general, who in response to the 
numbers of men suffering from combat fatigue and demands of expediency from the 
military, began to understand their domain to be shifting from the treatment of the very ill 
(predominantly in asylums) to the development of tools and methodologies for keeping 
“normal” populations from becoming ill in the first place.  The idea of preventative 
psychiatry, which had not functionally existed prior to WWII, became a newly hopeful 
site for institutional modernization and expansion where moving pictures and visual 
technologies might be able to influence vast and diverse populations.114  Along with this 
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change, motivation, more commonly referred to as “morale,” came to be seen as the 
crucial factor keeping men’s minds fit to fight, and psychiatry became a foundational 
language with which issues of morale were negotiated. 
Morale was a privileged (if indefinable) form of institutional currency, with 
military officials calling for its production, and psychiatrists, sociologists, and other 
social scientists working fervently to find the key to its manufacture.  Many hoped that 
the persuasive power of media could be used to build morale and thus potentially defend 
against both flagging public enthusiasm for the war, and the development of psychiatric 
casualties in soldiers; two phenomena that many psychiatrists and military officials 
claimed were inextricably linked.  The American Journal of Sociology published a pre-
war survey of mental hygiene studies in the US, in which H. Warren Dunham writes: 
[Once] the morale of a nation at war develops to the extent that all persons 
… become aware of the major aims of the war and have a role to play in 
carrying it out, the personality breakdowns … will diminish in frequency.  
… Thus a high national morale serves as a preventative device for the 
development of certain types of mental afflictions.115 
The fixation on morale as a form of preventative psychiatry necessary to win the war, and 
the hope that media could help to build this morale, cemented the integration of 
psychiatric ideas into films and media aimed at soliciting enthusiasm for war from 
viewers, civilian and military alike.   
Using media to generate enthusiasm for  (or despite) war took many forms.  The 
British army did early experimentation with “hate camps” where soldiers were given 
“lectures on hate” illustrated by images of dead and starving people followed up with 
battle training to the soundtrack of loudspeakers blasting German music meant to rile 
soldiers up for fighting while also desensitizing them to the future stresses of combat.116  
American counterparts to these experiments were conducted by Psychiatrist Julius 
Schreiber, who set up a program that used “broadcast news, lectures, a weekly column, 
and therapy groups to inspire the maximum amount of animosity in U.S. troops toward 
fascism.” 117  These experiments were significant in influencing the thinking and future 
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work of the people who administered them, but as large-scale training strategies they 
remained marginal as it was generally concluded that negative stimulus fostered 
depression and a lost ambition to fight. The cultivation of positive morale became the 
more common tactic to defend against the development of war neuroses, though the 
question of how to cultivate it remained a complex puzzle of moving parts.118  Chief of 
Staff, Lieutenant General George C. Marshall understood morale to be such a crucial tool 
for keeping men (and the nation) in fighting form that he established the “Morale 
Branch” in 1941 to “bring forcibly to the attention of all Army personnel and 
Commanders the extreme importance of the matter,” writing that, “since it is rather 
intangible, it requires considerable initiative, authority, and imaginative thinking.”119  The 
military subsequently brought many different minds to bear on this project, funding 
diverse research in the social sciences on how media and communications could be used 
to build national morale in the American citizen and optimize the morale of the fighting 
forces.  
Fred Turner’s history of American communications from the war period to the 
60s, The Democratic Surround, maps some of the remarkable diversity of thinkers 
working on issues of morale in the United States before and during the war, from 
anthropologists to philanthropists, communications scholars to designers.  Expat 
Germans who had fled Nazi Germany, such as Walter Gropius, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy, 
and Alfred Bayer worked on multi-media propaganda exhibits to try to foster “democratic 
personalities” in viewers, while Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Paul Lazarsfeld 
worked on the Princeton Radio Project to study the psychological power of mass media 
on its viewers.120  Lazarsfeld and others also analyzed foreign broadcasts and created 
intelligence reports on military intentions and enemy morale.121  Many of the leading 
social scientists of the time were brought together on the Committee for National Morale, 
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writing papers and reports on how to foster a particularly American “democratic” morale, 
with an emphasis on logical thinking and psychological maturity.122  Indeed, by the end 
of 1942, “the majority of social scientists in general and social psychologists in particular 
were in government service either full time or acting as consultants on particular 
projects.”123  The work done by these social scientists, psychologists, artists, and 
journalists in groups such as the Committee for National Morale, and the Institute for 
Propaganda Analysis, forged powerful links among the study of morale, psychology, and 
media; links that military psychiatrists would work to further strengthen throughout the 
war.   
Parallel to the cohort of civilian specialists working on issues of morale, military 
psychiatrists, too, sought to understand the key to generating morale as a tool for making 
military labour both efficient and self-motivated.  Military psychiatrist M.S. Guttmacher 
wrote in 1946:  
There was a time when war was a simple affair requiring little training and 
indoctrination, and almost no specialization…  It was assuredly not true of 
WWII and it will be even less so of the scientific warfare of the future.  
Armies are no longer made up of masses of men, but of individuals 
welded together into special functional units.  The individualized approach 
to the soldier’s adjustment has come to stay.  For the present, and at least 
for some time in the future, a well integrated organization composed of 
psychologists, social workers, and specially trained medical officers will 
be essential to the full efficiency of the army …  An effective program of 
education in personal adjustment to army life is a valuable method of 
preventing psychiatric disorders among trainees.  Training aids, 
particularly in the form of specially made motion pictures, are vital to such 
a program.124  
Both military and civilian researchers agreed on a three-part equation in which a) the 
success and morale of the larger group is premised on b) the performance of the 
psychologically-motivated individual who has c) been positively influenced by media.  
Military psychiatrists staked their claim in the morale-rush as experts who could deliver it 
by focusing on the mental health of the individual soldier.  An official Manual of Military 
Neuropsychiatry was published in 1944 for doctors who were being trained by the 
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military to be psychiatrists for wartime service.  In it, psychiatrist Captain John Appel 
includes an entry on “Psychology and Morale,” writing:  
[A]bility plus will to fight [is the] formula of warfare. … One hears 
endlessly that food, rest, promotion, letters from home, furloughs, fan 
dances, and ping pong balls must be provided to troops in order to keep up 
their morale.  Yet, in another sense, it could be said that morale is actually 
the will to keep fighting, to keep working, without these things.125 
Finding a way to make soldiers work willingly in the absence of such frivolities as food, 
sleep, and ping pong balls was a tantalizing goal, promising prestige to anyone who could 
achieve it.  Appel makes the case that psychiatrists were uniquely poised to build morale 
as a form of preventative psychiatry, not only keeping men working, but preventing 
collapse from the strain of doing so. 
By his position on various boards, medical and disciplinary; by informal 
discussions with line officers; by lectures to troops; by submitting reports 
and suggestions to the special service division, where they may be 
incorporated into movies, radio programs, and posters; … [the psychiatrist 
can] supply the stimuli which arouse and maintain mental health.126 
In order to secure their position as consultants in the crucial fight for morale, psychiatrists 
enlisted film as privileged aids among the innumerable other media and non-media 
objects put to this task.127 Psychiatrically- and psychologically-informed training films 
and communications became key resources that could help in this endeavour, as was 
repeated tirelessly by psychiatrists championing the benefits of preventative psychiatry.  
Military training and morale building agencies were brought together to “condition 
people to accept difficult situations,” and “rally motivation, and therefore good mental 
health,” using motion pictures to prepare them for what they would encounter 
overseas.128 As an article in a 1945 issue of The American Journal of Psychiatry writes:   
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Can it be said that the strongest defense consists in the most active offence 
in the battle of nerves as it does in other battles?  That here, also, fore-
warning is fore-arming? … Pre-conditioning by simulating battle 
conditions as employed in the Army to toughen men has proved its value, 
and sound films for this purpose have been found useful.129 
Explosives, artillery, and other munitions used in elaborate mock-battles during training 
were understood to help condition soldiers for combat, acting as a form of sensory 
inoculation.  Here again, films suggested themselves as efficient and cost-effective 
supplements to live munitions exercises by exposing soldiers to the sounds and sights of 
battle while saving the risk and resources of mock battles. 
 
Figure 5: Photograph of an explosion during a training exercise.  “Simulated Battle.”   
Image from “Photographs—Hospitals and Facilities and Personnel;” Neuropsychiatry; RG 112 SGO/A 
730; Box 1317, NACP 
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The military’s Neuropsychiatry Department produced several proposals for the 
production of “prophylactic films” by the Signal Corps for use in training.130  One 
document submitted to the Neuropsychiatry Department by two psychiatrists proposing a 
“Project for the Development of Psychotherapeutic and Prophylactic Films,” notes the 
high number of “neuropsychiatric casualties,” and the lack of neuropsychiatric officers to 
treat them, stating that trainees  
[A]re potential neuropsychiatric casualties whose breakdowns could be 
prevented by prophylactic psychotherapy, by building morale, and by 
eliminating irrational anxieties and presenting them with adequate means 
of coping with their problems.131   
It goes on to elaborate that “therapeutic and prophylactic films … [would be] morale 
building and hence prevent breakdown or the development or persistence of 
psychosomatic disturbances in those with organic illness or suffering from wounds.”132  
While the exact films described in this particular proposal were not made due to a lack of 
resources, other films were used to these ends.  With respect to inoculating soldiers to the 
sights and sounds of war during training, the series titled Fighting Men was made in 1942 
in collaboration with Army Ground Force Headquarters, and was screened extensively.133   
Further to using films as a form of battle preparation, the most famous training 
film series was made to protect mental health by giving rational arguments for why 
soldiers were being sent to war.  Frank Capra’s Why We Fight series, prior to its release 
as public propaganda, was initially produced as a morale-building training aid for 
soldiers.  In this capacity, the films were praised widely by psychiatrists who suggested 
that they be screened as often as possible (and were eventually deemed so effective that 
they should be distributed publically as well).  When Appel wrote the official post-
mortem of preventative psychiatry for the military review Neuropsychiatry in World War 
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II, he included a lengthy citation from a wartime report of a psychiatrist in the South 
Pacific Area:  
The ultimate goal of a very high percentage of personnel is to "get home," 
whether or not augmented by the thought "to get it over, and get home." 
… The overall problem of changing that goal from "to get home," to "win 
this War" or "to kill Japs" is a tremendous undertaking and involves 
changing of viewpoint in all ranks. It involves changing the trend of 
thinking even in the continental United States. Mail censorship indicates 
that mail from home does not promote the "win the war," "kill some Japs 
for me," "we're proud of you" note, but tends to increase nostalgia with the 
"wish you could be with us," "when are you coming home?" theme. Radio 
programs frequently carry the same note of nostalgic sentimentality. There 
is a preponderance of sentimental songs and love songs reaching 
popularity and being publicized and a dearth of good stimulating tunes 
such as marching songs for men to sing as they perform their duty. There 
is a great need for more education of the men by means of increased 
emphasis on orientation lectures. Greater emphasis should be placed on 
such types of moving pictures as "Divide and Conquer" and "Why We 
Fight." These latter are considered the best means at hand for education 
and orientation of the soldier, and their use should be extended and effort 
made to produce more of these films for showing to officer and soldier 
audiences. The soldier must know why he is fighting.134 
As the above quote and others in this section show, morale and the mental health of 
soldiers was located in a complex rhetorical and multi-medial web of training, 
encouragement, and education on issues of both psychiatry and the socio-political 
dynamics of the war.  Thus while psychiatrists asserted their position as specialists able 
to prevent casualties at the level of the individual soldier, they simultaneously lobbied 
aggressively for films and media that could be used to support their efforts, understanding 
media’s importance and power to reach people.  In a wartime memorandum to the 
director of the Morale Services Division from head of the Neuropsychiatry Division, 
William Menninger writes: 
The rate of nervous and emotional disorders among military personnel 
continues to be seriously high … on the basis of accumulated medical 
studies and reports from the field, this office believes that one of the most 
promising means of reducing this high rate of breakdowns and improving 
the mental health of military personnel in general lies in the dissemination 
of certain types of information … disseminated by the Why We Fight 
Films, Orientation kit, etc, but it is believed that an increased emphasis … 
                                               
134 Appel, “Chapter 14: Preventative Psychiatry” Neuropsychiatry in WWII   395. 
61 
and its constant repetition to both officers and enlisted men would be of 
great value.  … It is requested that insofar as possible, information of the 
types mentioned above be … disseminated widely and repeatedly to 
military personnel with whatever media is considered appropriate.135 
What is of primary interest for our purposes is that these statements reveal the 
institutional justification for making psychiatrically-informed films.  However, it is 
significant to note that the critically acclaimed—and now canonical—Why We Fight 
films were not only discussed as great works of cinema and public propaganda, but 
understood to be institutionally vital to the war effort by powerful members of the 
military organization for very specific reasons.  In the following section, we will examine 
the reasons these and other films—particularly the Fighting Men and the Why We Fight 
series—were “considered appropriate” preventative psychiatric aids to “reduc[e] the high 
rate of breakdowns” and “improve[e] the mental health of military personnel.”136  Morale 
was not simply a term that meant making soldiers “feel good.”  In the greater context of 
the war effort, morale was a strategic term, supported by the ascendant disciplines of 
psychiatry and social sciences seeking concrete formulas in order to strengthen their 
position as sources of expertise in the management of publics. 
  
2.3. “Fore-Warning is Fore-Arming:” Media Aids for Mental 
Hygiene  
The way that movies were used to bolster soldier morale can and should be 
understood in a few different ways.  Certainly the most thoroughly documented use of 
films in this respect was that of Hollywood features and other films shown to the troops 
as a form of entertainment.  “Entertaining the troops” in order to bolster soldier morale is 
an important area of military media history, as it was an undertaking of considerable 
scale that brought together powerful institutions, including Hollywood, the US 
government, and the military. Thomas Schatz’s formidable history of American cinema 
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in the 1940s, Boom and Bust, thoroughly examines the range of activities major film 
studios undertook during this period.  The book contains a short section on “Entertaining 
the Troops” that notes the deep imbrication of Hollywood, the Women’s Army Corps 
(WAC), the War Department, and the US military, as these institutions worked together 
to establish “the largest distribution and exhibition circuit in the world.”137  By 1945, 
Hollywood studios had provided the War Department with 1,941 features that were 
turned into a total of over 43,189 prints that were shipped out to military bases, outposts, 
marine vessels, and anywhere military men were stationed.  It is estimated that 
servicemen attended screenings of shorts and features for entertainment purposes at the 
rate of about 1.5 million per day.138  In his overview of this military-movie house 
network, Schatz notes that these films became part of the “everyday military routine,” 
and that they were “considered crucial to morale and [a] counter to the critical problem of 
battle fatigue,” though the analysis ends there and specificities of the relationship 
between morale and entertainment are presumed to be self explanatory.  139  
For work that is more focused on the activities of American studio cinema, it 
seems enough to note that the assumption that watching movies was good for morale had 
an enormous impact on the consumption, circulation, and production of wartime (and 
post-war) cinema.  Though, as we have seen in the previous section, when it came to 
understanding the relationship between film and morale, the military was not content to 
make assumptions, and there was no shortage of institutional research and speculation 
that went into understanding what morale was and how movies might improve it.  The 
military did not merely hope that watching films would help “battle fatigue”—a 
euphemism for extreme stress due to military service, now diagnosed as Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder—nor did they exclusively rely on films as a kind of simple idea of 
entertainment.  Indeed, my research leaves aside the well-studied question of 
“entertaining the troops” in order to look at films that were screened with more precise 
motivations.   
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Film scholars such as Eric Smoodin have begun to explore the institutional side of 
the relationship between films and soldiers, looking at the military’s experiments to 
understand how certain films were generating morale. Others, such as William Friedman 
Fagelson and historian Alison Winter have observed the range of films dealing with 
psychiatric/mental health subjects that the military incorporated into its screening roster 
as part of soldier training.  In the final section of this chapter, I draw on both of these 
lines of investigation in order to examine, not Hollywood features, but the films that were 
used during training with the express intention of arousing morale in specific ways in 
their viewers, using primary military psychiatric literature to show how these films were 
purported to work.  These military-made films were not watched by 1.5 million people 
daily, though they still boast significant audiences as they were used extensively in both 
military training and therapeutic treatment.  They were understood to be sophisticated 
media tools that could foster soldiers’ morale, not by keeping them entertained and 
happy, but by preparing their minds for war by conditioning them to battle stimulus, 
providing them with rational arguments as to why their sustained efforts mattered 
(appealing to the “democratic morale” the Committee for National Morale identified as 
desirable and uniquely American), and teaching them to recognize and understand basic 
psychiatric concepts related to fear, depression, and anxiety. 
 
2.3.1. Media as Mental Hygiene 
“Mental Hygiene” was a catch-all term used during the war to describe 
psychological/psychiatric/medical support and information given to soldiers in order to 
help them manage and cope with psychiatric difficulties encountered during service.  The 
mental hygiene unit of a given military division was essentially a mobile psychiatric 
clinic that would perform duties including the management of psychiatric outpatients 
from hospitals, evaluating and providing counsel to active soldiers, and setting up 
therapeutic activities and information sessions.  Most contemporaneous publications that 
describe the activities of mental hygiene units emphasize that almost all of their tasks 
worked towards the goal of preventative psychiatry—keeping soldiers’ minds fit enough 
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to fight.140  These units became key clearinghouses for psychiatric information distributed 
to troops during training and active duty.  Mental hygiene units delivered lectures, gave 
demonstrations, and showed films on adjustment problems likely to be faced by incoming 
soldiers.  By covering topics like psychosomatic disorders, personality deviations, and 
concepts such as “displacement, conversion, projection, and identification,” these 
materials sought to teach soldiers how to recognize the symptoms of incipient mental 
disorder in themselves or in others.141   
The self-management of emotions that mental hygiene films and lectures 
introduced to soldiers was part of the official policy passed in early 1943 that mandated a 
minimum of six hours of lectures on military psychiatry for every officer, with a 
minimum of three hours of mental hygiene training for enlisted men.  It was instituted 
that “all Army officers [should be given] some understanding of mental hygiene … in the 
hope that such knowledge would reduce the number of psychiatric casualties.”142  
Requiring soldiers to engage in prophylactic health measures sought to provide subjects 
with insight into the “psychosomatic dynamics of his syndrome,” and ease symptoms by 
way of sublimation and rationalization.143  The required 3 or 6 hours of mental hygiene 
training were often delivered in lecture format, but countless supplementary topics were 
made into short, instructional films.  In March 1945, director of military neuropsychiatry, 
William Menninger, proposed turning even the standard lectures into films to make them 
less boring and easier to remember.144  While the spectrum of topics covered in mental 
hygiene films was broad: everything from how to avoid venereal diseases while overseas 
to advising members of the Women’s Army Corps on how to maintain attractive figures 
while serving, many mental hygiene films ultimately sought to target the perplexing and 
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all-critical task of cultivating morale, defined variously through advice on healthy bodies, 
positive attitudes, good work practices, appearance, and safe sex.145   
A confidential memorandum sent to the Assistant Chief of Staff in December 
1944, set out a series of recommendations for “the prevention of psychoneuroses among 
the personnel within the Army.”146  The memorandum explicitly linked soldier morale to 
resilient mental health, writing: “Another approach to the problem of prevention is the 
attempt to increase the soldier’s motivation toward fighting the war, to bring home to him 
the degree to which he and his family were threatened by the enemy and to answer his 
questions about the home front.”  Much of the media used in the tasks of “increasing 
motivation,” “bringing home” the threat of the enemy, and “answering questions,” were 
the responsibility of the Information and Education Division of the War Department in 
the US government.  This division provided all manner of media for soldier education, 
including “motion pictures, such as the ‘Why We Fight Films’, [sic] news reels, radio 
programs, posters, pamphlets and [ran] the system of regular group discussion among 
troops throughout the Army known as the ‘Orientation Hour.’”  The military’s top 
psychiatrists were then responsible for overseeing how and what kind of information was 
distributed.  The memo on the “prevention of psychoneurosis” states that “major policy” 
adopted by the Information and Education Division for disseminating motivational 
information to troops was based on recommendations made by the Neuropsychiatry 
Consultants Division of the military’s Surgeon General’s Office, and that “the 
Neuropsychiatry Consultants Division has collaborated or acted as advisor in the 
production of films, radio programs, posters and pamphlets designed to induce healthy 
attitudes in troops.”  The policy governing production and content of military 
filmmaking—both by the Signal Corps and the War Department’s Information and 
Education Division, together comprising the most prolific makers of films during the 
war—were shaped directly by the theories that military psychiatrists were developing on 
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soldier morale and mental health, and how to influence them via media. Military 
psychiatrists effectively became a class of media experts. 
 
2.3.2. Training films 
Because the nature of generating morale in troops remained so broadly defined, 
the category of films used as psychiatric prophylactics was equally wide-ranging.  Many 
different publications, both in medical literature and official military literature, state that 
any film that can deepen a soldier’s understanding of their work and the circumstances of 
the war more generally can help to develop and sustain morale.  Despite the lack of 
specificity, there were several films and types of films that were distributed by the 
military expressly for such purposes, and were seen by a large cross-section of personnel.  
Different films targeted different aspects of morale building, revealing a co-existence of 
multiple models of motivation and how the mind worked.   
While the US military was producing its own psychiatrically informed films, a 
British film titled The New Lot (1943) was adopted for screening during training.  Two 
key series were made by the US military expressly for the purposes of training the minds 
and sharpening the resolve of soldiers, namely, the Fighting Men series, and Frank 
Capra’s aforementioned series of found footage films on the geo-political history leading 
up to the war, titled Why We Fight.  Other films shown on a more informal basis, but 
toward similar ends, were the bi-weekly Army-Navy Screen Magazine.  Each edition 
normally contained a short newsreel produced under Capra’s supervision, and a Private 
Snafu cartoon—the Warner Brother’s series of comedic, instructional cartoons featuring 
a bumbling private who does everything wrong in order to instruct soldiers to do things 
correctly.  The Army-Navy Screen Magazine (ANSM) episodes were produced from 1943 
through 1946, covering a wide range of topics that adapted with the ongoing war needs.  
While not conceived of as specifically therapeutic, ANSM functioned as morale-building 
more generally by being informational and addressing soldiers as members of a collective 
effort within the larger institution.  While films such as The New Lot, and the Fighting 
Men series remained basic staples of preventative psychiatry training films throughout 
the war, and seem to have been screened mostly in this context, the Why We Fight series 
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and ANSM, greatly exceeded the training context and were screened in many different 
circumstances, from mental hygiene lectures to nightly entertainment programs alongside 
Hollywood features.   
 
The New Lot 
Directed by Carol Reed, The New Lot is a short drama made for the British 
Directorate of Army Psychiatry that follows a group of five men drafted into the British 
Army.  With a classic odd-fellows narrative arc, five men from different class 
backgrounds, professions, and regions of England are assigned to the same training unit.  
They all have different reasons for feeling like they shouldn’t have been drafted into the 
army, and are disgruntled about being in service.  Scared, indignant, and generally 
incompetent, the group first struggles through basic training and tries various methods to 
escape or be discharged, and eventually learns to become a committed, efficient, and 
bonded unit through the trials and tribulations of military training and army life.   
The film’s approach to psychologically preparing viewers for training leans 
heavily on a social-identity model of morale as a contentment derived from 
camaraderie—from being on the inside of a group.  The film accomplishes this via the 
narrative of the odd fellows coming together and learning to appreciate each other’s 
differences and their endearing characters.  It also does so by having the film create a 
point of view that is sympathetic to the new recruit and what they are going through.  It 
does not rely on graphic or disturbing representations of war, but operates more as a kind 
and knowing-wink to the viewer, that says: “we know you don’t want to be here, but you 
will eventually come to appreciate what we are doing.”  A rather comedic portrayal of the 
rigours of basic training helps to position the film’s point of view as that of a friend on 
the inside, complete with the predictable tropes of an abrasive drill sergeant who is 
shown to be secretly kind when he arranges a two-day leave for a recruit who left his two 
motherless children with an unkind guardian, and a team of veteran sergeants who are 
outwitted by the once-bumbling unit in a tactical exercise.  The film’s encouraging 
message to its viewers comes again in one of the final scenes of the film that serves to 
demonstrate the conversion of the formerly inexperienced odd-fellows into a cohesive 
unit of trained soldiers.  On a free evening, the group goes to see a movie in town—a war 
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drama that one of them had seen before being drafted and had thought was very good.  
The soldiers use their newly gained knowledge to criticize the unrealistic elements of the 
drama, laughing and rowdily calling out the mistakes made by the actors.  The soldiers 
are shown to have become savvy viewers who can take pleasure in their confidence and 
knowledge.147 
Of interest when considering that this film was a morale booster whose screening 
was recommended by psychiatrists, is a scene where the troops find out they are about to 
be interviewed by psychiatrists to help determine what positions they are best suited to.  
In the privacy of their cabin, the troops complain bitterly about the “bunch of looney-bin 
doctors” who will be “plain ordinary nosey-parkerin” in their business. But in the end the 
group of trainees are won over by the psychiatrists who motivate them to achieve more 
than they had envisioned for themselves.  Skepticism about the “looney-bin doctors” 
throughout military personnel at all levels of service was one of the most significant 
hurdles that the psychiatric discipline faced in its institutional growth.  The tactic of 
confronting this scepticism by performing it in a training films appears first in the British-
made The New Lot, and, as we will see in the following chapter, re-appears in almost 
every other psychiatric military film made subsequently by the US military.  In The New 
Lot (and in all other films that contain this trope), despite the initial fear and dismissal 
expressed by other characters, the psychiatrists win over the skeptics, and are portrayed 
as intelligent, insightful, and able to motivate soldiers to work.   
 
Fighting Men 
The basic formula put forward in The New Lot of the character-driven narrative 
that follows one or more protagonist as they learn valuable lessons about military life and 
training, was also used in the American-made series of films called Fighting Men.  The 
Fighting Men series adopted a different style and tone, however.  Using voice over 
narrators to explain the significance of the action on screen, Fighting Men’s mode of 
address was less the camaraderie-building wink to the insider, and more a series of 
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cautionary “this is what you need to know” tales told from the point of view of seasoned 
veterans.  In this way, the “fore-warning is fore-arming” theory of preconditioning men 
to battle was literalized in the narrative.  The films were also produced in order to “fore-
arm” the nervous system of trainees.  In addition to a rational or social model of the 
mind, these films worked with the same premise as simulated battles used for training: 
they exposed soldier’s minds and senses to images and sounds of battle with the hope that 
this would begin to inoculate them to the shock of combat. 
Edmund North, a captain in the Army Signal Corps who produced the series of 
films, wrote an article for the Journal of the Society of Motion Picture Engineers 
describing the films and the rationale behind their production, demonstrating plainly that 
psychiatrists were shaping the activities of the Signal Corps.  He says that the conditions 
of “the mental or psychological side” of recruit training thus far had “left something to be 
desired.”148  As a result, 
Army Ground Force Headquarters decided that a series of films should be 
prepared that would serve, in a sense, as precombat conditioning. …  It 
was decided that these films, to be called the Fighting Men Series [sic], 
would not deal with techniques as most training films do.  These pictures 
were to drive home combat ideas.149 
As a form of “precombat conditioning,” the psychological approach was to generate 
morale not by promoting group satisfaction and camaraderie, but by inoculating the mind 
to fear by giving it a taste of what was to come.  North writes of the films that: 
[A]ctual combat conditions were to be simulated throughout and no 
punches pulled.  They were to be hard-hitting, as realistic as possible, and 
they were to be done in soldier language. …  These films have brought 
them as close to combat as a man can be brought without actually 
engaging an enemy.150   
The Fighting Men series covered a range of topics.  North’s article on the series lists six 
films, including Keep it Clean, in which the narrator is a disfigured soldier in hospital 
writing to his newly-enlisted younger brother on the consequences of not of keeping your 
gun clean, Crack That Tank, narrated by a seasoned “tank man” who gives a bar-room 
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pep talk to the viewer (addressed as a foot soldier) on the strengths and weaknesses of 
tanks and how to take one down.  Kill or Be Killed focuses on unlearning the concept of 
“fair play” as it is taught in civilian sport, and learning instead that war has no rules.  On 
Your Own, demonstrates how and how not to react when becoming isolated from the 
larger group. The last two are the unambiguously titled, How to Get Killed in One Easy 
Lesson, and the best known of the series, Baptism of Fire.  
Baptism of Fire is particularly interesting in this series for the fact that it alone 
directly names and confronts the subjects of fear and anxiety relating to a soldier’s 
experiences in battle.  North writes of the film that it was “the most elaborate” and that it 
“attempted to dramatize common battlefield psychoses.”  North contextualizes the film’s 
approach to this topic by citing “extensive research” that shows that all men experience 
fear during their first time in battle, and that many experience a form of initial paralysis 
he calls “battle shock.”  In its attempt to address the fears and anxiety that are likely to 
arise in a soldier’s first experience with battle, Baptism of Fire is an interesting departure 
from the rest of the films in the series, which for the most part, don’t explicitly propose 
ideas for how to prepare one’s mind for the traumas of battle.   
At the beginning of Baptism of Fire the protagonist has a conversation with a 
fellow trainee the night before being sent to battle for the first time.  His buddy tells him 
that he has been “trying to get my mind ready” by finding out as much as he can about 
“what it’s really gonna be like.”  Later in the film, the soldier pauses with horror over the 
body of a dead soldier that he encounters early in his first battle; he has a flashback to the 
conversation from the night before and a voice over of his thoughts repeat what his buddy 
told him: “your first battle your worst fight isn’t with the enemy, it’s with yourself.”  To 
this, he replies to himself: “how right you were.”  As the scene follows the soldier in real 
time, the only sounds are diegetic to the battle and those of the soldier’s thoughts as he 
encounters a series of harrowing experiences, attempting to depict what a viewer might 
hear and think in future battles.  The soldier’s thoughts repeat lessons that he would have 
theoretically learned in other films or in lectures about battle psychiatry.  After a close 
call with a German soldier, he asks himself: “Why couldn’t I stick my bayonet into that 
bastard?  I remember now, instructor called it ‘momentary paralysis.’  Why didn’t I think 
more about what they told me?”  During a second, and closer call, he acts on the lessons, 
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becoming more aggressive: “This is it.  Here it comes.  Kill or be killed.”  And when he 
makes the kill he muses, “Never thought I could do that—guess I never thought 
anybody’d try and kill me.  Well, I’ve got it licked now, now I can fight.”  And a few 
moments later after he kills a few men in hand-to-hand combat, he thinks to himself:  
“You’re damn right I can fight,” as triumphant music begins to swell over the diegetic 
sound and the film ends.   
Beyond the film’s attempt to narratively warn trainees of what was to come in 
battle, there was a more neurological understanding at work in the film’s construction as 
well.  The “pre combat conditioning,” as North describes it, was understood to come 
partly from the sensory exposure to sights and sounds—a kind of exposure therapy.  
North writes that,  
Sound plays a great part in pre combat conditioning, and all sound-tracks 
used were of actual weapons firing live ammunition.  In this way, a man 
can be shown what a tank attack looks and sounds like and how it feels to 
proceed through an artillery barrage.151  
As we will explore in more detail in the third chapter, the use of films and their sound in 
exposure therapy was part of treatments applied by some military psychiatrists to men 
discharged for neuropsychiatric reasons.  When discussing their work using war films to 
treat soldiers returning home with acute cases of combat fatigue, Psychiatrist Leon J. Saul 
and his colleagues cited the practice of training police horses to remain calm in traffic by 
“deconditioning” them to loud noises by playing audio recordings of loud, jarring street 
noise in their stables.152  It was in the attempt to use the Fighting Men series as “a 
medium for psychological instruction and conditioning,” that it acted as a bridge between 
the more straight forward pedagogical aims of training films and a desire to integrate 
sophisticated psychiatric and psychological knowledge into the creation of a more 
effective military.153  
Fagelson’s dissertation on war-era feature films containing themes of veterans and 
mental health has listed the Fighting Men series among films screened during training by 
the military.  While he does not contextualize them within the growing psychiatric 
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infrastructure per se (his interest is in contextualizing popular discourses of veteran 
mental health), he notes that their production was indicative of a general turn towards 
psychology to try to understand how people behave rather than simply telling them how 
to perform certain tasks.154  Fagelson describes this series as “psychological training 
films,” and concludes that they were functional as military training aids, operating among 
the “different genres of film …[used] to establish the demands of military service.”155  
Among these “different genres of film,” Fagelson also mentions the Why We Fight series, 
calling them “orientation films geared towards ideological conversion,”156 which is the 
received narrative surrounding these well known films.  These characterizations are 
useful, but they don’t give a full sense of the extent to which these films were considered 
crucial military tools for building resilient fighting forces.  Further contextualizing the 
Fighting Men and Why We Fight series within the psy apparatus that undergirded such 
films helps us to understand how these films were expected to operate on their viewers 
and locates them within a much larger apparatus that applied film as a tool to try to solve 
many different “problems of the mind,” as the rest of this study explores.  It also enables 
us to see how these films were understood and discussed by powerful institutional 
figures, and the value placed on the work it was hoped the films could accomplish. 
 
Why We Fight 
The Why We Fight series of documentary films directed by Frank Capra were the 
centrepiece of the military’s preventative psychiatry efforts.  Eric Smoodin’s Regarding 
Frank Capra describes their origin, writing that:  
Just after the entry of the United States into the war, the War Department’s 
Bureau of Public Relations … “had a corps of speakers busy traveling 
over the country delivering lectures to troops on the general theme of why 
they were being called upon to fight.”  Audiences seemed to find these 
lectures less than compelling, however, and so army chief of staff General 
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George C. Marshall, a film enthusiast, put into motion the plan that led to 
Capra’s military films.157 
Marshall had a vision of having “a series of documented, factual information films … 
that will explain to our boys in the Army why we are fighting and the principles for 
which we are fighting,” and he personally put Capra in charge of making it.158  As 
evidenced in quotes in previous sections from military officials and psychiatrists alike, it 
was generally believed that showing troops and trainees these films was one of the most 
effective tools the military possessed in order to bolster morale, motivate troops, and in 
doing so, keep them fighting longer and harder, holding “psychoneuroses” at bay.  
Different again from the camaraderie promoted by The New Lot and the pre-combat 
conditioning envisioned with the Fighting Men series, Why We Fight was designed to 
generate morale by appealing to the rational minds of its viewers by giving them a reason 
to fight via clear and compelling arguments about the larger socio-political conditions of 
the war.  The series of seven hour-long documentaries consisted primarily of footage 
taken from documentaries and newsreels from Axis nations and recontextualized using 
voice-over narration provided by Walter Huston, and interspersing it with animation from 
Disney studios and some original footage shot by the Signal Corps.  The films were 
executed with extreme care, presenting unequivocal arguments for what they saw as the 
danger of the Axis nations’ appetite for political domination and the valiant efforts made 
by the Allied nations to resist them.   
The narrative style and didactic tone common to many other military films from 
World War II give them an antiquated and comical feeling when watched now.  Despite 
the fact that the Why We Fight films share a visual aesthetic with many other 
documentaries from the 40s (presided over by an anachronistically confident voice over 
narration, for example), the nimble and intelligent juxtaposition of clips, sound, and 
script, give the story and argumentation an enduring appeal and feeling of relevance 
beyond their status as historical documents.  It is not surprising then, that the 
comprehensive literature that exists on these films tend to write about them as great 
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works of an auteur-filmmaker first and foremost, and documents of military propaganda 
as an inextricable yet secondary feature.  While the films’ status as works of great 
authorial quality is not in question, I think it is important to read their extraordinary 
viewership as thanks in large part to the extensive infrastructure that was put in place to 
help train men to fight.  It is also significant that its subsequent civilian viewership 
(estimated to have been seen by a total of 54 million Americans by the end of the war) 
was similarly facilitated by a military that believed that everyone should see the Why We 
Fight films as part of generating support for the war effort, and had access to the 
resources to make this possible.  My research offers no analysis of the films from an 
auterist standpoint, but works to strengthen the case for contextualizing the astonishing 
reach of these films within the highly organized and coordinated effort to improve the 
American military using sciences of the mind.159  A more fulsome picture of the larger 
military psychiatric apparatus that these films operated within, then, makes them more 
interesting as historical texts, beyond an analysis of them as great works of propaganda.  
The Why We Fight films were meant to generate morale by activating the 
viewer’s rational desire to fight and serve what was presented as an unambiguously just 
cause.  General George C. Marshall believed that knowing why one was fighting 
increased their desire to do so, but in the military context, belief was not enough.  
Rigorous military testing and observation was used to try to understand how the films 
were being watched by soldiers, and whether these viewings resulted in the institutional 
outcomes the military hoped for.  A lot was expected of these films, and a lot was at 
stake.  
Eric Smoodin’s book Regarding Frank Capra stands out from other auter-
centered approaches to the director’s work by giving a detailed account of the 
institutional contexts in which Capra’s films were circulated and studied.  Indeed, his is a 
study of the reception and viewership of Capra’s films and how this was managed and 
understood by the institutions facilitating the viewings.  Smoodin describes a Foucauldian 
disciplinary paradigm at work in the military contexts of the films’ screenings and 
receptions, particularly in the military’s careful monitoring of viewer reactions in order to 
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analyze the films’ effectiveness at producing desired outcomes.  The military did not 
simply screen the films and hope for the best, they wanted to “accomplish nothing less 
than change the ways that certain populations thought and lived,” and took measures to 
evaluate whether or not this was happening.160   
The films were screened to captive audiences of military trainees who were being 
carefully observed by military officials and psychiatrists taking detailed screening notes, 
collecting audience feedback reports, and conducting surveys to monitor the effect of the 
films and create a record of audience reactions.  As Smoodin notes, the techniques of 
observation that were used to monitor the viewers of the Why We Fight films were 
indicative of the increasingly bureaucratized infrastructure of the military.  The 
cataloguing, clerical, and scientific gaze of the psychiatric professional began to share 
space with the traditional force-based disciplinary gaze exerted upon soldiers by military 
officials.161  This scientific gaze was part of a transformative effort, seeking discipline not 
merely as an internalization of fear and observation, but as something that could be 
produced using different environmental stimuli.  Smoodin writes that “the Why We Fight 
filmmakers and administrators planned to create consensus, both about the facts of the 
war and the moral imperative of fighting it.  That is, they sought to turn a civilian 
audience into a militarized one.”  Smoodin proposes that as a result, in front of the film 
screen and managed by psychiatrists, the Foucauldian terminology of military 
discipline’s power “to qualify, to classify and to punish,” becomes more accurately “to 
qualify, classify, and reconstruct.”162  While the modern institutions of discipline that 
Foucault writes about have always sought to transform subjects’ behaviour by having 
them internalize their institutional surveillance and subsequently monitor themselves, 
Smoodin’s adaptation of Foucault’s terminology highlights the creative element of 
behavioural transformation.  The Why We Fight films addressed an ideal audience of 
future soldiers, the very ones the military hoped they would become: soldiers who were 
motivated, dedicated, rational, and committed to the particularly American brand of 
democracy identified by psychological and communications researchers. 
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Smoodin’s analysis of the disciplinary paradigm evoked by the captivity and 
coercion in which these films were watched concludes that a “preferred form of 
masculinity” is the ultimate end product of this “reconstruction” of civilians into 
soldiers.163  Fagelson, too, talks about a particular form of masculinity as the desired 
outcome of the indoctrination process that psychiatric training films (and indeed, many 
other media texts—Fagelson pays particular attention to this trope in Hollywood war 
films) were a part of.  If, as Smoodin and Fagelson suggest, masculinity is what is sought 
by psychiatric training films, then the argument follows naturally that the “preferred 
form” of this masculinity should manifest as a willingness and ability to fight in the war.  
Though it may seem like a minor semantic distinction, I would argue for flipping the 
equation.  By paying careful attention to the way that these and other military psychiatric 
films were discussed and used within the multi-pronged military psychiatric apparatus 
that this study sketches out, what is revealed is an institutional imperative to create first 
and foremost productive soldiers—a job for which certain preferred forms of masculinity 
were most certainly enlisted, but not absolutely necessary. 
Implicit in Smoodin and Fagelson’s naming masculinity as the goal of military 
training is the understanding that masculinity translated into doing the work that was 
being asked of soldiers.  What is interesting about contextualizing the Why We Fight 
series within the larger program of training films designed in collaboration with 
psychiatrists (such as the Fighting Men series) is that while they targeted the rational 
mind of the viewer on many levels—asking them to acknowledge the realities of fear and 
protect themselves from its effects—they were also trying to work on unconscious parts 
of the mind by triggering, and thus desensitizing, fear reactions using realistic sound and 
imagery.  While the hoped-for end result may still be masculinity manifest as an 
improved fighting ability, what is being engineered here is not simply a social 
performance of gender.  The machinations of these films were targeting neurological 
performances as well as social ones.  Of course, hierarchies of preferred and acceptable 
gender performances are very clearly at play in the representations of soldier life and 
labour in training films: the “right” way to deal with fear is always to acknowledge it, 
accept it, and then to buck up and get on with fighting.  And highly coded gender 
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expectations are neither rare nor surprising in military films from this or any era.  The 
gendered representations, alongside other (neurological, etc.) tactics, however, ultimately 
serve the end goal: the procurement of military labour.  It therefore seems worth saying 
explicitly that these forms of desired masculinity were tools meant to generate acceptable 
performances at work.  And indeed, as I hope to show, the importance of procuring 
labour in fact sometimes trumped the desire for a preferred form of masculinity, allowing 
for a spectrum of gender expression as long as any “atypical” soldiers were still doing 
work appropriate to their disposition. 
As we will see throughout the remaining chapters, particularly with respect to 
films such as Combat Exhaustion examined in Chapter 2, and Shades of Grey in Chapter 
4, while the psy sciences further rationalized and institutionalized a hierarchy of 
masculine values when evaluating men, they also made the military more flexible in its 
accommodation of a range of expressions of masculinity in a few ways.  One was by 
claiming to be able to “salvage” psychoneurotic men for duty by rehabilitating them—
taking men who had either had enough or could not hack it on the battlefield and placing 
them in non-combat positions.  Both of the films mentioned above include performances 
of “imperfectly” masculine men, and while these serve to identify the “preferred form of 
masculinity” by contrast, they also insist that the “imperfect” men still have institutional 
value.  It is interesting that, while still reinforcing particularly masculine ideals, the 
psychiatrically-informed training films as a whole (and not Why We Fight in particular) 
in fact broadened particular definitions of the masculine military subject by working to 
make neuroses, fear, and combat fatigue normal and acceptable behaviour, as long as 
they were tempered by a willingness to continue to work in some capacity. 
Another place where this logic is evident was the use of psychiatric/psychological 
profiles (such as the homosexual, the neurotic, and the schizophrenic) garnered from the 
personality tests used to match men to positions that suited their disposition.  The image 
based interpretation tests discussed at the beginning of this chapter helped to facilitate 
both the creation of a stratification of personality types and a means to funnel people 
toward tasks presumably suited to the types they had been assigned.  In this way, it is 
precisely the adoption of the psy sciences in the management of military labour that gave 
the military a more flexible neo-liberal logic in which anyone (within limits, of course—
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this is still a military) can be acceptable as long as they are working.  It is at the risk of 
minimizing this logic’s pernicious flexibility that I insist on labour, not masculinity, as 
the goal of military psychiatric media. 
Finally, when we look at the policies around mental hygiene instruction 
(minimum 3 hours for soldiers and 6 for officers) and the ways that media objects were 
used in these and other contexts, it is clear that they were meant to streamline labour for 
the military.  The frenzied devotion to unlocking the key to morale, written about in both 
government-sponsored and military psychiatric literature as we saw in the second section 
of this chapter, was often a race to save the military manpower.  As John W. Appel, chief 
of the Mental Hygiene Branch of the Neuropsychiatry Department, wrote in a proposal to 
the Signal Corps to produce a “Film on Fear:” “The general premise of the film, of 
course, is this: The military effectiveness of the average man can be markedly improved 
by teaching him certain simple facts about the nature of fear.”164  The films and image 
tests used in both screening and training were there to save resources by lessening the 
burden on scarce psychiatrists who could not treat or talk adequately to the volumes of 
men who needed evaluation and instruction.  And, of course their primary goal was to 
keep soldiers from suffering psychiatric afflictions in the first place, keeping them 
productive, out of expensive hospital care, and off a future disability pension.   
It may seem like a matter of semantics to make the concept of masculinity 
subservient to the procurement of military labour, and perhaps it is.  But if we look at the 
logic articulated in literature being produced by the military psychiatrists and the officials 
that they worked for, they are very clear about the institutional imperatives they were 
beholden to, and the language of labour (most often referred to as “manpower”) was the 
one they were using.  Masculinity was definitely a tool and goal of reconstruction, but it 
was one of a number of means to make better workers—ones who would fight willingly 
and without breaking down.  The larger psychiatric apparatus was developing tools (here, 
cinema and visual technologies) to streamline the process of disciplining people to be 
willing workers.  In the process, it evolved infrastructures, tools, and techniques that 
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could be transposed into other contexts (expectations of gender notwithstanding) in 
which the minds of labouring people needed to be made both willing and able.165 
 
2.4. Assessing the Power of Film Studies: From training films to a 
coordinated multi-phase, multi-medial apparatus 
As noted above, the investment that the military made in cinema as a tool to aid 
the training of soldiers resulted in a corresponding investment in film reception studies.  
As Smoodin writes, theirs was a form of “reception specific to situations of 
confinement,” and he proposes that the military’s rigorous study on soldiers watching 
Why We Fight films was one of the most significant developments in film studies during 
the 1940s.166   One of the factors making it so significant was the shift from a humanities-
based interest in the effect of films on viewers, as say monitored by public school 
teachers, to the “hard scientific research” of the psy sciences.167  Smoodin contextualizes 
this shift within the military’s larger investment in psychology and psychiatry to manage 
military personnel and to develop policy for managing populations on the home front (he 
gives the examples of Japanese American internment camps and studies on the morale of 
the American citizen) and abroad, particularly in occupied territories.168  Studying the 
film reception of soldiers was understood by experts to be an essential part of evaluating 
their efforts at indoctrination.  In order to do so, the Experimental Section of the Research 
Branch in the War Department’s Information and Education Division worked to study the 
films’ (particularly the Why We Fight films) ability to “impart[ ] information about the 
background of war and in effecting changes in attitudes towards the war that were related 
to the objectives of the Army’s orientation program.”169   
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The results of some of the studies made on soldiers watching Why We Fight: The 
Battle of Britain were published in a volume titled Studies in Social Psychology in World 
War II, Volume 3: Experiments on Mass Communication.  Different test groups of 
soldiers were shown this film and different versions of similar films in order to evaluate 
whether the viewings “benefit the morale of the men, that is, did they make the soldiers 
more willing to serve in the Army?”170  Using questionnaires, researchers evaluated the 
short- and long-term effects of the film screenings, the differentials produced in results 
based on education levels, the effects of viewing films that presented “one side” vs “both 
sides,” and the benefits of audience participation.  While conducting these studies on 
behalf of the military, researchers observed that the conclusions of this type of film 
reception study could be broadly applicable, and would prove valuable to “those 
interested in the possibility of using documentary films as a mass educational medium for 
producing desired changes in motivations.”171  Despite the perceived relevance of this 
type of reception studies, however, the results of the experiments themselves proved to be 
underwhelming.  In terms of generating motivation and morale the study found the film’s 
effects to be minimal.  While they noted that there was, “a marked effect on … 
knowledge of factual material,” they found only a small effect on general opinions, and 
essentially no effect on motivation.172   
While presumably these results would have been disappointing, the conclusions 
drawn from them did not lead the researchers to give up on film’s power to change 
minds.  One line of reasoning followed in the publication of the study stated hopefully 
that: “while a single orientation film might not produce effects large enough to be 
statistically reliable, the entire series … might have produced definite changes in 
motivation.”173  While this hypothesis confines itself to the Why We Fight series, inherent 
in the suggestion is that if an entire series were more likely to produce changes in 
motivation than a single film, an entire coordinated audio visual program comprised of 
many films, lectures, pamphlets, etc. could have an even more pronounced effect on 
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people’s disposition.  Here again, contextualizing the Why We Fight training films within 
the larger military psychiatric apparatus and the variety of films that it showed personnel 
at all levels of service, makes sense.  While Capra’s films may have been exemplary 
versions of the tactic to target the rational mind as a form of preventative psychiatry, they 
existed within a culture that concluded that the rational mind was not necessarily the best 
model for producing desired effects.  A multitude of methods and exposures, and a model 
of the mind as more than simply rational, seemed to be a better approach to getting 
results. 
The Experiments in Mass Communications study concludes with the troubling 
note that people 
[C]annot be appreciably affected by an information program which relies 
primarily upon “letting the facts speak for themselves.”  …   For most … 
individuals, motivations and attitudes may generally be acquired through 
nonrational channels and may be highly resistant to rational 
considerations.174  
The particularly American version of “democratic morale” that the Why We Fight films 
sought to promote was premised on the cultivation of rational soldiers and citizens.  
Doubts about the effectiveness of this tactic led to disenchantment with the idea that 
democratic morale could, ultimately, be cultivated.  Historian of psychology, Ellen 
Herman writes that after several disappointing attempts to use media and discussion to 
make soldiers fight for American political ideals, psychiatrist Julius Schreiber, head of 
the Information and Education division of the military, “capitulated to the dismal view 
that hatred for the enemy was easier to manufacture than genuine enthusiasm and respect 
for U.S. institutions.”175  Schreiber returned again to the idea of “hate camps” and set up 
a program  
[U]sing broadcast news, lectures, a weekly column, and therapy groups to 
inspire the maximum amount of animosity in US troops toward fascism.  
The program was later copied elsewhere.  With this sort of experience 
behind them, it is not very surprising that Stouffer and others associated 
with the Research Branch emerged from the war convinced that “for the 
majority of individuals … it may be true that motivations and attitudes are 
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generally acquired without regard to rational considerations and are 
practically impregnable to new rational considerations.”176  
A model of mind as non-rational and subject to more neurological, sense-based 
interpretations was gaining precedence, shaping the kinds of experiments with media, and 
understandings of how media interacted with the mind that would follow. 
The conclusion that people could not be relied on to generate motivated, rational 
characters as a result of their exposure to facts again meant that psychiatrists and 
psychologists were needed not less, but more, in order to find other ways to unlock the 
productive power of both military and civilian labour.  On this Herman writes that: 
One of the consequences of learning all these dismal truths about 
Americans’ lack of democratic morale and motivation, their political 
apathy, and their vulnerability to emotional manipulation was to 
strengthen the psychological experts’ faith in themselves and illuminate 
the gravity of their future choices.177   
The psy science experts now had a more pressing task than ever, and the value of their 
contribution to managing the minds of the military and the citizenry was increasingly 
validated within military and civilian culture because other more conventional and widely 
accepted strategies were deemed ineffective.  The foothold that the psy sciences received 
by being tasked with the responsibility of keeping all future psychiatric casualties out of 
the military in the first place established the infrastructure and carved out the realm of 
health management that they would preside over for decades.  This was thanks in no 
small part to the use of image interpretation tests to make their work and processes 
quicker.  Image interpretation tests and later film were at the centre of efforts to show that 
psychiatry could be efficient and also effective, providing access into the otherwise 
murky territory of the mind.  Still and moving images were thought to provide x-ray like 
vision into the mind of test takers, to be able to “fore warn and fore arm” soldiers, to 
build camaraderie in groups, to deliver powerful rational arguments, and when these were 
no longer believed to be effective, to bypass the intellect to access and address the 
neurological mind: the emotional and behavioural elements of the mind and nervous 
system that were now seen to be needing management in order to wage war effectively.   
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The routinization and institutionalization of the techniques for testing and labour 
management would continue to develop into different aspects of military psychiatry 
throughout the war, as the following chapters will explore.  Not only did the use of 
techniques of visualization impact the growth of the psy sciences, but their use in testing 
and training films introduced the language of military-based psychiatry and psychology 
to an enormous cohort of Americans.  In these two ways, films and other visual 
technologies effectively accomplished what the studies on Why We Fight suggested 
would be needed to change minds: they did not present people with a single, compelling 
argument, but constituted a multi-mediated, expansive, and persistent mode of address 
that sought maximum productivity by targeting the mind of viewers in various ways.  As 
we will see in the following chapter, this culture was extended in more specifically 
instrumental ways via films made to teach soldiers, officers, medics, and psychiatrists 
how to understand mental health in the context of their work for the military.   
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Chapter 3. Films for Preventative Psychiatry: 
Projecting and Monitoring the Damaged Mind 
In 1940, Charles Hillman, Colonel in the US Army Medical Corps, wrote that: “a 
superior army cannot be moulded from inferior individuals.”178  As the previous chapter 
explores, psychiatry and psychology made significant inroads into military operations on 
the promise that they could deliver the goods when it came to crafting such an army.  
With the help of films and other image-based technologies, these psy sciences influenced 
a regime of rigorous testing to pre-emptively weed out what the military considered to be 
psychologically “inferior” men, and fortifying the morale of those who remained during 
training.  Films created by the military’s Signal Corps in consultation with the 
Department of Neuropsychiatry were understood to target particular psychiatrically-
identified characteristics such as the promotion of resilience through resolve and 
conviction (the Why We Fight series) and inoculation to trauma via exposure to war 
stimulus (the Fighting Men series).  During World War I, the brutal fighting and 
conditions of industrial warfare had resulted in a large number of psychiatric casualties 
and an extensive network of military psychiatric hospitals had been built to deal with 
“shell shock.” 179  When World War II began, many experts were optimistic that such 
investments in prevention would obviate the need to provide soldiers with the same 
extensive and costly psychiatric treatments as had been necessary in World War I, saving 
the military both the expense of treatment and preserving its manpower.  Despite this 
optimism, and the 1,846,000 recruits that were rejected for “neuropsychiatric” reasons, a 
further 550,000 men were discharged from military service with a neuropsychiatric 
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diagnosis.180  As it became increasingly evident that screening techniques and morale-
boosting would not eliminate psychiatric casualties, the military’s willingness to further 
incorporate psychiatry into operations grew as new ways to manage the problem of what 
was referred to with the euphemism, “combat fatigue,” were explored.  This second 
chapter moves, as military policy did, from an exclusive emphasis on using the psy 
sciences to select and prepare soldiers, to their broader use in systems of personnel 
management.  The implementation of psychiatrically-informed surveillance and 
management formed another layer in the attempt to optimize the fighting forces.  The 
films examined below worked to sell the validity and techniques of such a program.   
This chapter looks closely at some of the films that formed a core part of a 
communications campaign launched by the military to mitigate the effects of combat 
fatigue.  These films were developed as educational aids to introduce soldiers, officers, 
medics, and even psychiatrists to the psychiatric concepts that mattered most for their 
particular role in the military.  They expanded on the existing training regime with a more 
comprehensive “forward psychiatry” approach that provided personnel with specialised 
psychiatric discourses that were expected to make them more effective at their jobs.  
Looking at the rhetoric presented in these films side-by-side gives insight into the broader 
ideas about psychiatry, mental health, labour, military responsibility, and the human mind 
that this campaign was disseminating widely to military audiences in pursuit of 
instrumental outcomes.  Psychiatric discourses were deployed to further rationalize 
military labour following models of industrial labour.  Within the larger military 
psychiatric apparatus examined here, this chapter delves into the intricacies of the 
discourses presented in psychiatric training films in order to situate them as both an 
adaptation and continuation of ideas underlying the screening and inoculation practices 
discussed in chapter 1, crystallizing certain ideas about how psychiatry should operate in 
the military.  These ideas shaped therapeutic practices as well as their subsequent 
dissemination beyond the military and into the broader American public, as discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4.  Their foremost aim was disseminating knowledge about and 
engendering a culture of practices around mental health.  In doing so, they acted as 
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techniques of visualization, making certain behaviours “visible” as mental health 
concerns and therefore enabling them to be monitored within the military’s surveillance 
networks.  This chapter focuses on the cinematic and discursive representations of 
military labour and psychiatry in films screened for personnel.  It analyzes them 
alongside extensive research from archival military documents in order to show how the 
rhetoric presented in the films fit within strict institutional imperatives of “forward 
psychiatry” and the military’s power to organize communications in order to achieve 
instrumental ends.  I have not been able to find documentation of how often and where 
these films were screened (although many of them are named frequently in military and 
psychiatric literature, so they clearly enjoyed relatively extensive screening), so this 
chapter focuses on mapping the film’s rhetoric within the logics and uses described in 
more generally stated goals of forward psychiatry.  This chapter begins by mapping out 
the context of the military’s forward psychiatry, and “preventative psychiatry” programs 
and the coordinated communications campaigns that they engendered.  Films were used 
in these campaigns in order to instruct personnel on basic psychiatric principles and 
manage discourses around psychiatry and mental health.  It follows by looking at the 
rhetorical and cinematic strategies used in several of these films; targeting audiences of 
either soldiers, officers, or medical personnel, and establishing a hierarchy of psychiatric 
surveillance. 
 
3.1. Adopting and Promoting Forward Psychiatry 
3.1.1. Psychiatry Reaches the Front Lines 
Texts that address US military psychiatry in World War II commonly point to a 
“mistake” that was not corrected until 1943, referring to the lack of provision for 
psychiatric casualties in the early years of the war.181  It is considered to have been an 
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avoidable mistake largely because during World War I, substantial provisions had been 
made to accommodate losses from psychiatric casualties.  Rather than accepting this as 
an inevitability, military administrators in World War II thought that they could bypass 
this problem using careful psychiatric selection of recruits.  By 1943, alarming numbers 
of soldiers were being discharged for psychiatric reasons—between 26% to 75% of all 
combat casualties in the most brutal campaigns—challenging the widely held notion that 
it was simply a matter of weeding out the “inferior individuals” prior to service.182  In 
order to deal with the significant loss of manpower, the military’s official rhetoric around 
trauma began to change.  The management of mental health began to shift from an 
exclusive reliance on preventative psychology to the widespread uptake of psychiatric 
strategies for conserving the manpower of soldiers at all levels of service by treating 
“combat fatigue” early and quickly by using what was called “forward psychiatry.”   
The practice of forward psychiatry—a strategy that had also been used in World 
War I, and taken up again part way through World War II—originated in France in 1915.  
The term was coined by neurologist Georges Gullain, who insisted that: “disorders are 
perfectly curable at onset … such patients must not be evacuated behind the lines, they 
must be kept in militarized zones.”183  Forward psychiatry relied on a different ontology 
of trauma from that of pre-screening, which leaned heavily on the assumption that all 
neuroses were embedded in people from childhood and merely activated by the trauma of 
war.  Forward psychiatry accepted that the trauma of war was sufficient to generate 
neuroses in any person, regardless of their upbringing; though it could happily co-exist 
with the idea that upbringing was a factor in how easy it might be to help someone 
recover.  Refocusing from an effort to screen out the “neurotics” most likely to break 
down in battle, the strategy targeted the management of soldiers’ mental health so that 
breakdowns were dealt with efficiently to minimize their drain on the total fighting 
forces.  This came with a corresponding shift in the etiology of neuroses from something 
to which a given soldier was “predisposed” to contextual or experience-induced “stress.”  
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With this shift in the understanding of the origin of neuroses, all soldiers came 
under the purview of the psychiatrist, not merely the “abnormal” ones, and the scope and 
orientation of the psychiatrist had to be adapted to this new expanded military role.  In an 
official bulletin outlining the procedures and practices of military psychiatry, the 
priorities of the psychiatric officer are laid out in no uncertain terms in the section on 
“Psychiatry at the Army Level” written by Major Alfred Ludwig:  
Since the primary function of the Medical Department is to preserve 
maximal fighting strength, the medical officer must subordinate to that end 
his traditional interest in the individual patient. … [W]e came to realize 
that more could be expected of [soldiers suffering minor psychiatric breaks 
in combat, or manifesting neurotic symptoms in civil life] than was 
formerly considered possible by the civilian psychiatrist.  The most 
important points in the management of psychiatric casualties are 1) correct 
diagnosis, 2) holding and treating such men as far forward as possible, and 
3) relief of symptoms at the earliest possible time.184 
The military psychiatrist was now much more than a diagnostician and therapist to the 
individual—they were now responsible for the “fighting strength” of the army.   
The adoption of forward psychiatry thus forced a clarification and consolidation 
of the roles and strategies of military psychiatrists, especially for the cohorts of doctors 
taking the newly created special training program in military psychiatry.  This training 
program provided a 12-week crash course designed to turn medical doctors into 
desperately needed psychiatrists.185  The Manual of Military Neuropsychiatry was 
published in 1944 for use in this training program; in it psychiatrist Samuel H. Kraines 
writes that:  
The function of the psychiatrist in the Army is twofold: 1) to select, 
examine, and treat or recommend discharge of men with psychiatric 
disturbances; and 2) to utilize his knowledge and understanding of the 
individual and ‘mass’ mind so as to enhance the morale and, hence, the 
fighting efficiency of the solider.  If psychiatry is to perform these 
functions in the most efficient fashion possible, at least two adjustments 
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are necessary: the military orientation of the psychiatrist and the 
psychiatric orientation of combat officers.186 
Within this concise statement, various key strategies and aims of military psychiatry are 
contained: 1) that it needed access to soldiers at all stages of service to evaluate their 
fitness (“select, examine, and treat,” not merely “select”); 2) that it should be involved in 
managing the communications and information disseminated to soldiers in order to 
improve their performance (“enhancing morale and hence, fighting efficiency”); 3) that in 
order to serve military goals, the psychiatrist had to adjust civilian practices and “orient” 
themselves to the military, thus learning to “forego the needs of individuals in favour of 
winning the war;”187 and finally, 4) “the psychiatric orientation of officers,” or the 
teaching of psychiatric principles to military personnel to both overcome existing 
prejudices toward “mental cases”188 in the army (and psychiatry in general), and make 
them part of the psychiatric optimization of the fighting forces.189  This fourth component 
forms a central concern of the films discussed in this chapter, and it was the foundation 
on which military psychiatry became the concern not only of a small group of specialists, 
but a program of surveillance and self-discipline that needed to be taught to all military 
personnel. These films tried to remove the existing taboos around psychiatry in order to 
teach personnel to act as lay therapists—to themselves and to others, and to monitor the 
mental stability of the personnel around them.  The integration of psychiatric practice into 
everyday military operations was a strategic intervention to try to limit losses.  But it was 
a move met with deeply held scepticism and resistance toward psychiatry, and it had to 
be carefully sold to the larger military organization.190   
                                               
186 Samuel Kraines, Manual of Military Neuropsychiatry, eds. Harry C. Solomon and 
Paul I Yakovlev (Philadelphia: WB Saunders Company, 1944), 481. 
187 Shortly after this quote, Kraines elaborates that psychiatrists need to learn to “forego 
the needs of individuals in favour of winning the war,” thus adapting their practice of 
counselling people in the best interest of their personal mental health in order to make 
them good (or at least functional) soldiers first and foremost.  Ibid., 482. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Albert Glass, “Psychiatry at the Division Level,” in BUSAMD: Combat Psychiatry, 
47-8. 
190 See order of operations in “Appendix II: Method of Handling Neuropsychiatric 
Casualties in Theatres of Operation” in BUSAMD: Combat Psychiatry. 
90 
Implementing forward psychiatry required that everyone be trained to carry out 
the strategy.  In this context, the psychiatrist became as much a consultant as a therapist, 
expected to work with officers and other personnel to help them understand and carry out 
basic psychiatric principles.  In the Manual of Military Neuropsychiatry, Captain John W. 
Appel writes that:  
The medical officer, particularly the neuropsychiatrist, by dint of his 
knowledge of the body and the working of the mind, is equipped to play a 
fundamental role in arousing and maintaining the will to fight. …  By his 
position on various boards, medical and disciplinary, by informal 
discussions with line officers; by lectures to troops, by submitting reports 
and suggestions to the special service division, where they might be 
incorporated in movies, radio programs, and posters; by everyday personal 
contacts with men themselves can he supply the stimuli which arouse and 
maintain mental health.191 
The labour of influencing a broad range of personnel suggested here, was in part 
shouldered by films made to more efficiently take the place of giving “lectures to troops,” 
having “informal discussions with line officers,” and advising medical corps on how to 
treat soldiers. 
By 1944, General William Menninger, head of the army’s Neuropsychiatric 
Consultants Division, was appointed to run a division of military neuropsychiatry on par 
with that of surgery and medicine in the Surgeon General’s Office, complete with its own 
Public Relations department.192  In order to try to make good on the claims of 
psychiatry’s efficacy in “nipping problems in the bud” and getting soldiers back to work 
quickly, a communications campaign took shape in order to change the way that mental 
health was talked about and understood.  Crucial to this campaign was transforming the 
way psychiatry and mental illness itself—in particular what the military termed “combat 
fatigue” or “combat exhaustion”—was understood by all military personnel.  Using films, 
lectures, and pamphlets to disseminate information, the idea of “preventative 
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psychiatry”—a concept that had not existed prior to WWII—was promulgated widely 
within the military as an essential correlate to forward psychiatry.193   
 
3.1.2. Films for Preventative Psychiatry 
Alongside other projects developed to address the growing role of military 
psychiatry, such as the training of new personnel and public communications, the 
Neuropsychiatric Division in the Surgeon General’s Office (SGO) appointed psychiatrist 
Major George D. Goldman to direct the Psychiatric Film Program.194  A range of 
different films addressing either soldiers, officers, or medics were part of this project, and 
one of its primary aims was to convince these different groups of personnel that men 
suffering from distress, but who were not physically wounded, were not simply 
“goldbricks” trying to get out of duty, or “psychos” who should not have been in the 
army in the first place.195  Psychiatrists saw the existing taboos surrounding mental health 
and the shame accompanying a neuropsychiatric diagnosis to be the greatest barrier to 
implementing preventative and forward psychiatry. As such, the films’ scripts worked 
aggressively to neutralize these taboos while disseminating basic psychiatric ideas and 
strategies for treatment.  In addition to promoting a discourse of empathy, these films 
sought to convince people in the military of the usefulness of a medical interpretation of 
fear and trauma as normal and predictable, shifting away from earlier models of fear as a 
moral failing.  A statistic often repeated in these films claimed that catching 
neuropsychiatric casualties early could “salvage” or return up to 80% of cases for active 
duty, making it clear that this campaign was not about accepting psychiatry’s tenets 
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merely to be more enlightened about mental health, but that the war’s labour power was 
seen to be at stake.  
Documents in the “Training Films” files from the military’s Neuropsychiatric 
Department archives reveal that in addition to the circulating films described in this 
chapter and other films not covered here (including Hypnosis—Okinawa, The New Lot, 
and Psychiatric Procedures in the Combat Area), even more films were slated for 
production.  The files include scenarios for training films aimed at various audiences: 
soldiers, officers, the general public, doctors, and psychiatrists, that were not completed 
either due to an inability to spare psychiatric personnel to oversee the projects during 
wartime, or because the war ended, cutting some projects short.  Considering the fact that 
the army did not begin to make their own psychiatric training films until quite late—with 
the bulk of them being produced and distributed in 1945—the backlog of unfinished 
projects suggests that several more films in this vein would have been made had the war 
gone on for longer.  The navy appears to have been more proactive than the army in its 
adoption of film for these purposes, screening existing British psychiatric training films 
earlier on and producing their own films as of 1944.196   
Regardless of the military division that produced them, the films circulating as 
part of the preventative psychiatry program exist within the same aesthetic and rhetorical 
family.  They are black and white, often narrative-based documentary-style films with an 
authoritative narrator clearly explaining and interpreting the diegetic action for the 
audience.  Films for higher-ranking specialists (psychiatrists or doctors) are narrated by 
someone attributed to their same rank whereas films for officers and soldiers are narrated 
by ranking superiors such as generals or psychiatrists.  Most of these films follow a 
resolution-based character narrative in the diegetic action, and the narrator uses more or 
less complicated psychiatric language to analyze and explain the scenes.  The calm and 
knowing narrator helps to create a neutral reflexivity during occasional scenes of 
disturbing material such as battle or suffering soldiers.  For the most part, however, 
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depictions of individual suffering are quite innocuous, usually being indicated by way of 
a furrowed brow, a reluctance to speak, and/or a hunched posture taken by the actor.   
 
Figure 6: Stills of neuropsychiatric patients from the film Combat Psychiatry: The Division Psychiatrist 
More severe cases might be portrayed using shaky hands and difficulty speaking.  
The mildness of the portrayals of combat fatigue make the recurring cinematic transition 
from distressed to cured soldiers relatively believable.  Interestingly, the British film 
adapted for US military use by the signal corps, Field Psychiatry for the General Medical 
Officer, employs a fairly distinct aesthetic.  Forgoing the narrator, this film includes battle 
scenes with diegetic sound, including long, tense silences between explosions, and 
doesn’t shy away from more harrowing depictions of the symptoms of psychiatric shock 
in soldiers.  Later in the chapter this film will be examined in more detail.  While this was 
not the aesthetic style preferred by US filmmakers, the military circulated this British-
made film in a restricted capacity for officers and doctors only.  Many of the films 
examined here had “Restricted” designations, meaning that they could only be screened 
to specified ranks of military personnel.  Each restricted film circulated with an 
accompanying fact sheet identifying who could watch it and any information pertinent to 
how it should be screened.  
94 
 
Figure 7: Fact sheet for Introduction to Combat Fatigue  
“Training Films,” Neuropsychiatry; RG 112 SGO/A 730; Box 1328, NACP 
While there are more or less minor differences among the films used for 
preventative psychiatry, one thing that emerges from examining them as a whole is the 
articulation of a nested institutional hierarchy of specialized discourses.  All of the films 
espouse the need to use psychiatric techniques to protect the military’s labour power, 
with each successive rank of a given film’s intended audience enlarging the web of 
surveillance for which they are responsible.  Seen together, these films reveal a 
discursively-structured Foucauldian network of “hierarchical observation,” where it is 1) 
the soldier’s responsibility to recognize and sublimate his own symptoms before they 
hinder his ability to work; 2) the officer’s duty to monitor the mental health of his 
soldiers, notice any warning symptoms and intervene before they progress further; 3) the 
medic’s task to make sure officers do their part in managing the mental health of soldiers 
and treat symptoms as best he can before sending patients back to work; and 4) the 
psychiatrist’s job to treat those soldiers who made it past all other gatekeepers, and to 
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teach all the rest of the personnel how to carry out their particular tasks.  Each 
psychiatrically-informed gaze forms a successive ring of “hierarchized surveillance” of 
the minds of the fighting forces with the highest ranking personnel occupying the 
outermost circle and the soldier at the center of the web, ultimately internalizing his own 
surveillance so that he can observe, catalogue, and sublimate his symptoms.197   
Foucault’s description of the perfect military camp is one in which “all power 
would be exercised solely through exact observation; each gaze [forming] a part of the 
overall functioning of power.”198  Foucault is of course describing the architectural 
design that subjects the camp’s residents to surveillance by making each component part 
visible to its closest neighbour.  The films described here remind their viewers to use 
these existing structures of military surveillance and they add a new vocabulary of 
behavioural “deviance” (from an articulated norm of mental health stability) to be 
observed.  All films ultimately end with some version of a soldier restored to health and 
full working capacity, providing an observable spectrum of mental health. The attempt to 
make aspects of mental health visible, and therefore observable, is crucial to the larger 
project of psychiatric surveillance, as the films examined below will demonstrate.  By 
depicting physical symptoms of mental health distress via actors frowning, stuttering, 
shouting, etc., and pairing them with cinematic techniques such as flashbacks, dissolves, 
montages, and narration, the films create simple and tidy schemes of cause-and-effect 
where “combat fatigue” can be described, diagnosed, and cured within the explanatory 
parameters established by the films.  One of the most remarkable contributions 
techniques of visualization seem to have made to the expansion of the military 
psychiatric apparatus was bestowing a purported visibility to things happening inside the 
mind so that they could be more easily surveyed, catalogued, diagnosed, and managed 
institutionally.  The films illustrate instances of both the military working as an idealized 
                                               
197 See Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, in which he talks about the “spatial 
‘nesting’ of hierarchized surveillance,” referring to the architectural design of institutions 
such as military camps, hospitals, and urban developments in which subjects can always 
be seen by other subjects so that they are both monitored at all times and also aware of 
their own surveillance, making them likely to internalize it and adapt their own behaviour 
accordingly.  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1995), 171-2. 
198 Ibid. 
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organism of surveillance, where issues of mental health are being monitored, reported, 
and treated efficiently, or the unfortunate results of neglecting these systems of 
surveillance (including self-surveillance), resulting in cases of combat fatigue.  Or as they 
are frequently called in these films, “an unnecessary leakage of manpower.” 
The rest of this chapter looks at the techniques and discourses presented in select 
films in order to map out the particular understandings of psychiatry and combat fatigue 
targeted at different audiences, and their corresponding web of hierarchized surveillance, 
beginning with films made for soldiers, then those made for officers, and ending with 
films made to instruct medical personnel.   
 
3.2. Projecting and Monitoring the Damaged Mind 
3.2.1. Teaching Soldiers 
While the films discussed in the previous chapter were produced for the military 
with a mandate to prevent the onset of crippling distress in soldiers-in-training, the films 
in this chapter were conceived as part of the arsenal for administering treatment to people 
already in early or developed stages of distress; forward psychiatry aimed to minimize 
losses once problems had begun.  For this reason, psychiatric training films made for 
such soldiers frequently dealt with specific conditions incurred in service.  By 
naturalizing these conditions and offering practical advice on how to seek help or cope 
with these conditions, such films implicitly and explicitly asked soldiers to apply 
psychiatric understandings to their own self-surveillance in order to maintain good 
fighting health.  The films shown to soldiers have the highest production values, and fall 
on the more dramatized end of the documentary aesthetic spectrum.  They tend to have a 
narrative visual diegesis that follows a protagonist or two as they experience and then 
overcome different kinds of psychiatric problems, all narrated by a friendly psychiatrist 
who explains and dissects characters’ experiences. 
Films that introduce the language of military neuropsychiatry to soldiers consist 
primarily of the restricted Introduction to Combat Fatigue series produced by the Navy 
between 1944 and 1947.  Titles in the series included: Introduction to Combat Fatigue 
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(1944) in which the battle experiences of a corporal in a psychiatric hospital are depicted 
by flashback, and a productive vs. unproductive understanding of fear is explained with 
reference to cats being startled by dogs; Irritability (1945) in which Gene Kelly plays a 
Naval boiler-room operator in group therapy who had lashed out at family and friends 
while on leave due to repressed feelings about surviving a torpedoing; Insomnia (1946) 
where a military screening of a Donald Duck cartoon aggravates a young soldier’s 
frustration at his inability to “unwind”; Assignment Home (1947) which follows three 
veterans on their turbulent transition back to civilian life;199 and a film that was proposed 
as the last of the series and may or may not have been made: Inside Story of Seaman 
Jones, said to examine “the adjustment problems—psychosomatic and otherwise—of an 
ex-football hero.”200 
 
Figure 8: Gene Kelly in Combat Fatigue: Irritability, and a Donald Duck cartoon screened for an audience of 
marines in Combat Fatigue: Insomnia. 
The intention was to show these films to patients in navy hospitals (and were 
subsequently adopted for use by the army as well), and also to use them as adjuncts to 
military training.  This means they were put to work as aids for transitioning men into 
warfare, re-deployment after hospitalization, and, if they were not well enough to be re-
                                               
199 Films listed in several publications including “Therapeutic Films and Group 
Psychotherapy” by Howard P. Rome, the “Education and Training” chapter in 
Neuropsychiatry in World War II written by William C. Menninger, and Psychiatry and 
Modern Warfare by Kenneth Appel and Edward Strecker. 
200 I have not been able to find this last film in any other publications that discuss this 
series, nor in the military’s catalogue of films from WWII, but it is listed as having been 
released within the series and is described by Dr. Elias Katz in his article “A Brief Survey 
of the Use of Motion Pictures for the Treatment of Neuropsychiatric Patients,” 
Psychiatric Quarterly, 20 supp. 1 (1946), 205-6.   
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deployed, then out again into peaceful civil society.  In an Army Medical Bulletin printed 
in February 1945, the first film in the series is announced as so:  
“Introduction to Combat Fatigue,” intended for use in group 
psychotherapy … sent camera crews into the South-West Pacific Theater 
to film the scenes in a realistic battle setting, this picture involves a vivid 
discussion of fear and means of controlling and turning it to the use of the 
soldier under fire.   
The new film is required for all Medical Department personnel in Army 
Service Forces installations, and is to be shown when practicable in wards 
and centers where group psychotherapy is practiced.201 
This and other films in the series feature actors in common scenarios of distress and 
frustration, orienting patients or soldiers-in-training to the diagnoses of “combat fatigue” 
or “combat exhaustion” that they may receive or encounter in their fellow soldiers.  The 
name of this film series and the medical diagnosis it refers to was itself a calculated 
communications move used by military administration to manage perceptions of the 
problem and its resolution.  Military psychiatrist Alfred Ludwig writing in the official 
medical bulletin on combat psychiatry published in 1949 notes:  
It was our policy to use the term “exhaustion” for psychiatric casualties.  
This diagnosis was the only one permissible to use on emergency medical 
tags forward of army level.  This term was, frankly, a euphemism and its 
use constituted an evasion.  However, it served to emphasize the … role of 
physical exhaustion and to imply rapid recovery after a short period of 
rest.  It also avoided giving the impression that incurable mental illness 
was present….  Although other terms, such as “psycho,” were current, 
most patients referred to their condition as “exhaustion.”  Thus despite the 
defects of the term it was valuable in fostering a proper attitude in 
patients.202  
The films in this series did their part to help “foster[ ] a proper attitude in patients” by 
framing combat fatigue as “normal,” “understandable,” and most importantly, “curable.”  
In all of the films, a psychiatrist who is either a narrator or an onscreen character 
provides explanations, terminology, and reassurance about symptoms and suggests 
techniques for their alleviation, modeling a kind of diagnostic laboratory of the mind.  In 
                                               
201 “Training Film—Introduction to Combat Fatigue,” Bulletin of the US Army Medical 
Department (BUSAMD) 85 (1945), 12.  A thorough discussion of the use of films in 
group therapy follows in Chapter 3. 
202 Ludwig “Psychiatry at the Army Level,” in BUSAMD: Combat Psychiatry, 92.   
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her essay “Film and the Construction of Memory in Psychoanalysis, 1940-1960,” 
historian Alison Winter observes that the narrator in Introduction to Combat Fatigue uses 
the analogy of a pet cat that encounters a dog in order to provide his audience with a clear 
taxonomy of “productive and unproductive modes of fear.”  On the one hand is fear that 
can be useful for stimulating quick responses to dangerous situations (the cat getting into 
“condition red” in order to defend herself), on the other is fear that “becomes so 
overwhelming that it paralyzes the subject,” and “continues to affect the body after the 
danger has passed” (the cat acting as if the dog had never left).203  Indeed, the film 
illustrates the parallels between the cat’s fear and that of the protagonist of the film, 
Edwards, in a scene where Edwards is on a small craft headed to shore to fight.  A close 
up shot of Edwards’ face as he prepares himself for landing, dissolves into a faded close 
up of the cat’s face from the earlier scene superimposed on top of Edwards’ face, while 
the narrator says: “that’s it—they’re like the cat.  They’re seeing their enemy and they’re 
scared, but they’re not yellow.”  This is followed by a sequence of battle scenes, over 
which the narrator points out the positive effects of fear: “See how that fear helps him—
see it snap that rifle into firing position.”  This begins a long flashback sequence of the 
film comprised of short scenes of Edwards in combat and other stressful realities of 
prolonged overseas duty, one in which Edwards’ friend is killed.  The narrator-
psychologist tells the viewer:  
The danger is always present; it’s as if the dog never went away. … Not 
that he is a coward, you’ve seen that he isn’t, but the death of his friend 
was a breaking point.  From now on, you’ll see that Edwards no longer 
behaves like himself.  But if we interpret these symptoms we’ll see that 
what looks mysterious or strange isn’t so illogical after all.  It’s just that 
Edwards won’t accept fear; won’t admit that he’s reached his breaking 
point. 
In order to convince soldiers of the existence of “productive and unproductive modes of 
fear” that can be drawn upon to enhance performance, the film first makes an emphatic 
distinction between “natural fear” and “cowardice”—insisting that one should not be 
ashamed of fear, and that its ability to arouse powerful survival instincts should be 
appreciated and harnessed.  




Figure 9: Edwards’ fear compared to the cat’s fear in Introduction to Combat Fatigue 
While the films’ narrator/psychiatrist provides the information, it is the soldiers 
portrayed in the films who ultimately put the information to work by taking charge of 
their healing process.  All of the films end with a resolution scene where an application 
and internalization of the psychiatric information allows the protagonist to be cured of his 
ailment and get on with business.  The “takeaway” lesson offered to viewers at the end of 
Introduction to Combat Fatigue is narrated over a montage of various scenes of 
recreation and group discussion at the psychiatric hospital:  
As soon as you’ve learned that the bullets shot at you yesterday can’t hurt 
you today, you’ve learned the first big lesson.  Then and only then will 
you get into “condition red” at the right time and in the right place.  You 
accept fear as part of living; something to be taken as a help, not as a 
handicap.  You … will be as fit as a new silver dollar, and you’ll be 
shoving off; well.204   
A smiling Edwards is shown leaving the psychiatric hospital as the narrator sums up:  
“[You are] not only better, but better than ever because you’ve learned something that 
can only be learned the hard way: that fear is a fighting man’s friend if he learns how to 
run it, and not be run by it.”205  The cure portrayed here is not only the effect of the 
                                               
204 Introduction to Combat Fatigue, TF (Training Film) 8-1402 (United States Navy, 
1944). Viewed at NACP, 2016. 
205 Ibid. 
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treatment received in the hospital, but a direct result of the soldier’s ability to interpret 
and internalize a psychiatric understanding of his fear. 
Some of the films in this series offered soldiers recognizable characters to 
empathize with in order to solicit identifications with the cures portrayed onscreen, 
bringing in a young Gene Kelly to portray a marine suffering from repressed grief, and 
Donald Duck as a frustrated insomniac.  Kelly’s role in Irritability stands out, for aside 
from Donald Duck who appears not as a protagonist but the subject of a cartoon in a 
military base screening, Kelly is the only recognizable actor in any of these films.  
Though very early in his career, it may not be a coincidence that this particular role was 
given to a Hollywood actor, as it is the one film in the series that asks most blatantly for 
identification and mimetic behaviour from its viewers.  As it follows the protagonist from 
“sick” to “cured,” the film establishes a precise formula for healing, and implicitly asks 
its viewers to be co-operative patients in their own treatment.   
Kelly’s character, Lucas, is a naval mechanic who ended up in a military recovery 
station after repeated violent outbursts while on leave to visit family.  He models the 
behaviour expected from viewers of the film when he erupts angrily during a group 
therapy session in which he has been asked to recount his story of surviving an attack on 
his ship that caused most of his shipmates to drown.  Following his outburst of extreme 
anger and irritation followed by expressions of guilt, helplessness, and weeping, the 
presiding psychiatrist ushers Lucas out of the group therapy room, congratulates him, and 
gives him a sedative.  He then returns to the rest of the patients in the session to tell them 
firmly that: “every one of you must go through a similar realization of what lies behind 
symptoms … you have to face those memories, get them out in the open, exactly as 
Lucas has done.”206  Kelly’s character models the expected sequence for resolution for 
the therapy group in the film and the therapy group ostensibly watching the film: an 
initial resistance, followed by emotional catharsis, leading to acceptance and healing.   
                                               
206 Introduction to Combat Fatigue: Irritability (United States Navy, 1945). 
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Figure 10: Gene Kelly as Lucas during Group Therapy in Combat Fatigue: Irritability 
Scenes such as these that aim to “foster proper attitudes” in group therapy are 
central elements of the narrative, and take on a particular significance in their intended 
screening context in military hospitals.207  Modelling the eventual internalization of the 
techniques and language of psychiatric group therapy becomes just as crucial a lesson as 
the provision of the psychiatric information itself.  There is a Foucauldian bio-politics at 
work here, where the films present an acceptable range for expressions of, and techniques 
for self-management of extreme distress.  The expectation is that as these cinematic 
depictions are mimicked and internalized, symptoms will be increasingly self-managed 
by viewer/patients, making them more predictable and compliant during treatment.208  
The desired result was, of course, a conservation and optimization of manpower.  As seen 
above, military documents are very explicit in their expectation that screening certain 
films could promote the self-management of psychiatric symptoms in soldiers, stating for 
example that they should be: “shown to all patients in the medical and surgical wards of 
military hospitals in an attempt to relieve them of the anxieties associated with their 
illness, and to instil in them a desire to leave the hospital and return to duty.”209  In the 
following chapter, which deals explicitly with the use of films in psychiatric therapy, we 
will revisit this scene, exploring how it offered viewers models for mimicry in the 
therapeutic context. 
                                               
207 Ludwig, “Psychiatry at the Army Level,” 92. 
208 “Bio-politics” is a term Foucault uses to describe the bureaucratic management and 
regulation of the population at the levels of the individual body and its biological 
processes.  “Bio-power” seeks to control, optimize, and govern “forces, aptitudes, and 
life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern.”  See 
“Right of Death and Power over Life” in Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume I (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1990), 141. 
209 “Project for the Development of Psychotherapeutic and Prophylactic Films,” 
“Training Films” Neuropsychiatry; RG 112 SGO/A 730; Box 1328, NACP. 
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Self-management of symptoms was not the only way in which these films 
contributed to the saving of manpower.  Providing basic psychiatric information to 
soldiers served another important function as well, in large part because of the large 
numbers of neuropsychiatric patients needing treatment and the relatively limited number 
of psychiatrists available to treat them.  Military psychiatric practice could show these 
films on heavy rotation, enabling both a standardization of the information they provided 
to viewers while simultaneously easing the burden on the limited professionals on hand 
to do therapeutic work.  In a 1946 survey of films being used as part of military 
psychiatric treatment, Lieutenant Dr. Elias Katz writes that the Introduction to Combat 
Fatigue series was prepared primarily: “for developing in the neuropsychiatric patient an 
insight into psychological mechanisms of adjustment,” but further acknowledges that 
they are useful assistants to the busy psychiatrist.  The survey quotes Lieutenant 
Commander Dr. Howard Rome, the psychiatric consultant for the Navy’s Bureau of 
Medicine and Surgery who personally oversaw the films’ production, who says that the 
films have the benefit of “relie[ving psychiatrists] of [the] tedium” of “those aspects of 
psychiatry which we admit are dull and uninspiring.”210   Rome adds that thanks to the 
films: “treatment by less experienced therapists will be raised to a higher standard and 
simplified,”211 constituting a crucial supplemental resource to the 12 week crash-course 
in psychiatric training that the military was offering to medical doctors in order to 
promote them to psychiatrists.212  Films such as Introduction to Combat Fatigue, and 
Combat Fatigue: Irritability were expected to make psychiatric treatment more efficient 
by standardizing the practice of both patient and practitioner.   
These films were thus tasked with multiple acts of heavy-lifting: 1) to create an 
environment where personnel would be receptive to psychiatric ideas and treatment; 2) to 
simplify and teach basic concepts that were considered useful for treating conditions 
quickly and getting men back to work; 3) to present soldiers with models for recovery 
that they could internalize and use to self-discipline; 4) to help to standardize treatment 
by overtaxed and under-trained specialists, and 5) in doing all of this, to facilitate the 
                                               
210 Katz, “A Brief Survey,” 204. 
211 Ibid., 204-5. 
212 Eli Ginzberg, “Logistics of the Neuropsychiatric Problem of the Army,” The 
American Journal of Psychiatry 102 no. 6 (May 1946), 729. 
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rolling out of the “forward psychiatry” program on a mass scale with limited resources. 
Evidence suggests that it was further hoped that these films could be useful in teaching 
soldiers to pre-emptively notice, diagnose, and treat themselves at the onset of symptoms 
such as fear, insomnia, irritability, etc., thus internalizing the role of the psychiatrist 
entirely and lessening burdens on the military further still.213   
In the Manual of Military Neuropsychiatry, in a segment on “Neuropsychiatric 
Aspects of Torpedo Casualties,” a subheading titled “Prevention” mentions the 
development of a film that was not identified by name, but is likely referring to the first 
of the Introduction to Combat Fatigue series.  The rationale for its production is a 
repetition of the ones seen so often in writings on morale and psychological inoculation 
examined in Chapter One: 
The vulnerability to the stress and strain of war can be lessened through 
education, and with particular reference to psychological reactions to fear 
and anger…  Moving pictures offered by the US Public Health Service, 
the Army and the Navy, … are being used with lecture teams to instruct 
the seamen on the subjects of health and morale. … We have a moving 
picture of our own in production.  This will demonstrate to the seamen of 
the Merchant Marine the types of reaction most likely to be encountered 
under combat conditions and the best methods of overcoming them.  We 
believe … [it] will exert a great influence in preserving the seamen’s 
normalcy under conditions of war strain.214 
What I hope to show by returning once again to this refrain of “normalcy” and 
inoculation, is that while on one hand, these films helped open the door to recognizing 
that traumatic reactions to fear were normal and insisted that these reactions were 
recognized with empathy, on the other hand these discourses were instrumentally applied 
to insist that soldiers adapt in logical and predictable ways to the very abnormal 
conditions of the labour they were expected to perform.  Very early in the military’s 
official bulletin on combat psychiatry, it is written that:  
                                               
213 Film prospectuses in the “Training Films” file from the Neuropsychiatric department 
of the SGO frequently list a prophylactic benefit among their aims.  See “Project for the 
Development of Psychotherapeutic and Prophylactic Films,” cited earlier in this chapter 
and in chapter 1. 
214 “Neuropsychiatric Aspects of Torpedo Casualties,” in Manual of Military 
Neuropsychiatry, 641. 
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The soldier [who has submitted himself for psychiatric leave] is saying in 
effect that he feels he cannot subject himself further to this [fear] reaction.  
Management consists in pointing out to the soldier that these sensations 
represent a normal response to combat not differing greatly from that 
experienced by men who have remained in the lines. …  The soldier must 
‘learn to live with it.’215   
The management spoken of here was too big a task for the few thousand psychiatrists 
available to an army of millions.  Films were useful tools to try to bring soldiers in to the 
military psychiatric apparatus as their own “front line” of defence and treatment.  
 
3.2.2. Teaching Officers  
The next perimeter of surveillance in the nested hierarchy was company and 
platoon officers who also had roles to play in the “forward psychiatry” program.  As the 
closest eyes to the soldiers themselves, films and other texts teaching forward psychiatry 
instructed officers that they were crucial monitors of soldiers’ mental health and stressed 
managerial techniques in addition to basic information.  In a section on “The Psychiatric 
Orientation of Combat Officers,” in the Manual of Military Psychiatry, Major Samuel 
Kraines expresses the necessity of educating officers to overcome their prejudices of 
“mental cases,” and teaching them to provide basic psychiatric services for their 
company.  The section provides an outline for a sample lecture to be given to officers by 
psychiatrists on how to “recognize abnormal mental states in your men and what to do.”  
The lecture includes discussions of: “feeblemindedness,” “neuroses,” “psychopathic 
personalities,” and “psychoses,” and suggests a follow-up lecture on the types of 
“problematic” behaviour they are likely to observe in troops as a result of family trouble, 
difficulty adjusting to military life, or fears and tensions from combat, and, most 
importantly, how to prevent these breakdowns.216 
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Films were also enlisted to teach officers how to understand psychiatric principles 
and to apply them to the management and surveillance of soldiers in their companies.  
Many psychiatric films (made for soldiers or doctors) came with explicit instructions to 
circulate to all enlisted officers.  Preventive Psychiatry in the Navy: The Role of the 
Junior Officer Part I (1954) addresses officers specifically, teaching them to pay 
attention to and cultivate a proper psychiatric disposition in their men.217 While still a 
black and white documentary, this film takes a slightly different aesthetic and rhetorical 
style from the Introduction to Combat Fatigue series by focusing less on a central 
dramatized narrative plot and instead using quick cuts between animated and montage-
based sequences to illustrate more general principles of what is configured as a balance 
between psychiatric distress and well being.  The calm and knowing psychiatrist-narrator 
is here replaced with a narrator who speaks in bold, direct imperatives.  These qualities 
give the film a more commanding and informational tone than the Introduction to 
Combat Fatigue series, which were made to inspire empathy and self-identification. 
The film begins with a rhetorical heavy hand, placing viewers implicitly within a 
lineage of history’s great military leaders as images of their official portraits fade one into 
the next, and then surveying an animated hall hung with all the portraits.  The narrator 
asks what all these great leaders all had in common, and then answers: “they got men to 
do the job, and they got them to do it better … men must want to do the job.  They need 
forces that can drive them to think, to sweat, to work, to get the job done.”  The narration 
in this film frames mental health as a balancing act that swings between “adjustment and 
maladjustment,” using short vignettes to portray common scenarios that might put a 
soldier off balance, such as a difficult bunkmate, a cold night on watch duty, or an 
“oversolicitous” mother (here alluding to the family: the ever-implied inner circle of 
                                               
217 This film is dated 1954, so it is possible that it was not actually used during WWII.  
There are other films, however, that were circulated within the military during the war, 
and then re-released for public viewing in the post war period.  Some of these films are 
dated as of their re-release date as opposed to the date of their original production.  I have 
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include it here as the rhetoric, style, tone, and message are perfectly in keeping with other 
films that were used as well as other media and documents circulated to educate officers 
in forward psychiatry. 
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responsibility for productive states of mental health, which we will look at more closely 
in chapter 4).  Problems that arise from “maladjustment,” are illustrated in a montage 
sequence of seamen on duty exhibiting bad behaviour that the narrator labels as either 
“flight reactions:” daydreams, sickness, timidity, alcoholism (“the personality suffers”), 
or “fight reactions:” irritability, destructive behaviour (“the environment suffers”).   
 
Figure 11: A still from Preventative Psychiatry in the Navy shows a closeup of a marine in a difficult situation 
with an image of a compass superimposed on his head to show that he is currently “unbalanced” as a result 
of environmental factors. 
As the disciplinary enforcer, all of these behaviours fall under the officer’s 
jurisdiction, but the film reassures the officer that he has allies in preventing these bad 
behaviours at their source—a medicalized view of the human mind.  The medical officer 
(and implicitly, his knowledge of psychiatry) is positioned as a key resource that can help 
company officers by teaching them to recognize and prevent “maladjustment,” and the 
officer himself can support this endeavour by recognizing his men’s particular stressors 
and “help them toward a successful adjustment to navy life.”  The schema of mental 
health responsibility with soldiers (in this case, seamen) at the center, the officers in the 
next concentric circle, and the medical officers in the one beyond that is here clearly 
described.  As we can see in this film and others it was doctors who were tasked with 
convincing officers to overcome their prejudices and adopt a psychiatric orientation 
toward their company.  Thus these films often contain implicit or explicit imperatives to 
listen to and take seriously the information given to them from doctors about combat 
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fatigue.  These films and corresponding documents position doctors as ideal promoters of 
the practical value of psychiatry to officers, asserting that a doctor well-versed in 
psychiatry could prove its worth by sending soldiers who had seemed unable to continue 
to fight back to their companies in relatively short order, restoring its fighting strength. 
Combat Psychiatry: The Battalion Medical Officer, a film addressed to an 
audience of field doctors, emphasizes the value of convincing officers that early 
psychiatric diagnosis can make their companies more efficient.218  This film is strictly 
narrative based and follows one doctor as he goes from being interested but reserved 
about the value of psychiatry to understanding that his primary role is that of a champion 
of psychiatric monitoring by company officers.  The dialogue in one of the central scenes 
in the film lays out its central concern explicitly.  The scene centers on a newly arrived 
doctor observing and learning from the doctor he will be replacing who is presiding over 
a conversation with a group of company officers at a mess table. One officer asks the 
more experienced doctor: “what about that fella I sent down with the drizzly runs?” who 
replies: “we corked him up—probably more of an emotional thing than infectious. … 
better keep an eye on him, though, not sure he can take much more.”  Another other 
officer quips: “oh, why not evacuate him, we’ve got fighting to do up here… he won’t be 
any good to ya even if you do get him back on the line,” to which the first officer steps 
in: “now wait a minute, Pete sent us back plenty of men I never thought we’d see again.  
And they performed, too.  That sold me.  Equivalent of a couple of platoons.”  As the 
officers all chime in about the value of psychiatric management of their companies, one 
officer remarks derisively: “look out for competition, doctor, seems like we’re all turning 
into a bunch of psychiatrists,” to which the experienced doctor replies sagely: “you know 
that’s very interesting.  Because if you realize it or not, you’ve hit it right on the head.  
Platoon leaders can be our biggest help in this whole problem.”  The new doctor’s 
voiceover observes: “Peters (the head doctor) was getting cooperation by proving that 
there could be an unnoticed and unnecessary leakage of manpower if company officers 
                                               
218 This film does not have an accurate date recording.  It is catalogued by the National 
Archives in a series titled “Professional Medical Films, ca. 1946-1948.” According to 
documents in its production file, the film was given clearance for rerelease for public 
circulation in 1962, and this is the date that appears in the title reel of the copies available 
to view. 
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did not understand the problem of combat anxiety in its many and varied forms.”219  
While this film was aimed at military doctors, the dialogue makes clear the strategic 
positioning of officers as key points of mental health surveillance alongside the role 
played by doctors.    
In fact, some films made explicitly for training doctors in psychiatry were seen as 
useful adjuncts for training officers as well, and were slated for distribution to this end.  
Field Psychiatry for the General Medical Officer is a British film adapted for distribution 
by the US Army in May 1945 (although the Navy had its own copy already circulating by 
this time).220  On the first page of the adaptation report prepared by the Signal Corps it 
states: “This British Training film is primarily for the General Medical Officer, but may 
be very helpful to all medical personnel and to officers commanding troops.”221   Indeed 
the film was classified “Restricted,” approved only for showing to military officers and 
enlisted medical personnel with a corresponding distribution plan produced by the 
Surgeon General’s office to make it available at all military hospitals and to “all officers 
in all branches of the service.”222   
The British film loosely traces a few soldiers as they become incapacitated while 
fighting and end up in a field station for treatment, and some of the officers and doctors 
they interact with.  The film has a different style from its American counterparts, with 
almost no narration (and the little narration appears on title cards between shots) and 
almost exclusively diegetic sound instead of a confident narrator and a musical score.  
The early part of the film uses long, graphic scenes of combat and lingering shots of men 
in extreme psychiatric distress to create tension and convey a blunt picture of their 
harrowing effects.  It trades the more euphemistic images of a man scowling or tossing 
uncomfortably in a bed for a harrowing sequence set in a barn used as a temporary 
medical holding site for a number of psychiatric casualties.  The camera pans slowly 
among the men in the barn, pausing to zoom in on several men who are either shaking 
violently, stuttering uncontrollably, and/or crying with extreme distress.  Field Psychiatry 
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for the General Medical Officer is also more blunt in how it recommends dealing with 
psychiatric casualties.  The first instance of extended dialogue in the film is two medics 
talking over tea, where one of them says: “First thing to do is to give him a sedative.  Not 
a textbook dose, but a whacking great big dose to wipe out his anxieties and let him get a 
deep, proper sleep with no nightmares.”223 Part of the differences between the style of 
this film and the films discussed above can be accounted for by the different people 
making the films and the cultural and institutional contexts in which they were made, but 
some of the differences are likely also due to the fact that its intended audience was made 
up of medical professionals.  It was therefore not afraid of scaring its viewers, indeed, it 
wanted to press home the seriousness of these ailments and why they should be 
diagnosed early.  The film’s extended close up shots of men in distress also supplied a 
visual catalogue of common symptoms, making training and diagnosis more efficient.   
  
Figure 12: Stills from Field Psychiatry for the General Medical Officer depict medics tending to 
neuropsychiatric patients 
The latter part of the film focuses less on these action scenes and more on 
extended dialogue between medics, officers, and psychiatrists that provide the film’s 
information on diagnosis, treatment, and rationale for forward psychiatry.  In this film, as 
with the American films for officers, the rationale for the surveillance schema in which 
officers are essential for monitoring changes in soldiers’ personalities and reporting them 
to the next level of authority, hinges on avoiding a loss of manpower.  The second to last 
scene in Field Psychiatry for the General Medical Officer takes place in a makeshift bar 
in an old country house commandeered as a military field station, in it, the medical 
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111 
officer (MO) who is holding a few soldiers out of combat for a couple of days of rest 
finds the officer of one of the soldier’s companies to talk to him.  The officer expresses 
his disappointment that what seemed to have been a good soldier “cracked up” and 
therefore must have had “a yellow streak in him somewhere.”  The MO chastises him, 
telling him that: “under the circumstances, any man will crack up—especially if he had 
any private worry.  Did he have any?  You should know, you’re his platoon commander.”  
He goes on to tell the officer to keep an eye on the returned soldier and to send anyone 
else down to him who he thinks is “tired.”  The interaction then ends with the same 
argument for efficiency heard in all films examined here: “If I have him for a couple 
days, I’m saving a week in the exhaustion centre down the line.” 
 
Figure 13: The medical officer casually reprimands the military officer for not keeping a closer eye on the 
mental health of his company’s troops in Field Psychiatry for the General Medical Officer 
While the originally intended audience for this film was doctors and medical 
personnel, the military extended the recommended viewership to include officers.  The 
reason for this is depicted narratively in the film’s final scene of a dialogue between a 
medical officer and a general.  This scene was clearly understood to be very important to 
the Signal Corps issuing its American military distribution, as a description of this very 
short scene makes up one of the two sentences comprising the film’s synopsis found in 
the official report made to accompany the film’s completed adaptation.  The synopsis 
reads: “The closing phase of this picture shows that even a medical officer, prescribing 
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for … and treating shock cases will himself come down with the symptoms of combat 
fatigue or shock.”  In this scene, the same MO who has been putting soldiers on 
temporary sick leave to treat psychiatric symptoms is called in for congratulations by a 
general for reducing the number of psychiatric cases in their outfit.  When the MO 
explains his psychiatric approach to medicine by saying that “prevention is better than a 
cure,” the general then gives the MO “a taste of his own medicine,” telling him that he is 
commanding him to take a week of sick-leave, reading him symptoms of fatigue he has 
noticed in the MO from a psychiatry pamphlet distributed to him by the medical services.  
Here, the net of psychiatric surveillance widens again to include higher-ranking officials 
and medical officers as well.  The same trope occurs at the end of the American-made 
Combat Psychiatry: The Battalion Medical Officer, when the mental health of the pre-
existing doctor who was replaced by the film’s protagonist is discussed among officers 
and the other doctors.  His professional sloppiness and irritability are attributed to his 
own “combat fatigue” and the new doctor is warned that: “it’s one of those things you 
gotta watch for yourself.”224 
While the officers were busy watching soldiers for warning signs as forward 
psychiatry’s “intelligence officers,” doctors and other medical personnel formed the next 
ring in the surveillance schema, acting as the primary gatekeepers between a soldier on 
duty and a soldier on sick leave, and deciding who needed to be sent to see a psychiatrist 
and who was presumed able to recover after a bit of “rest and reassurance.”   
 
3.2.3. Teaching Medics 
Medical personnel were the first in line to see patients whose afflictions were 
getting in the way of their work, and as such, a fair number of films were made to teach 
them how to incorporate forward psychiatry into their job.  Films addressed to doctors 
once again emphasized the need to take seriously the afflictions of psychiatric casualties, 
but added to this a host of other responsibilities such as: 1) recognizing when an ailment 
was psychosomatic in order to save time and resources looking for organic causes; 2) 
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teaching officers to be their allies in identifying the causes; 3) recuperating the potential 
lost labour of “combat fatigued” men by recognizing the validity of their complaints, 
giving them brief rest or sedatives, and sending them back to work; and 4) learning other 
techniques for treatment, such as narcosynthesis, which could be used to try to heal 
soldiers quickly.  The films looked at in this last section presented standardized and 
efficient means of communicating these concepts to doctors in the hopes that it would 
result in efficient medical practice that ultimately conserved the manpower of soldiers. 
Doctors, with their own rigorous training in the medical sciences, were the most 
likely group to take professional issue with what were sometimes considered the 
“charlatan” practices of psychiatry.  Many histories have documented the resistance of 
the military medical profession to taking the claims and practices of psychiatry 
seriously.225  Indeed, the amount of effort these films expend addressing doctors’ 
presumed resistance to psychiatry corroborates the story told in histories of military 
medicine.  All of the films made to teach doctors forward psychiatry address this problem 
one way or another: some head-on, and others through the side door.  The films 
acknowledge that doctors are likely to be irritated with both the imperative to accept 
psychiatric practices as well as the psychosomatic symptoms being displayed by their 
patients “masquerading” as “real problems.”  Doctors are encouraged to channel their 
impatience with psychosomatic symptoms toward adopting quicker diagnostics—the very 
ones enabled by accepting the psychiatric interpretation that symptoms might not have 
“organic” causes. The film discussed in the previous section, Combat Psychiatry: The 
Battalion Medical Officer, for example, addresses the anticipated resistance of doctors 
implicitly through the interpersonal dynamics played out between the two doctors 
portrayed in the film.  The efficiency and calm of the more experienced doctor who has 
embraced a psychiatrically-influenced practice is contrasted with the time-consuming and 
over-wrought diagnostic techniques of the new doctor who has to learn to keep up.  The 
new doctor observes in his voice over: “I didn’t know then that combat anxiety might 
show up as a sprained ankle that stayed lame… a pair of broken glasses … a toothache,” 
adding how he used to “waste a lot of time” doing thorough check ups for head injuries 
                                               
225 See Ben Shephard’s A War of Nerves, Chapter 3 of Mark K. Well’s Courage and Air 
Warfare: The Allied Aircrew Experience in the Second World War, and Gerald N. Grob’s 
From Asylum to Community.   
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or gastro-intestinal diseases in response to complaints of persistent headaches or chronic 
diarrhea.  The new doctor is also depicted learning how to “cure” patients quickly by 
essentially telling them to get back to work, with a kind but firm: “you can go back out 
there, everyone gets worked up like this—c’mon, you’re going to be alright.”226  The 
Foucauldian structure of hierarchized surveillance that aims to shape the self-disciplining 
subject is very clear here: by asking soldiers to recognize and correct the institutionally 
problematic link between their fear and their bodies, the doctor reminds the soldiers (and 
the film’s viewer) that the ultimate responsibility for healing their condition is theirs.  
The spread of psychiatric diagnostics into military medical practice encouraged doctors 
to recognize the validity of the “combat fatigue” diagnosis in patients with physical 
ailments, but it also allowed the medical apparatus to reassert that soldiers needed to take 
responsibility for their own minds. 
In order to make these diagnoses quickly, the films coach the doctors to call upon 
the surveillance that the officers have been coached to supply.  The new doctor in 
Combat Psychiatry: The Battalion Medical Officer at one point spends too long trying to 
diagnose a “real problem” in a marine complaining of a headache—a “luxury of civilian 
practice” his voice over editorializes.  His more experienced colleague teaches him to 
place a quick call to the marine’s officer to get “some dope” on the patient and find out if 
he might be trying to shirk his duties.  When it is confirmed that he is a “rabbity sort of 
fellow,” the responsibility is then shifted back down the ladder to the officer who is asked 
to “show some interest in him” to try to boost his morale—much as the film Preventive 
Psychiatry in the Navy coaches officers to do.  Combat Psychiatry: The Battalion 
Medical Officer acknowledges that some cases require more than firm reassurance, but 
stresses nonetheless that even these more serious cases are often easily recoverable by 
sending them to see a psychiatrist: “those who break down in battle are sent back after a 
day or two rest; those who have to be evacuated to psychiatrists, well, they send back 
well over half of the men we do have to evacuate.”  These films, when placed alongside 
each other within the roster of forward psychiatry films and military writings on forward 
psychiatry, put the rhetorical hierarchy of responsibility firmly in place: officers keep 
track of borderline cases, doctors give brief respite to mild ones, and psychiatrists cure 
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and return the rest.  Together they sell a story that a solid hierarchy of surveillance and 
management systems could bring a measure of ease and control to the institutional 
navigation of the otherwise messy, complicated, and unruly, problem of battle trauma. 
Beyond making diagnostics more efficient, the imperative to take the 
psychosomatic complaints of soldiers seriously was also officially understood to be a 
strategy for managing the morale of soldiers, who might otherwise take bad feelings 
about being dismissed by doctors back to their companies, raising the ire of not one, but 
many soldiers.  Echoing a classic fear associated with mobilizing or dissenting workers in 
industrial manufacturing, this concern is detailed in official letters and scenarios for a 
proposed film on the psychiatric dimensions of military “sick call.”  The film did not 
make it through to production before the war ended, but it would have promoted the 
value of an attentive family doctor-style bedside manner to medical officers as a way of 
making soldiers feel institutionally listened to even if their symptoms were ultimately 
diagnosed as psychosomatic.  Correspondence among high-ranking officials, filmmaking 
units, field surgeons, and psychiatric consultants found in the archives of the 
Neuropsychiatry Department give a sense of the back-and-forth negotiation that formed 
the basis for developing the scenarios, rhetorical strategies, and central concerns for this 
unrealised film on “sick call,” and some of the other psychiatric training films discussed 
here.227   
Made early on in US’ military campaign, Combat Exhaustion (1943), is a 
restricted professional medical film made by the Signal Corps for military doctors only.  
It eschews the soft sell of psychiatry’s benefits seen in Combat Psychiatry: The Battalion 
Medical Officer for direct commands and instructions on how and why to use it.  This 
film also employs the conventions of a scripted documentary aesthetic, but is much less 
narrative and more explicitly didactic.  Shot in the 312th Station Psychiatric Hospital 
where military doctors went through an intensive one-week course in psychiatry, the film 
uses a combination of actual patients, doctors, and actors, and its storyline follows a team 
of doctors who visit the psychiatric hospital to learn about “combat exhaustion.”228   In an 
                                               
227 Multiple documents in the “Training Films” file contain scenarios for such a film, as 
well as letters from psychiatrists recommending the kind of content such a film should 
contain.  “Training Films;” Neuropsychiatry; RG 112 SGO/A 730; Box 1328, NACP. 
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opening scene, the trope found in other films is repeated: the hospital’s head psychiatrist 
confronts a group of field doctors’ scepticism about the legitimacy of psychiatric 
conditions, but this time it is framed squarely as a policy directive, and not as a question 
of personal choice.  After describing a particular patient’s case file, the psychiatrist asks 
the doctors how they would treat him, causing the group to erupt in protestation: “We’re 
going to be busy out there with guys who are really shot up, and we won’t have time to 
monkey around with guys like that;”  “Major, I’m a surgeon.  Looks to me like this is a 
job for a psychiatrist.”  The psychiatrist responds firmly: “Gentlemen, you are not 
requested to treat these patients, you are directed to do so.”  He laments that by the time 
patients are sick enough to be sent to his psychiatric hospital, he “can return only a very 
small percentage of patients to actual combat duty.  Whereas you, out in the forward area, 
can, by getting at them early, send 70 to 80% back to duty on the front line.”229  This oft-
repeated promise of productivity reasserts the institutional pressure underlying all of the 
films examined here and their insistence on taking psychiatric casualties seriously.  These 
films shaped a narrative of trauma’s ordinariness, and framed it as being observable, 
predictable, treatable, and ultimately, under control.  By aggressively labelling all manner 
of conditions “normal,” psychiatric training films changed ideas about who was 
considered productive, re-casting an older model of the “stoic soldier” with a new model 
of adaptable wartime labour that could accommodate not only “good soldiers,” but also 
those who appeared unwilling or unable to fight.   
One of the primary reasons for making Combat Exhaustion and other medical 
films such as Psychiatry for the Field Medical Officer and Hypnosis: Okinawa, was to 
promote the use of abreaction—expressions of emotion considered to be a re-
experiencing of fears and conflicts—by medics and to orient other high-ranking 
personnel (including officers) to this practice.  The following chapter looks more closely 
at this treatment, which was adopted as a tool for efficient psychiatric treatment of 
combat fatigue, and the use of films by psychiatrists as medical tools and adjuncts in this 
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process.230  These films encouraged medical officers to adopt psychiatric practices such 
as narcosynthesis while situating the importance of these practices within the efficient 
functioning of the larger military structure.  Films made to be viewed by psychiatric 
personnel, on the other hand, tended to be more strictly informational and concentrated 
on specific techniques, such as the film Ward Care for Psychotic Patients, examined in 
Chapter 3.  However, there appears to be at least one exception: a film produced within 
the same series as Combat Psychiatry: the Battalion Medical Officer, the film discussed 
above. Combat Psychiatry: the Division Psychiatrist was a film made to orient 
psychiatrists assigned to field duty about the particularities of psychiatric practice in a 
battlefield medical station.231  As the film addresses professionals who are presumably 
already convinced of psychiatry’s usefulness, its predominant message is how viewers 
should adapt their psychiatric practice to the conditions of field medicine.  The film 
loosely follows a psychiatrist working out of a small tent in a navy medical station not far 
from active fighting as he diagnoses and treats patients and interacts with other officers in 
the station. 
                                               
230 See L. F. Beck, “A Second Review of 16-milimeter Films in Psychology and Allied 
Sciences” Psychological Bulletin 39 no.1 (1942).  The film Hypnosis: Okinawa (or 
alternately titled: Psychiatry on Okinawa: The use of Hypnotherapy in Combat 
Psychiatry) is mentioned in this and other military publications, and is described as 
documenting the success of hypnosis-based therapy being used on soldiers in the Pacific 
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available in the “Training Films” folder from the archives of the Neuropsychiatry 
Department describes the film as follows: “In Okinawa, the main method of sedation was 
hypnosis to bring about similar results to chemical sedation.  A scene demonstrates the 
use of hypnotherapy.”  
231 Combat Psychiatry: The Division Psychiatrist, PMF 5300 (United States Navy 
Training Film, 1954).  This film also has an unclear date of production.  It is also 
catalogued in the file “Professional Medical Films, ca. 1946-1948” at the National 
Archives.  It was given clearance for public rerelease in 1954, and this is the date that 
appears on its title card. 
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Figure 14: A still from Combat Psychiatry: The Division Psychiatrist shows a graphic representation of where 
the field Neuropsychiatric Unit sits in relation to the combat zone and other aid stations. 
Existing in the outermost ring of the surveillance network, psychiatrists in this 
film are shown interacting with all levels of personnel in order to get them involved in the 
effective implementation of forward psychiatry.  Psychiatrists are encouraged to lean on 
the supervision of the group in order to maximize cooperation from soldiers, with the 
narrator saying: 
[I]nform men of their impending return to duty in the presence of other 
soldiers.  In a private interview they will protest leading to unprofitable 
discussion and possible resentments, but if buddies are listening they 
won’t complain.232  
Stressed among the tasks required of the field psychiatrist is once again the role of 
teaching others to be receptive to their practice.  Psychiatrists are encouraged to visit the 
medic stations frequently and get to know both the medical officers and the commanding 
officers of their patients.  As the film’s narrating psychiatrist states: “effort to win friends 
is necessary” as there is sometimes a “lack of understanding as to the role and usefulness 
of the psychiatrist.”233  In a voice-over, the psychiatrist in the film rehearses the refrain 
common to all the films here: “If I can get these battalion medical officers to spot 
neuropsychiatric cases and hold ‘em forward, we can get them back to duty more 
quickly.”234 The film insists that good relations with doctors is essential to rooting out 
                                               




patients with psychosomatic ailments whose misdiagnosis can result in “an appreciable 
leakage of manpower.”  The psychiatrist portrayed in the film, at the top of the ladder of 
hierarchized surveillance, is shown interacting tactfully and successfully with doctors, 
officers, and soldiers, effectively demonstrating the range of relationships and influence 
that the entire forward psychiatry program itself hoped to achieve. 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
The films deployed as part of the preventative psychiatry program in the US 
military were tools for efficiency and automation: they enabled standardization of 
messaging and psychiatric practices across all levels of personnel.  They ensured that the 
psychiatric information reaching viewers was in line with institutional imperatives while 
also lessening the workload of psychiatrists, both in the hospital by conveying basic 
information to patients, and in the larger military organization where they were expected 
to be consultants on behaviour.  These films formed part of a multi-pronged 
communications campaign that clearly outlined the role of each ranking personnel in 
implementing the preventative psychiatry program.  In order to roll out this program 
effectively, the pervasive taboos surrounding mental health and psychiatry had to be 
confronted, substituting them with a discourse promoting the normalcy and even 
productivity of fear, and alerting higher-ranking personnel to the environmental factors 
that were likely to contribute to a “combat fatigued” soldier.  In order to ensure the 
uptake and use of psychiatric practices and information, the films taught their viewers a 
visual and discursive language of mental health/distress that was integrated into the 
network of behavioural surveillance inherent in the military institution.  Promoted 
repeatedly as the key to effective psychiatric management, careful surveillance was said 
to result in increased efficiency for the fighting forces by keeping soldiers at work longer, 
and getting them back to work again as quickly as possible should they need psychiatric 
attention. 
While a widely circulated media campaign promoting the acceptance and 
empathy of mental health collapse and symptoms of acute distress can on one hand be 
understood as a marker of institutional enlightenment and modernization, it is also crucial 
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to see that the institutional imperative behind the adoption of this discourse was one of 
manpower efficiency.  The military documents written about or in conjunction with these 
films, and indeed, the language used in the films themselves make this imperative 
abundantly clear.  In addition to the plainly stated belief that forward psychiatry could 
reduce the number and severity of psychiatric casualties, the establishment of a discourse 
of normalness around issues of mental health and distress was part of an institutional 
effort to recuperate the unruly category of the “psycho;” a subject who would otherwise 
be a casualty of the institution’s rigid demands for behavioural normalcy.  By widening 
the spectrum of “normal” to include soldiers with psychiatric distress, the military 
psychiatric apparatus increased its bio-power by developing corresponding administrative 
tools that worked to regulate and organize people, symptoms, and treatments and 
ultimately lessen their disruption to the larger military organism.235  Providing visual 
models of both distress and healing in films such as Combat Fatigue: Irritability helped 
to promulgate this wider set of norms within which even soldiers formerly considered to 
be “psychos” could see and internalize a range of acceptably deviant behaviour.  By 
putting a visible narrative trajectory from “combat fatigued” to “cured” on display the 
films acted as techniques of visualization, prescribing a course of action for returning to a 
more productive state of normalcy.   
In practice, however, the much-touted power of forward psychiatry to “salvage up 
to 80%” of “combat exhausted” soldiers may have been more about selling the program 
than producing actual results.  Post war studies have suggested that such ambitious claims 
may have been a widespread public relations strategy to keep morale high amongst 
personnel, making the films documents of institutional propaganda as well as their roles 
as organizational maps of surveillance and promulgations of self-help.  Even optimistic 
psychiatrists from forward areas claimed only a 60% possible return to duty.236  The 
bleaker reality was that only about 2% of servicemen who left fighting for psychiatric 
reasons went back into combat, while the rest of the return percentages were beefed up by 
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including soldiers transferred from combat to “noncombatant service in quiet sectors.”237  
Despite forward psychiatry’s goal of stemming the tide of casualties leaving their jobs 
and filling overcrowded and costly hospitals, vast numbers of soldiers still required 
psychiatric treatment.  The military-published postmortem, Neuropsychiatry in World 
War II, acknowledges the massive disparity between the number of patients needing 
treatment and the number of trained specialists available, stating that military and veteran 
hospitals often had the option of offering patients “group treatment or no treatment.”238  
The same economy-of-scale tactics that adopted films to promote preventative psychiatry 
were again used in hospital treatment where some practitioners thought that films could 
efficiently trigger therapeutic expressions of emotion from patients—the subject of the 
following chapter.239  While this reality appears to make the claims of the films examined 
in this chapter laughably false, the rhetoric and institutionally instrumental psychiatric 
concepts that they promoted nevertheless consisted in a highly-coordinated course in 
“Psychiatry 101” that was taught to millions of military personnel, influencing 
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Chapter 4. Performances of Trauma in Theatres of 
Cure: Audio Visual aids in Military Psychiatric Therapy 
 
The films that promoted forward psychiatry examined in the previous chapter 
were, for the most part, auxiliary to psychiatric treatment.  They worked to teach, to train, 
or to establish infrastructures for managing behaviour in order to streamline and 
ultimately lessen the burden on the act of therapeutic treatment itself.  Some of these 
films, however, were also used in a way that was not about providing information, but 
instead sought more targeted effects from the minds of viewers.  In the clinical setting, 
films were sometimes used as tools in therapeutic treatment, soliciting reactions of 
identification, soothing, or fear from individual patients in pursuit of faster, more 
efficient recovery.  This chapter shows how experimentations with film as a tool in 
therapeutic psychiatric practice arose in tandem with the popularization of 
narcosynthesis—a form of performative catharsis therapy that became a central 
component of military psychiatry during World War II.  Experimented with by some of 
the first psychiatrists sent to work with soldiers in medic tents very close to lines of active 
fighting, this technique of visualization proved successful at soliciting performed 
expressions of trauma from patients, which were equated with unearthing repressed 
memories understood to be impeding recovery.  Not only was this technique documented 
in films that circulated throughout the military in order to teach viewers about psychiatry, 
but films were also used in clinical settings in order to solicit the same effects sought 
from narcosynthesis treatments. This chapter positions performance of trauma as a key 
technique of visualization in the development of military psychiatric therapy’s 
modernization.  It enabled practitioners to to administer large numbers of patients 
efficiently as demand for treatment began to exceed available resources.   
Narcosynthesis was not used as a treatment until partway through the war, but it 
quickly became widespread.  Many military and psychiatric documents describe the 
process as dependable, predictable, and easy to implement.  The first section of this 
chapter describes the emergence and cinematic documentation of this techniques, and 
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works to show that the visible/performative nature of this practice was key to the benefits 
that it conferred on military psychiatry—in particular as an implicit confirmation that an 
institutional obligation to the patient had been fulfilled.  The success of what I call a 
“theatre of cure”—a therapeutic event involving some form of trigger that results in a 
performance of trauma— spurred many psychiatrists to experiment with the use of film.  
Indeed projecting films became a privileged tool that was itself used to trigger 
performances of trauma from patients, further automating the therapeutic process.  This 
use of film and techniques of visualization further led some psychiatrists to incorporate 
film-like explanations into their models of the mind’s functions as they theorized the 
effects of film observation on viewers. 
The second half of this chapter looks at several different ways in which film was 
used in clinical psychiatric practice with soldiers.  These practices were not as standard or 
widespread as that of narcosynthesis, and tended to differ in their aims and methods 
along with the practitioner deploying them.  As a result, we see that films were used in a 
multitude of ways, understood variously as handy pedagogical objects, soothing proto-
psychedelia, triggers for repressed memories, and in the case of narrative films—offering 
surrogate performances that could be identified with and emulated by patients.  In all 
cases, psychiatrists approached film as an object that could be used to target particular 
cognitive functions and optimize the minds of patient-viewers.   
 
4.1. Developments in Field Psychiatry  
Despite forward psychiatry’s goal of keeping men fighting longer and quickly 
returning “up to 80%” of “combat exhausted” soldiers to work after a short rest, vast 
numbers of soldiers ended up in military hospitals requiring psychiatric treatment, with 
between 26 to 40 percent of all medical evacuations diagnosed as psychiatric, and 
numbers as high as 75% in particularly brutal campaigns.240  As we have seen in previous 
chapters, apart from using various psychological tests to pre-screen inductees to avoid 
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them altogether, there was minimal provision for psychiatric casualties at the outset of the 
war.  Historian of American psychology Ellen Herman writes that  
During the first 2 years of the war, psychiatric casualties had been 
summarily discharged; they were given a diagnosis, but treatment was 
discouraged because “the official point of view of the Army toward 
psychiatric illness was a mixture of fatalism and disinterest; treatment was 
discouraged.”241 
But by spring of 1943, numbers of neuropsychiatric admissions rose to 20,000 a month, 
reaching a peak of 31,000 men per month in August of that year.242  By the end of the 
war, the total number of men discharged from the US military for neuropsychiatric 
reasons was 504,000, or 5% of the entire fighting force.243 
In medic tents, field hospitals, hospitals overseas, stateside psychiatric hospitals, 
outpatient clinics, and Veteran’s Association centres, both active duty soldiers and 
discharged veterans required treatment for the symptoms they had developed in service.  
There were, however, very limited numbers of psychiatric professionals available to treat 
them, making experimentations with expediency essential.  One of the most significant 
outcomes of military psychiatry during World War II was an investment in and 
routinization of group therapy as a form of treatment.  And the post war review published 
by the US Military, Neuropsychiatry in World War II, acknowledges the massive 
disparity between the number of patients needing treatment and the number of trained 
specialists available, stating that military and veteran hospitals often had the option of 
offering patients “group treatment or no treatment.”244   
In addition to group treatment, a number of other clinical expediencies were tried 
out and popularized amongst psychiatrists trying to meet the overwhelming demand for 
care, including: narcosynthesis, sedation, rest, electroshock therapy, hypnotherapy, and 
hydrotherapy.  Both in conjunction with and alongside these techniques, film was 
experimented with as an aid for expediting psychiatric treatment.  Films themselves were 
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incorporated into treatment in a number of different ways, understood in different 
contexts to be tools for inoculation, didactic aids, subliminal therapy, and exposure or 
desensitization therapy.  The same economy-of-scale tactics that led to using film to 
promote forward psychiatry en masse led to the use of film as a medical tool that could 
speed treatment up by providing information quickly, teaching audiences what was 
expected of them as patients, and also by acting as a more complex interlocutor, working 
to trigger therapeutic expressions of emotion from patients in group therapy.245 
The extensive forward psychiatry program, whose rhetoric of catching problems 
early and creating a network of responsibility for monitoring mental health was discussed 
in the previous chapter, also included the actual treatment of patients who needed to be 
seen by a specialist.  In addition to medical officers briefed in psychiatric practices by 
way of films such as Combat Exhaustion, there was a significant (though insufficient) 
cohort of psychiatrists who were employed by the military to treat soldiers.  Many of 
these psychiatrists were newly minted by the military during the war, as the number of 
professional psychiatrists working in the US prior to the war was not nearly enough to 
meet their demand.  In 1940, the total number of psychiatrists registered in the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) was 2,295.  Beginning in 1943, an additional 2,400 
medical doctors were put through a twelve-week training program in military psychiatry, 
established by William Menninger to deal with this lack.246  Thus a full doubling of the 
number of psychiatric professionals in the United States occurred as a direct result of 
military training.   
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This massive new cohort was trained specifically to address wartime needs.  Prior 
to the war, two-thirds of the registered members of the APA worked in psychiatric 
hospitals administering to vulnerable people with ongoing conditions.247  In wartime, 
military psychiatrists were working with people without major ongoing psychiatric 
difficulties, or “normal” citizens, who were suffering under abnormal conditions.  They 
were also working under a strict institutional imperative to get patients back to work, 
favouring strategies that provided quick and demonstrable successes over ongoing 
custodial care and psychotherapy.  Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely observe this in their 
book Shellshock to PTSD: Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War, where they 
write that: “the principle aim of [forward psychiatry] treatments was to return men to 
duty rather than address their mental state.  …  Contemporary accounts provide little 
evidence that the primary motivation was therapeutic.”248  It is perhaps not surprising that 
this bias existed given the exigencies of war and the demands of the military institution.  
Alongside the enormous increase in working psychiatrists in the US as a result of the war 
and the legitimacy conferred on their practices by military communications and 
infrastructure, a closer examination of how this bias translated into practice and rhetoric 
is warranted.  For the purposes of this study, what is most relevant is how pressures for 
expediency dovetailed with the possibilities provided by film and other audio-visual tools 
in order to help facilitate this rapid and large-scale transformation of psychiatry. 
Roy Grinker and John Spiegel were two of the first psychiatrists sent by the 
military to work with distressed soldiers on the battlefront. The goal was to keep soldiers 
in the field, rather than discharging them and sending them back to hospitals in the US.  
Their work was vastly influential, and much of it was compiled into the training manual 
used in the military’s psychiatric training program.  In an article titled “The Management 
of Neuropsychiatric Casualties in the Zone of Combat,” Grinker and Spiegel write that 
for many patients coming directly from battle: “4 or 5 days in a rest camp or forward 
evacuation hospital can return many run-down men to combat.”  However, for those 
patients with “excessive anxieties,” these “covering up” techniques (rest, food, and firm 
encouragement) did not work, and forward psychiatry was required to expand its 
                                               
247 Grob, The Mad Among Us, 196. 
248 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, 87. 
127 
strategies beyond preventative mental health education and management.  Grinker and 
Spiegel write that seriously distressed patients required “‘uncovering technics’ to relieve 
the effect of the traumatic experience, with a dosed, carefully graded emotional release.”  
Their model consisted of soldiers who were either able to get back to work by “covering” 
up their anxieties or those who needed a “release” to “uncover” them which would 
hopefully return them to productivity.  They write:  
In one case we assist the ego in repressing or enduring anxiety if it can do 
so in a relatively non symptomatic fashion.  In the other case we release 
the repressed forces and direct our therapy to reorganizing the 
personality.249  
The rhetoric that emerges here is a more formal articulation of the kind seen in other 
training texts, including some of the films introduced in the previous chapter.  The film 
Combat Psychiatry: The Division Psychiatrist, also presents a rhetorical division between 
patients who can be treated quickly through “covering” techniques vs. those who require 
more lengthy “uncovering” treatment.250  In keeping with the established protocol of 
forward psychiatry communications, the film emphasizes the use of the “covering” 
techniques of rest and recuperation over more elaborate “uncovering” techniques.  The 
various “covering” therapies depicted in the film include “24 hours of complete relief 
from anxiety” where soldiers are allowed to sleep in and receive food while still in their 
cots, followed by games, athletics, and re-training.  Several patients portrayed under the 
care of a psychiatrist in a field medical station are deemed minor cases, serving to 
reinforce the message that most can be sent back to duty, but a few need to be sent further 
from active fighting for more extensive “uncovering” treatment.  A narrator describes one 
such patient as an “obviously immature personality” suffering from minor trauma after a 
short tour of duty and showing no improvement after 24 hours.  He is deemed an 
“evacuee” as he “is not going to be of value even in a rear echelon job.”251  Another 
                                               
249 Roy Grinker and John Spiegel, “The Management of Neuropsychiatric Casualties in 
the Zone of Combat” in Manual of Military Neuropsychiatry, eds. Harry C. Solomon and 
Paul I Yakovlev (Philadelphia: WB Saunders Company, 1944), 520. 
250 Combat Psychiatry: The Division Psychiatrist, PMF 5300 (United States Navy 
Training Film, 1954).  This film is archived under “Second World War Military Films” at 
the National Archives and was likely made for naval use prior to 1954, but given 
clearance for rerelease by the army at this time. 
251 Ibid. 
128 
character is diagnosed with “old sergeant” syndrome who, having served extensively, is 
too damaged to continue to be of use and will need to be treated in a psychiatric hospital 
further from the fighting front.   
While depicting a couple of soldiers who need to be evacuated, the film’s 
emphasis remains firmly on the “covering” techniques of rest, recuperation, and re-
deployment.  The film’s narrator reminds the intended audience of psychiatrists that they 
need to learn that many men can “take more than what seems possible.”  They are also 
directed to emphasize to their patients how sparingly non-combat jobs are given out, 
warning that otherwise word will get around that “the psychiatrist is the man to see if you 
want to trade your foxhole for a rear echelon job.”252  This film’s superficial treatment of 
actual psychiatric practices and its emphasis on how to manage relationships with 
patients and other personnel was presumably meant to remind new psychiatrists of their 
primary responsibility to institutional priorities over and above those of any individual 
patient.253   
  
 
4.1.1. Catharsis Therapy—Narcosynthesis and Hypnosis  
The institutional imperatives guiding the training of psychiatrists entering military 
service inclined their practice away from time-consuming talk therapy and toward 
treatment techniques that were theoretically efficient and elicited dramatic responses, 
privileging the sudden change over the gradual.  This orientation, demanded by the 
military’s needs, contributed significantly to the larger changes that psychiatric practices 
underwent during this period.  In The Romance of American Psychology, Ellen Herman 
documents the growth and change to the psychological and psychiatric disciplines in the 
United States as a result of the war.  Herman quotes WWII military psychiatrist Edward 
Strecker, who notes “the necessity for therapy to adapt itself to a more or less inflexible 
military framework,” in his presidential address to the American Psychiatric Association 
(APA) in 1944.  Herman writes that military constraints “forced clinicians to devise a 
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menu of creative psychotherapeutic alternatives and shortcuts ‘which give promise of 
returning a maximum number of men to duty within a minimum of time and with 
techniques which are feasible in the active theatres of combat.’”254   Pioneers in the 
development of this “menu” of therapeutic alternatives were Grinker and Spiegel.  A 
practicing psychiatrist before the war, Grinker belonged to the psychodynamic school of 
psychiatry—a disciplinary orientation that emphasized the social and environmental 
influences on mental health.  Prior to the war, this school was a marginal trend in relation 
to the dominant psychosomatic school, which was more inclined to understand mental 
illness as physiological and pathological (thus more difficult to cure).  Certain 
psychodynamic psychiatrists gained prominence during their careers as military 
psychiatrists—partly due to their conviction that neuroses were largely a social problem 
and could therefore be cured.  This institutional success flipped the disciplinary 
dominance, and in the post war years, psychodynamic psychiatrists came to occupy key 
positions in the APA and federal mental health institutions.255 
Grinker had himself gone through psychoanalysis with Sigmund Freud, and he 
brought to front-line military psychiatry a tradition of attending to a patient’s past in 
analysis.256  Adapted to a military context, psychoanalytic concepts laid the foundation 
for the narcosynthesis treatments introduced in the previous chapter, which became 
formalized and popularized by Grinker and Spiegel.257  Once they had arrived in Tunisia, 
Grinker and Speigel set up a makeshift neuropsychiatric hospital just behind the fighting 
lines, using what supplies they could find.  Historian Alison Winter writes that, “as they 
scrounged for medical supplies, they came upon a huge stash of Sodium Pentothal, then a 
popular intravenous anaesthetic.”258  Familiar with the work of British psychiatrists John 
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Stephen Horsley and William Sargant, who had published accounts of their use of 
barbiturate drugs in “narco-analysis,” or the recovery of repressed memories during 
interviews conducted under heavy sedation, Grinker and Speigel began using the Sodium 
Pentothal as part of their psychiatric interviews with soldiers.  Winter writes:  
This new technique required almost no training or time.  And the stories 
patients related under its influence were not the usual stuff of 
psychoanalysis—the childhood memories and intrafamily conflicts 
rendered symbolically in interesting symptoms.  Rather they were 
straightforward narratives of events of the recent past.  Therapists using 
Pentothal rarely dwelt on these narratives to probe their symbolic 
significance… Instead, they treated them as straightforward historical 
records.259 
Called “Narcosynthesis,” this treatment was implemented in order to produce emotional 
catharsis in the patient by way of an emotional “abreaction” or a re-experiencing of 
frightening memories, this in turn was understood to release the memory’s hold on the 
mind and body of the patient.  In their chapter in the Manual of Military Neuropsychiatry, 
Grinker and Spiegel write that Sodium Pentothal, delivered intravenously, “induces a 
state of seminarcosis during which the patient is able to live through his traumatic battle 
experiences.”260  They report that the drug allows patients to deal with revived emotions 
“economically and rationally,” free from the distortions normally created by their 
repression.  Though ideally, the drug would be delivered once, producing the desired 
reaction from patients, in an article titled “The Therapeutic use of Prolonged Sodium 
Amytal Narcosis,” published in 1947, psychiatrist Thos J. Heldt writes that in stubborn 
cases, the treatment can be extended over 5-12 days of narcosis where the patient is kept 
asleep for 12-20 hours out of 24.  He concludes that “the goal of therapy is a toxic drug 
delirium in which the patient will not only talk freely, but also will act out and actually 
abreact some of the painful repressions which have been previously inaccessible.”261   
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Due to its relative simplicity: administer the drug; expel the damaging repressed 
memories, the narcosynthesis treatment became wildly popular, rising to the top of the 
“menu of creative shortcuts.”  Winter writes that: 
This cathartic practice spread through the army, where it was celebrated as 
the linchpin of humane yet speedy psychiatric care.  The idea of accessing 
blocked memories motivated the work of hundreds of military 
psychiatrists and field doctors and the experiences of thousands of 
patients.262   
It was believed that these drugs could efficiently “uncover” frightening memories from 
the mind of patients, and the proof that this uncovering was occurring was the patient 
narrating or acting out their memories visually and audibly, performing a kind of scene of 
the past for the attending physician.  In other words, the treatment was understood to act 
as a kind of “rewind” button that could be pressed until the therapist was able to watch 
the desired scene of trauma. 
Unlike scenes of narcosynthesis depicted in films such as Combat Exhaustion, 
where the drug alone prompts a spontaneous acting out of emotion by the patient, it 
seems that in many cases, the acting was not solely done by the patient.  Described by 
Major Alfred Ludwig in Bulletin of the US Army Medical Department: Combat 
Psychiatry, narcosynthesis entailed first the intravenous injection of the drug, and then 
often, the dramatic participation of the attending medical doctor or psychiatrist in order to 
stimulate the memory of the patient.   
In the early stages of treatment the object was to recall to the patient the 
original traumatic situation in battle.  He was told that he was again on the 
battlefield, and the statement was reinforced by loud warnings, such as 
“look out,” or “watch those shells,” or “duck,” or by whistling to mimic 
approaching shells and jarring the cot.263   
Grinker and Spiegel also noted that if a patient is proving resistant, “the stimulation is 
made more dramatic and realistic. … The medical officer is called on to play a variety of 
roles” including pretending to be dead comrades who may have been involved in a 
particular scene.264  These performances on the part of doctors and psychiatrists were a 
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technique of visualization that formed a key part of the larger theatre of cure taking place 
in military psychiatry.  Ludwig writes that: 
Usually the patient responded with a dramatic startle pattern, cowered on 
the couch, sought cover, and at times jumped to the floor to dig in or take 
flight.  He then relived his battle experiences and talked to the therapist as 
if he were some officer or comrade who was with him at the time.  Such 
recitals, highly realistic and dramatic, were often accompanied by a great 
outburst of emotion and expressions of resentment, hatred, or previously 
suppressed fear.265 
All of this action sought the instrumental result of a quick and violent expulsion of 
emotions in the hopes that this would “uncover” the problem that had brought the patients 
to the psychiatrist for help.  Ludwig concludes of this treatment that: “In general, the 
greater the emotional release, the better … end result,” boasting that this method “proved 
successful in approximately 95% of patients.”266 
Confident figures such as these secured this technique’s popularity and meant that 
drug-induced audio-visual performances became a standard and normalized element of 
military psychiatric treatment.  The damaged human mind was suddenly being described 
by experts as eminently treatable through the re-creation of these quite simple and 
standard procedures: scene one, trigger the memory with drugs, voice and/or actions; 
scene two, witness the memory being acted out, which was akin to watching the trauma 
being purged.  In this concise theatre of cure, the performance of trauma by the soldier 
was presumed to be the indication that the treatment was successful.  This technique of 
visualization lent itself very well to being portrayed on film, making it easily 
communicable to viewers without having to delve deeply into the complex psychiatric 
explanations underpinning its development.  Winter notes this connection in her book, 
observing that “among the most influential means of establishing this practice were a 
small number of widely distributed motion picture films made by the US Army Signal 
Corps to train field medics in how to diagnose and treat psychiatric disorders.”267 She is 
referring to films including Combat Exhaustion and Psychiatric Procedures in the 
Combat Area, examined below.  The ease with which this treatment could be 
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communicated on film meant it was not only expedient to administer, but also to learn.  
These films were circulated widely throughout the military, and, as Winter writes, “in 
some cases [they] supplied most of the ‘training’ a medical officer might receive.”268  
The performative/visual nature of this treatment greatly facilitated its standardization and 
routinization as it was promulgated via training films, and also promoted a model of the 
mind as something that could be “seen into” in the service of making it work better. 
 
Performances of Trauma; Theatre of Cure 
Film Bulletin number 184, Psychiatric Procedures in the Combat Area, is a black 
and white newsreel-style film made in 1944 as an introduction to the general practices of 
military psychiatry for officers and medics.  It stands in striking contrast to the films 
described in the previous chapter whose depictions of “combat fatigue” in 
neuropsychiatric casualties are very mild.  This film bulletin presents a distressingly 
honest portrayal of men in various stages of trauma and recovery in overseas medical 
stations.  While the soldiers portrayed in the training films examined in the previous 
chapter are clearly actors, this newsreel has a realist documentary aesthetic with scenes 
that appear to be unprompted and spontaneous performances given by soldiers who have 
recently been in combat.  The film opens with a predictable rhetorical arc beginning with 
a few short, graphic scenes of combat and dead and mutilated bodies narrated by voice 
over, making a case for the dire circumstances that make military psychiatry an essential 
service.  It then introduces the field medical station with its psychiatric intake tents and 
recovery stations, followed by a long scene of an extended intake interview with a soldier 
who the narrator describes as having “mild anxiety.”  The soldier is able to communicate 
with the psychiatrist clearly and he and the other soldiers in the early part of the film 
represent less severe cases of neuropsychiatric casualties.  The film then shows several 
short, generic shots of soldiers eating, resting, and training and the narrator states that 
after few days of “good food, rest, and retraining,” these soldiers are sent back to their 
companies in “good form.”269  In contrast to other films tackling this topic, the film then 
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continues with several extended scenes of increasingly incapacitated soldiers in 
interviews with psychiatrists, some of whom can barely or can’t speak at all.  The film’s 
arc follows a typical forward psychiatry’s flow chart, moving geographically further 
away from battle as soldiers’ symptoms prove to be more challenging.   
 
Figure 15: Still from Psychiatric Procedures in the Combat Area shows the different regions of treatment of 
neuropsychiatric patients in relation to the zone of active combat (left).  The goal was to treat most patients 
as close to combat zones as possible, moving only a small number of the most severe cases increasingly 
further from combat until they are discharged back to the US (right). 
Overall, the film maintains the confident rhetoric of success heard in the other 
military psychiatric films, describing how forward psychiatry recuperates soldiers and 
puts them back to work effectively.  Statistics of how many soldiers are successfully sent 
back to active duty and/or to non-combat jobs, and how few are actually discharged from 
the service entirely are repeated regularly.  The remaining few who are discharged back 
to the US are explained away by emphasizing that they most likely had “pronounced 
neurotic disabilities in their past.”270  Despite these similarities to other training films, 
what sets this film firmly apart from the others is the devastatingly candid footage of 
interviews with distressed soldiers who reply meekly to psychiatrists’ questions with 
answers such as: “I just can’t stand seeing people killed,” “I’ve had about all I can take,” 
or “I can’t kill people.”271  It is impossible to know whether the soldiers appearing in the 
film had been coached or prompted prior to shooting, and how much of the film is staged 




(apart from the scripted narration), but the affect of the performances is clearly meant to 
convey the authenticity of their experience.  
One of the most interesting and affecting scenes in this film documents a soldier 
undergoing narcosynthesis in a medic tent.  The narrator introduces the scene by stating 
that: 
A few tense, uncertain patients cannot start on their road to recovery 
because the specific sources of their anxiety have been obscured in the 
depths of an hysterical amnesia…. This man will be given an intravenous 
injection of a barbiturate, which will permit him to relive his experiences 
constructively.272  
The medic, an attendant, and a soldier, are all framed tightly together as the medic gives 
the weeping and thrashing soldier an intravenous injection of sodium pentothal while the 
attendant holds him down against the cot.  A medium close up of the medic shows him 
animatedly commanding the patient: “you’re back on the battle field now … what are you 
doing?”  A reverse shot frames the three of them around the cot again while the medic 
continues to animatedly describe a violent battle scene and the attendant holds the patient 
down who is trying to escape the shells that he thinks are exploding all around him.  
Against the background sounds of helicopters flying outside the tent, the patient starts to 
weep and describe being stuck in a fox hole with his dead buddy, being blown out of that 
hole and trying to find another one, and taking to a ridge for cover, as if he were there.  
His story starts to meander and he recalls shooting some surrendering German soldiers at 
close range, when the medic intervenes to bring him back to the first story by 
commanding: “you’re back on the ridge; watch out for those shells!”  The patient cries 
out: “Sargent [indiscernible name], are you there?” to which the medic replies: “yes, I’m 
here.”  This disturbing scene is 8 minutes long, and contains almost exclusively diegetic 
sound from the patient and psychiatrist and the noises outside the tent.  The scene is 
bookended by the calm narrator who wraps up what has transpired by saying that in the 
process of the narcotized interview, violent emotions result, sometimes accompanied by 
tears, and: “As the patient wakes up, he is forced to repeat the newly remembered 
experiences, this ensures that the memories will be available for later treatment.”273  





Figure 16: Stills from narcosynthesis scene in Combat Procedures in the Combat Area. 
Though its distressing honesty, detail, and length make this depiction of 
narcosynthesis stand in curious contrast to the quick and painless depiction of 
narcosynthesis from the film Combat Exhaustion examined in Chapter 2, a few key 
principles remain the same.  In addition to a visualization of the principles of 
narcosynthesis that military psychiatrists have described in their writing, the 
narcosynthesis scenes in both films depict the crucial element of this military-therapeutic 
process; what I am calling a performance of trauma.  To say whether or what kind of 
curative benefit this performance provided patients is not something that this project has 
any intention or capacity to comment on.  The fact that it represented an objective 
improvement over offering no treatment (or imprisonment and/or dishonourable 
discharge, as was often the case in World War I) is undeniable.  The goal of this analysis 
is instead to suggest that there were institutional benefits to achieving a visible 
performance of trauma that was readily equated with a successful act of catharsis within 
military psychiatry.   
I use the term “performance of trauma” drawing on the work of anthropologist 
Audra Simpson who has herself used the term “performance of reconciliation” to draw 
attention to the ways in which certain expressions of emotion displayed by indigenous 
subjects engaging with the Canadian government’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) can be made institutionally beneficial.274  Simpson proposes that the performative 
nature of official “reconciliation” paired with the ongoing reality of indigenous people 
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being violently dispossessed of life, land, and culture by the government presents “a 
simultaneous affective and extractive mode” of address that attempts to “make a break 
from a grievous past.”  She states that the spectacle of reconciliation which often includes 
documentation of indigenous subjects expressing emotional responses to the TRC works 
to settle the unsettled co-existence of the colonial state and indigenous claims to 
sovereignty “through the technique … of a contract” that “repairs and presumably cancels 
out the possibility of all further claims to harm.”  While Simpson says that it is extremely 
important to recognize that indigenous subjects have often expressed a deeply healing 
benefit from the TRC, she also wants to account for the symbolic value that can be 
extracted from a performance of emotion by allowing it to signal a form of closure and a 
contract fulfilled.  She says that during this event, “the performance of emotion becomes 
key … in exercises of absolution.”  The potential for a performance of emotion, or 
trauma, to be put to work in the service of institutional goals that are incommensurate 
with the healing of the individual subject is where Simpson’s concept of a “performance 
of reconciliation” presents helpful analytical tools for critiquing the extractive orientation 
of institutional power even as it works to repair damage it has caused.  I am not proposing 
here any kind of equivalence between the ongoing trauma and dispossession visited on 
indigenous people and the experience of soldiers undergoing psychiatric treatment during 
World War II, especially given the fact that indigenous suffering and dispossession often 
comes at the hands of soldiers working for state militaries.  Instead, I draw on Simpson’s 
work to show a continuity of modes of institutional exploitation to add to the critique 
that, without substantive change to their larger institutional goals (such as wealth 
extraction), any acts of reparation must be analyzed with suspicion whether they are 
addressed to labourers (in this case soldiers) or those who have been victims of their 
labour. 
In the US military’s psychiatric practice during World War II, the assumption that 
a patient would perform his trauma if triggered often enough and/or in the right way, 
appears to be the unacknowledged lynchpin that enabled the expansion of a particular 
logic of treatment, and with it, the military psychiatric apparatus.  The production of a 
visual, observable performance of trauma on part of the patient in response to the event of 
narcosynthesis signified that some measure of therapeutic success had been achieved, 
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thus fulfilling an obligation toward this patient for trauma suffered on the job.  The films 
that depict this treatment not only show us the very visual and performative mode of this 
cure, but are themselves constitutive of the routinization of these performances as 
curative practices.   
 
The Cinematic Mind 
While the similarities in the scenes depicting narcosynthesis from the film 
Psychiatric Procedures in the Combat Area and Combat Exhaustion allow us to see the 
important continuity in how narcosynthesis was presented, the differences between them 
offer insight into the institutional evolution of this practice.  Combat Exhaustion, filmed 
one year after Psychiatric Procedures in the Combat Area, presents an extremely 
controlled and straightforward depiction of a narcotic interview.  In contrast to the scene 
described above, it seems to be an almost parodic portrayal of the theatre of cure.  It is 
interesting to note that in their desire to generate a clear and communicable picture of the 
mind under stress, some of the films used in military psychiatry and the treatments they 
promoted portrayed a model of the patient’s mind as cinematic in itself; as something that 
could clearly display both its trauma and its cure for doctors to see, and therefore assure 
them that their techniques were working.  The narcosynthesis scene from Combat 
Exhaustion takes place in a military psychiatric hospital in front of a group of observing 
doctors who are learning the technique.  The tall, calm, and authoritative psychiatrist 
providing the demonstration administers a dose sodium pentothal to bring about a state of 
“chemical hypnosis” in a patient while soberly describing what he is doing to his 
audience.275  He also reassures the goofy, chubby, and deferential patient in patronizing 
tones as he becomes increasingly intoxicated.  Once the patient has been deemed 
sufficiently drugged by the psychiatrist, the camera centers on the patient’s face.  An 
attendant reaches behind his head to “straighten him out in bed—put him on his back,” as 
directed by the psychiatrist, immediately triggering the patient to go from a pleasantly 
“drunk” state to wide-eyed and screaming in panic.  The close up shot of the patient’s 
face in the hospital bed fades to a close up shot of the same actor, face now covered in 
                                               
275 Sodium pentothal and sodium amytal were the most common drugs administered for 
the purposes of narcosynthesis.   
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dirt and helmet on his head, panicking, while the sounds of explosions and missiles can 
be heard.  As the camera pulls back to a medium shot of the soldier cowering in a 
foxhole, a large clod of dirt hits him, which the soldier interprets as a gunshot to the back, 
losing the functioning of his legs and weeping in pain.  This flashback scene ends with 
another fade from the soldier in the foxhole back to the patient in the hospital bed, still 
crying in distress as he had been in the flashback scene.  This sequence signals to the 
film’s viewer that the patient is reliving his trauma under “chemical hypnosis,” which the 
film equates with a virtually instantaneous purging of his obstacle to recovery.  After the 
flashback, the psychiatrist calmly and confidently rouses the distressed patient, reminding 
him that he is safe in a hospital, and coaches him to get up and walk, telling him “your 
back is fine and straight.”  After a few cautious steps, the patient begins to walk 
normally, and marvels at the returned use of his legs.  In a medium shot with the 
psychiatrist in the foreground, and the patient walking back and forth in front of the team 
of observing doctors, the psychiatrist parades his newly cured patient, encouraging him 
to: “put your shoulders back. … Let’s see you walk like a soldier.”  The use of the 
flashback to show doctors how the mind could be triggered to release its trauma with the 
help of drugs was not simply cinematic shorthand.  The flashback mimicked a 
formalization of narcosynthesis treatment that presumed the patients’ mind as able to 




Figure 17: The effect of the narcosynthesis treatment is portrayed in Combat Exhaustion by cutting from the 
patient in the hospital to a flashback of him in the field, and then back to the hospital again where he 
immediately regains the use of his legs. 
This sanitized re-visioning of the theatre of cure injects a visual rhetoric of ease 
and control (the performance provided by the medic or psychiatrist that would normally 
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trigger the patient’s memory is conspicuously absent) into a scene that otherwise trades 
on the same basic principle: the performance of trauma signals to the observers that the 
patient has cathartically released his traumatic memory, and the medic has successfully 
moved forward in his task of returning him to a functional state.  Psychiatric Procedures 
in the Combat Area depicted the procedure as effective yet somewhat messy, involving 
violent emotional and physical reactions, and possibly requiring repeated attempts to 
achieve the desired outcome.  In Combat Exhaustion this procedure becomes an easy, 
efficient, and infinitely replicable treatment that immediately produces not merely 
emotional catharsis, but a complete return to normal functioning. 
 Reading descriptions of narcosynthesis written by Grinker, Spiegel, Ludwig, and 
other military psychiatrists written in military publications and psychiatric journals, it 
becomes clear why a cinematic depiction of the performance of cure could be 
functionally signalled by a flashback sequence.  Scenes of emotional abreaction under 
narcosis are described by psychiatrists as a kind of “rewinding” to an indexical imprint of 
an experience; a cinematic playback of a moment of trauma.  Grinker writes of the 
process that: “the minuteness and wealth of detail which flood the memory, even of 
events which took place many months and even years before, is always impressive.”276  
And together with Spiegel in the Manual of Military Neuropsychiatry, they write that: “it 
is electrifying to watch the terror exhibited in the moments of supreme danger,” 
describing the rigid body, sweating, and changed breathing of a patient under 
narcoanalysis.277  The language used to describe the technique in later texts becomes both 
more cinematic in its description, while its results are presented as being less ambiguous.  
Historian Alison Winter notes the emergence of cinematic tropes to describe these 
processes, writing that  
Patients sometimes likened their experiences to mental movies, and 
psychiatrists spoke of their patients’ memories as capable of being 
replayed … Techniques of this kind produced a theatrical repertoire of 
memory-production that spread through the Allied forces.  It was 
frequently summarized in terms reminiscent of the experience of cinema; 
memory was like a film, the consulting room a theatre, and the process of 
                                               
276 Grinker as cited in Winter Memory, 60. 
277 Grinker and Spiegel, “The Management of Neuropsychiatric Casualties,” 530. 
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abreaction played the flashback before the amazed audience of medical 
staff.278 
Alongside the presentations of these procedures in films, came a corresponding 
distillation of both technique and its interpretation by the psychiatrists who continued to 
write about it throughout and after the war.   
One particular extension of the logic of this model of mind applied to the use of 
narcosynthesis was as popular “lie detector” test both before and after the war. Winter 
writes that some psychiatrists saw the mind’s “rewind” function as not merely a useful 
curative tool, but one that could also identify which veterans actually deserved treatment 
and disability pensions, and which ones were “malingering,” or pretending to be ill.  
Military psychiatrist Alfred Ludwig published on the use of narcosynthesis to expose 
lying by observing the types of reactions that it produced.  He states:  
The malingerer resists narcosis, fearing that it will make him tell the truth.  
Narcotized, he fails to show any of the productivity of a neurotic patient 
and combats any effort to recover his lost memory.279   
Conforming to the expected performance of trauma under narcosis was thus more than 
just a useful indicator to practitioners, it also functioned as visual “proof” that the soldier 
was actually traumatized.  With narcosynthesis, the logic that psychiatric treatment could 
trade in visible, interpretable performances allowed for the categorization of patients into 
groups that either “productively” responded to treatment or were shown to be leeches on 
the system with the refusal of a performance.   
When narcosynthesis was initially introduced into the military context, its 
practitioners were borrowing a Freudian model of mind (and memory) where the 
emotional and analytical significance of memories had much less to do with their “truth” 
content than with the associative meanings that a skilled interpreter could draw from 
them.  But, as Winter explains: “the exigencies of the war encouraged a more mechanical 
understanding.  Missing memories were now like missing puzzle pieces, which could be 
snapped back into place by pharmaceutical levers.”280  The coming together of 
                                               
278 Winter “Film and the Construction of Memory,” 118. 
279 Ibid., 70.  My emphasis. 
280 Ibid., 73.  Pioneering military psychiatrists Grinker and Spiegel had been trained in 
Freudian psychoanalysis. 
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instrumental drug use with depictions of the mind as a motion-picture like device that 
could “play back” true events from the past laid the foundation for narcosynthesis’ 
proliferation in military psychiatry, as well its extension into post war experimentation 
with drugs as “truth serums” and agents of mind alteration.281 
 
Group Therapy 
The theatre of cure was not restricted to an audience of medical staff.  Abreactive 
or catharsis therapies like narcosynthesis were combined with group therapy to deal with 
the problem of scale plaguing military psychiatry.  In his article “Military Group 
Psychotherapy,” navy psychiatrist Howard Rome champions the expediency of group 
therapy, writing that it: “provides a method of management which not only solves the 
problem of providing adequate care for large numbers of patients, but also answers the 
baffling question of how to quickly and effectively rehabilitate military personnel.”282  
Efforts to do psychiatric work despite a scarcity of resources not only lead to the use of 
sodium pentothal in Grinker and Spiegel’s early narcosynthesis experiments in Tunisia, 
but also created the conditions for a key breakthrough that brought narcosynthesis into 
the group therapy context.  Due to a lack of space, their therapeutic practice took place in 
an open medical tent in plain view of other patients, and as a result, they noted the 
potential of visual stimulus to act as an adjunct not only to individual treatment, but in 
group therapy as well.  They observed that while the doctors and patients were acting out 
battle scenes during narcosynthesis treatment, other patients within eye- and earshot were 
liable to react with sympathetic displays of distress.283  This observation formed the basis 
of experimentations with and standardizations of treatments that used visual and auditory 
stimulus.  In writing on the development of group therapy in the post war review The 
                                               
281 Ibid., 127. Some WWII doctors went on to use Pentothal as part of criminal 
investigation procedures, see Winter Memory, 126.  These ideas are revisited in the 
conclusion of this study. 
282 Rome “Military Group Psychotherapy” in Manual of Military Neuropsychiatry, 569. 
283 Louis L. Tureen and Martin Stein, “The Base Section Psychiatric Hospital,” in The 
Bulletin of the US Army Medical Department: Combat Psychiatry, US Army Medical 
Department, ed. Lt. Col. Wayne G Brandstadt (Washington: The Bulletin of the US 
Army Medical Department Printing Office, 1949), 129. 
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Bulletin of the US Army Medical Department: Combat Psychiatry, psychiatrists Louis 
Tureen and Martin Stein note: 
Our interest in group therapy was first stimulated … when acute 
psychiatric battle casualties were treated in an open ward of an evacuation 
hospital in full view of 20 other patients.  There was no privacy during the 
examination interviews or any phase of narcoanalysis.  Any abreaction 
produced in the patient produced a response in all the other patients, who 
were attentively observing the procedure.284 
This discovery gave narcosynthesis the status of an efficient therapy not only at the level 
of individual treatment, but also as a performance with curative potential that could be 
carried out en masse.  The practice of performing narcosynthesis treatments in open 
wards and tents became standard military policy, where treatments viewable by other 
patients are praised for promoting the exercise of self control and good behaviour.285  The 
group setting therefore offered the added benefit of enabling Foucauldian supervision of 
the patients by each other during treatment, allowing for increased institutional control 
and rationalization. 
Drugs were the most common tool used to trigger performances of cure due to 
their ease of administration, but hypnotherapy was also used as a method of achieving 
similar results.286  The military film Hypnosis—Okinawa (alternately titled Okinawa: The 
Use of Hypnotherapy in Combat Psychiatry) developed by Lieutenant Colonel M. Ralph 
Kaufman and Major Lindsay E. Beaton, ostensibly documents similar events to those 
seen in films featuring narcosynthesis, with a focus on the hypnotic methods being used 
commonly in Okinawa.287  An information sheet made to accompany the film in military 
circulation summarizes concisely:  
                                               
284 Ibid. 
285 Ludwig, “Psychiatry at the Army Level” The Bulletin of the US Army Medical 
Department: Combat Psychiatry, 97. 
286 See for example, Fred D. Kartchner and Ija N. Korner “Use of Hypnosis in Treatment 
of Acute Combat Reactions” The American Journal of Psychiatry 105.3 (1947): 630-6. 
287 This information comes from documents about the film found in the National 
Archives.  I have been unable to find an existing copy of the film. 
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In Okinawa, [the] main method of sedation was hypnosis to bring about 
similar results to chemical sedation.  A scene demonstrates the use of 
hypnotherapy.288  
In 1945 an article was published in The American Journal of Psychiatry titled “Hypnotic 
Techniques for Therapy of Acute Psychiatric Disturbances in War.” 289  In it, the author 
describes group trances where a lecture is given to first establish a rational framework for 
the procedure, and then followed with a demonstration of hypnosis with the hope that the 
catharsis performed by the soldier at the front will similarly conjure affects of distress, or 
performances of trauma from the audience.  The author adds that drugs should be used to 
supplement hypnotic trances should the audience prove disturbed or uncooperative.290  In 
both narcosynthesis and hypnotherapy, the same performance of trauma marked the 
success of the treatment—which was part of what made these treatments friendly to 
cinematic portrayal.  More significant than their photogenic qualities, however, is the fact 
that catharsis therapies shared with cinema a reliance on the visible as a catalyst.  It is 
precisely its use of the audio-visual—its ability to be seen and heard—that made catharsis 
therapy useful as both as an easily teachable and learnable therapy, and maybe more 
importantly, as a basis for group therapy.  Catharsis therapy’s ability to work by creating 
a theatre of cure within a group setting appears to be one of the key reasons that it 
became such a routine element of the military’s psychiatry program.  Its expediency and 
efficiency in group settings when resources for treatment were scarce was very appealing.  
Within this context, film became a logical next-step for achieving similar results.  In what 
follows, we will look at how the principles established in the early formalization of 
psychiatric practice in the US military’s field psychiatry created a natural bridge to using 
films in therapeutic treatments in military hospitals.  
  
 
                                               
288 Information sheet found in the “Training Films” file contained in the file series under 
Neuropsychiatry; Record Group 112 Office of the Surgeon General/Army World War II 
Administrative Records-ZI 730 (RG 112 SGO/A 730); Box 1328; National Archives at 
College Park (NACP). 
289 Milton H. Erickson “Hypnotic Techniques for Therapy of Acute Psychiatric 
Disturbances in War” The American Journal of Psychiatry 101.5 (1945): 668-672. 
290 Ibid., 669. 
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4.2. Films in Clinical Treatment  
In the “Training Films” folder from the files of the Neuropsychiatry Division at 
the Surgeon General’s Office (SGO), there is a letter signed by Mark Marvin of the US 
Army Signal Corps addressed to John Appel, military psychiatrist and chief of the Mental 
Hygiene Branch in the SGO.  In the letter, Marvin proposes to Appel that films might be 
used to address the psychiatric needs of the military, saying that the “use of motion 
pictures [is] perhaps the only mass medium of psychiatric treatment available.”291  He 
goes on to offer his services—should their division be interested in working with film as 
a tool—saying: 
As a motion-picture producer … I know there is available a great deal of 
talent for experimental work along such lines.  And, in view of the widely 
recognized shortage of competent psychiatrists, investigation of the 
possible uses of motion pictures as a supplementary therapeutic aid … 
seems to me to be an urgent necessity.292   
Appel’s letter of reply, dated August 16th 1944, assures the enterprising Marvin that the 
Neuropsychiatric division has “long been interested in the use motion pictures both for 
prevention and treatment of psychiatric disorders.”  Somewhat surprisingly, Appel’s 
letter then proceeds to lament that the Neuropsychiatry Division’s efforts in developing 
such films had been stymied by an inability to spare qualified psychiatrists to oversee 
film projects.  Even though Appel clearly thought that there was much more psychiatric 
labour that could be accomplished using films, there were quite a few film projects made 
and used by military psychiatrists and the Neuropsychiatry Division despite the lack of 
available supervisory resources.  Film as an avenue for modernizing psychiatric treatment 
and prevention was plainly pursued within the military psychiatric apparatus.   
As we have already seen in Chapters 1 and 2, there were dozens of films made at 
the level of the military institution itself for the express purpose of “preventing and 
treating psychiatric disorders,” and as we will see in this section, there were many more 
films that were being experimented with by military psychiatrists in hospital settings with 
the support and approval of overarching institutional bodies such as the military’s 
                                               




Neuropsychiatry Division.293  Lieutenant Commander Howard P. Rome was the head 
psychiatrist working for the Navy and one of the most active users and proselytizers of 
film as an aid to psychiatric treatment.  Rome’s personal enthusiasm for using film was 
likely responsible for the fact that the Navy’s psychiatric film program was more 
developed than that of the other military divisions.  Rome wrote frequently on film’s 
usefulness as an aid in general military operations and the application of this usefulness 
to psychiatric therapy.  He was also responsible for spearheading the development of the 
Introduction to Combat Fatigue series.294  In an article titled “Military Group 
Psychotherapy,” Rome writes that: 
Deconditioning to sounds and sights—peek views of experiences yet to be 
lived through and analyses of typical past performance—are some of the 
possibilities that lend themselves to accurate motion picture portrayal.  …  
The benefits of motion picture training in new skills developed by the 
training films division of the Bureau of Aeronautics are now being turned 
to therapy by the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.295 
The Aviation Psychology Program in the Bureau of Aeronautics was experimenting with 
motion pictures as a tool for testing and improving motor and perception skills needed to 
fly combat planes.  The Waller Flexible Gunnery Trainer—a complex multi- projector 
and screen apparatus that adapted technologies that had been in development to become 
the theatrical Cinerama in the post war period—was used extensively to train aviation 
machine gunners to shoot down aircraft.296  Eighty-five Gunnery Trainers were built for 
this purpose, often “[running] schedules of as much as 15, 18, and as much as 24 hours a 
day … seven days a week.”297 
                                               
293 Head psychiatrist for the US Navy, Howard Rome, writes for example that “eight 
films have been produced [to supplement group psychotherapy] with the technical 
cooperation of the Training Films and Motion Pictures Branch of the Bureau of 
Aeronautics” in “Therapeutic Films and Group Psychotherapy” Sociometry 8 no.3/4 
(1945): 247.  See also Elias Katz’ “A Brief Survey of the Use of Motion Pictures for the 
Treatment of Neuropsychiatric Patients” Psychiatric Quarterly 20.1 (1946): 204-216. 
294 See Rome, “Therapeutic Films and Group Psychotherapy,” “Military Group 
Psychotherapy,” and “Audio-Visual Aids in Psychiatry.” 
295 Howard P. Rome, “Military Group Psychotherapy,” The American Journal of 
Psychiatry 101.4 (1945): 496.  My emphasis. 




Figure 18: The Waller Flexible Gunnery Trainer.  Caption from original publication reads: “The Waller 
Flexible Gunnery Trainer with four trainees and an instructor (top center).  Five 35 mm projectors (center) 
produce a mosaic image of enemy aircraft that serves as a target for the trainees’ ‘guns.’” 
Image reprinted from “Archeology of Cinerama” in Film History 5, no. 3 (1993).  
Successes such as these, achieved using film to achieve technical skills, spurred 
further interest in film’s ability to stimulate different kinds of cognitive capacities, 
including those of processing, understanding, and healing traumatic experiences.298  With 
the pressing need to streamline therapeutic techniques in order to meet demands, military 
psychiatrists worked with films to help re-condition soldiers once they were temporarily 
evacuated for psychiatric treatment or discharged from military service. 
Reflecting specifically on the group therapeutic setting, Rome speculates that the 
use of motion pictures represents a dramatic breakthrough in the scope and power of 
psychiatric methodology, writing: 
AV aids—motion pictures—are extremely useful adjuncts to group 
treatment and training which have been neglected until recently.  … With 
care and perfection [a technique developed for the production of such 
films] should do for medicine what the graphic arts have done for book 
                                               
298 The Bureau of Aeronautics new skills training included the testing for motion 
detection, map reading, shooting, and landing skills for pilots.  See James J. Gibson, 
“Motion Picture Testing and Research” Army Air Force Aviation Psychology Program 
Research Reports, 1947. 
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publishing—enlarge its field, increase its depth and make it less 
mysterious for a great many people.299 
The use of film technologies in treatment brought together and refined the uses to which 
film was put in other contexts explored in previous chapters, namely: the provision of 
emotional motivation and fortification by cultivating morale, the spread of military 
psychiatric concepts via training films, and the popularization and use of cinematic tropes 
in medical-psychiatric practice.  In addition to these qualities of film as a medium of 
mass communication, film in therapeutic practice demanded something more targeted, 
more direct.  Practitioners using film in therapy banked on film’s capacity to solicit 
memories, fears, and emotions from viewers in particular ways—ways that would make 
them effective adjuncts to the types of abreaction treatments examined above.  In World 
War II, the military psychiatric apparatus was asking complex questions about film’s 
relationship to its viewers, and it worked them out in the clinic and the laboratory.  While 
questions of film’s particular effects on viewers have been debated in film studies 
throughout the discipline’s existence, how the powerful institution of the US military 
engaged these questions, and the larger social ramifications of their understandings and 
conclusions, is only beginning to be thoroughly analyzed.  The rest of this chapter works 
toward this end. 
Howard Rome’s name surfaces again in the context of these investigations into 
film’s impact on its audiences when psychiatrist Francis Braceland writes in his 1947 
article “Psychiatric Lessons from WWII,” that:  
Mention should be made of the extensive use of audio-visual aids in the 
naval service.  Films were used for instruction purposes as well as for aids 
in diagnosis and treatment.  Several interesting studies were made 
measuring audience reaction by infra-red photography, etc., all of which 
have been described by Commander Rome who was the prime mover of 
this type of work in our service.300 
This tantalizing mention of using infra-red photography as a device for spectator study 
unfortunately does not have any more in-depth or follow up documentation that I was 
able to find.  The military invested significant resources studying the effects of some of 
                                               
299 Rome, “Military Group Psychotherapy,” 496. 
300 Francis Braceland, “Psychiatric Lessons from World War II,” The American Journal 
of Psychiatry 103, no. 5 (1947): 592. 
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their large-scale preventative psychiatric efforts, as Eric Smoodin has shown with his 
research on the apparatus for studying effects of the Why We Fight films.301  Many of the 
clinical experiments examined in this chapter, however, occurred on a comparatively 
small scale by individual practitioners with an enthusiasm for film’s potential to automate 
aspects of therapy.  Evidence of these experiments often comes from articles written by a 
small handful of enthusiasts seeking to compile notes among like-minded psychiatrists.302  
These individual studies and observations therefore do not reveal a comprehensive theory 
of film spectatorship developed within military psychiatry.  They do however, show that 
the deep investment the military had made in film and visual technologies in order to 
expand particular psychiatric practices was taken up and furthered in clinical practice.  
Watching audiences watch films using infra-red photography was part of the ongoing 
research into using film as a tool to optimize military labour.303  Some psychiatrists 
believed that if the effects of watching a film could somehow be made predictable 
enough, visual technologies could become the key to efficient large-scale group therapy.  
In other words, if films could provide a substitute for the personal memories sought by 
psychoanalysis, instead supplying images that traded in a kind of generic, shared 
experience of trauma, a kind of assembly line treatment could become imaginable.  In 
what follows, we will explore how particular types of films were integrated into military 
psychiatric treatment in order to understand better the kinds of responses that 
psychiatrists sought from their patients, and how they understood these effects, and how 
they functioned within institutionally determined goals for mental health. 
 
                                               
301 See Eric Smoodin’s Regarding Frank Capra: Audience, Celebrity & American Film 
Studies,  
1930-1960, on the film studies apparatus developed by the US military.  See also the 
discussion of Smoodin in the last section in chapter 1 of this study. 
302 In particular Elias Katz, Howard Rome, and Francis Braceland. 
303 See  
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4.2.1. The Military Psychiatric Hospital 
In the same file containing Marvin and Appel’s exchange is a letter titled 
“Neuropsychiatric training film; production of” dated November 5th 1943, that suggests 
making a film to be used in the training of medical staff, nurses, and corpsmen who work 
with neuropsychiatric patients in medical facilities and psychiatric wards.  The letter 
states that such a film could help with the “correction of many false ideas and 
misconceptions which popularly exist concerning mental illness,” such as thinking that 
psychiatric patients are different from other patients, that they are faking their symptoms, 
or that their condition is incurable.304  It states that: “An open and frank movie 
presentation of the facts on this subject should do much to allay the fear and anxiety often 
experienced by those who must necessarily come in close contact with the mentally ill.”  
Several movies were made to aid the training of medical staff to this end, including Care 
of the Sick and Wounded—The Neuropsychiatric Patient (1944), Ward Care of Psychotic 
Patients (1945), Psychosis and Allied States, and Your Job and the Psychiatric Patient 
parts I, II, and III (1947).305  
 
Figure 19: Series of photos taken during the filming of The Neuropsychiatric Patient US Navy training film 
(1944) Z. M. Lebensohn, Technical Director.  Photo’s caption reads: “Schizophrenic patient (played by an 
actor) being interviewed by Navy psychiatrist (also an actor)”   
                                               
304 “Training Films,” Neuropsychiatry; RG 112 SGO/A 730; Box 1328, NACP.   
305 I haven’t been able to date Psychosis and Allied States, but it is listed among a 
program of military psychiatric films shown during the 26th Annual Meeting of the 
Western Psychological Association in 1946. See “Program of Films” American 
Psychologist 1 no.10 (1946): 458. 
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Source: “Prints: Photographs of the Production of the US Navy Training Film ‘The NP Patient’ 1943-44” 
Records of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital; RG 418 - NP, NACP 
 
Figure 20: Photo’s caption reads: “Seriously depressed patient (played by “Chubby” Sherman, well known 
Broadway actor) being interviewed by a young hospital apprentice” 
Source: “Prints: Photographs of the Production of the US Navy Training Film ‘The NP Patient’ 1943-44” 
Records of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital; RG 418 - NP, NACP 
 
Figure 21: Photo’s caption reads: “Hydrotherapy at St. E’s, the Scotch douches” 
Source: “Prints: Photographs of the Production of the US Navy Training Film ‘The NP Patient’ 1943-44” 
Records of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital; RG 418 - NP, NACP 
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Figure 22: “Dr. Lebensohn supervising a scene with the cameraman (open shirt) and the director, Lt. Hugh 
Mullen (in shirtsleeves and black tie).  Corpsman at the desk was actually assigned to the Navy detail at St. 
E’s” 
Source: “Prints: Photographs of the Production of the US Navy Training Film ‘The NP Patient’ 1943-44” 
Records of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital; RG 418 - NP, NACP 
The Neuropsychiatric Patient and Ward Care of Psychotic Patients were 
instructional training films for military medical staff. Both were shot in St. Elizabeth’s 
military psychiatric hospital in Washington. The former film was directed by Hugh 
MacMullen, who also directed Introduction to Combat Fatigue.  I have not been able to 
find a copy of The Neuropsychiatric Patient to view, but Ward Care of Psychotic 
Patients provides context for understanding practices of basic care in a stateside military 
psychiatric hospital.  It includes segments on how to approach, restrain, and move a 
resistant patient. It depicts various forms of treatment such as continuous tub treatment 
(strapping a patient into a restraining hammock inside a bathtub of warm water where he 
stays for many hours), or wet packs (wrapping the patient mummy-style in wet sheets and 
securing him to a bed for several hours).  The longest segment of the film deals with 
methods for suicide prevention by carefully searching patients’ rooms for sharp objects, 
etc.  Notably absent from the film are the more specialized procedures such as 
narcosynthesis and electroshock therapy, even though both appear on the list of 
treatments made in the typed letter proposing such a film above and are subsequently 
crossed out by hand.  It may be that these techniques were thought to be an unnecessary 
inclusion in a film for medical staff, even though they were both widely used in this 
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context.  Electroshock therapy is described as “one of the most useful instruments in 
military … psychiatry,” in the Bulletin of the US Army Medical Department: Combat 
Psychiatry, where it is listed among the primary treatments for soldiers including 
interviews, hydrotherapy (continuous tub treatment), wet packs, narcosynthesis, art, 
recreational, and occupational therapy, and group therapy, which is often described as 
involving the watching of films in a group.306 
 
Figure 23:“Feature Movies in the Day Room at the Closed-Ward for the Disturbed Patients.”   
Image from “Photographs—Hospitals and Facilities and Personnel;” Neuropsychiatry; RG 112 SGO/A 
730; Box 1317, NACP 
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4.2.2. Films as Aids to Psychiatric Treatment 
Pedagogical 
Some of the films used in group therapy settings traded primarily in their ability 
to appeal to the rational minds of patient-viewers, imparting information and creating a 
set of shared ideas and experiences to provide a foundation for more effective, focused, 
and empathetic group discussion.  Often film content worked toward producing specific 
effects in group therapy. But in other instances, the experience of watching a film that 
was loosely connected to a desired topic of conversation was understood by therapists to 
be enough to unite the group in meaningful ways.  In an article titled “Deepening a 
Group’s Insight into Human Relations: A Compilation of Aids” written in 1949, doctors 
Bettis, Malamud, and Malamud observe that “our treatment of groups consisting of 
hostile military delinquents seemed to identify frequently with the persons or situations 
on the screen: these they seemed able to discuss more readily than their own personal 
problems.”307  Other studies cite the use of filmstrips and excerpts from Hollywood 
productions that deal with social problems as stimulating otherwise incommunicative 
patients to identify and even build rapport with characters on a screen.308  Although it is 
never explicitly stated as such, it seems that there was a belief among therapists that 
characters seen in films could provide a starting point for recognizing patients’ own 
conditions, and a safe and impersonal vehicle through which patients might begin to 
discuss their experiences within a group. 
In his 1946 article, “A Brief Survey of the use of Motion Pictures for the 
Treatment of Neuropsychiatric Patients,” Dr. Elias Katz reports findings from a survey he 
sent out to a number of psychiatrists working with soldiers in military hospitals, asking 
them about their use of film in treatment.  Among one of the more common sets of films 
reported as aids during therapy is Dr. Jules Masserman’s eleven film documents made as 
part of his clinical study of “The Dynamics of an Experimental Neurosis in Cats.”  These 
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films are silent recordings that Masserman made of his experiments to produce neuroses 
in cats.  Katz notes that: “in Canada, psychiatrists in the Department of the Veteran’s 
Association have been using these films for psychotherapeutic purposes,” and comments 
on the added benefit of the silent films is that doctors can supply their own interpretation 
and commentary during group therapy sessions.309  The films’ appeal was not limited to 
Canadian geography.  Masserman’s experiments with neuroses in cats are cited 
frequently in psychiatric literature as useful illustrations for explaining fear as a 
biological/neurological mechanism used to trigger self-defence reactions rather than as a 
moral failing.  These cat films are even implicitly quoted in the first Introduction to 
Combat Fatigue film with a sequence occurring early in the film where a cat reacts 
fearfully to the presence of a dog that comes into frame while the cat (interestingly 
referred to as “she” by the narrator—one of the very few females appearing in any of the 
Combat Fatigue films) is drinking milk in order to illustrate a parallel to what is 
happening in the mind of the film’s protagonist during battle.  The scene with the cat 
occurs early on in the film as an illustration of fear reactions, and later in the film when 
the protagonist, Edwards, is preparing to land on shore for battle, a faded close up of the 
scared cat from the earlier scene is superimposed onto a close up shot of Edwards’ face.  
 
Figure 24: Edwards’ fear is compared to the cat’s fear in Introduction to Combat Fatigue 
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Automating the Theatre of Cure with the Cinematic Trigger 
 
The Introduction to Combat Fatigue films—a series of fiction films made by the 
US Navy illustrating common experiences of stress, neurosis, and fatigue experienced by 
soldiers— were most commonly screened during soldier training to introduce inductees 
to the military to basic psychiatric concepts in the hopes that it would help them to cope 
with common difficulties and sublimate symptoms.310  These same films were also 
screened for patients in military psychiatric hospitals, making a regular appearance in Dr. 
Katz’ survey of film use by psychiatrists.  Their subject matter (and the fact that they had 
been designed with this very application in mind) could specifically target a set of 
problems for shared identification amongst viewers; more so than random Hollywood 
titles or films about cats and fear.  An earlier survey written up in 1944 by Dr. Katz on 
the use of audio visual aids in military hospitals praises the Introduction to Combat 
Fatigue films for their ability to stimulate productive group discussion,311 and in an 
article published for the US Navy in 1945, psychiatrist Howard Rome (a key actor in the 
films’ production and conceptualization) writes that they are successful in “assist[ing] the 
patient in understanding the nature and cause of his illness” in group psychotherapy 
sessions.312   
In addition to their ability to impart valuable information about common 
conditions, psychiatrists also used these same films in group therapy to try to trigger 
emotional catharsis or performances of trauma.  The films themselves often contain 
scenes of soldiers performing emotional outbursts followed by scenes of recovery and 
resolution, presenting not only a model for understanding how the steps of recovery 
should proceed, but also an embodied performance available for mimicry.  As we 
explored in the previous chapter, Introduction to Combat Fatigue: Irritability, is a 
particularly interesting model for this technique, as the main character, Lucas, ends up in 
a group therapy session where he tells the story of his battle experience to his fellow 
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patients.  Unlike the scenes of catharsis described above in films made for medics, there 
is no flashback illustrating this scene.  When Lucas has his cathartic breakdown, the 
camera stays fixed on his face and upper body in a medium close up as he shakes and 
shouts and cries.  As a film for soldiers, the scene in which Lucas performs his trauma 
does not emphasize the coherence of the memory, as it does in the film Combat 
Exhaustion made for doctors.  Instead it offers a model of performance that was expected 
of patients viewing the film.   
When this film was shown in training contexts, this scene served as a model for 
“fostering proper attitudes” in soldiers, as discussed in the previous chapter.313  In the 
therapeutic context, this scene holds a slightly different significance.  While it surely still 
functioned as a model for “proper attitudes,” it was also meant to serve as a visual trigger, 
soliciting reciprocal performances of trauma from the patients watching the film.  
Following his outburst, Lucas is ushered out of the group therapy room and given a 
sedative by the presiding psychiatrist who then returns to the room with the rest of the 
participants in the group session to tell them that: “every one of you must go through a 
similar realization of what lies behind symptoms … you have to face those memories, get 
them out in the open, exactly as Lucas has done.”314  Lucas’ performance of trauma was a 
result of his conscious recounting of his memory, and does not precisely conform to the 
“replay” of a repressed memory as they are often described in narcosynthesis treatments.  
However, this film proposes that emotional outbursts related to traumatic memory can 
both function as abreactive (expulsion of a blockage) therapy and also be an effective 
audio-visual trigger for other participants in a group. 
This film and others in the series trade primarily in the realm of “rational 
identification” promoted by psychiatrists such as Malamud and Malamud cited above.  
However, there is even more at stake in this film’s careful articulation of a performance 
of trauma and group identification.  We know that military psychiatrists involved in 
making these films were thinking about film as a sophisticated medium that could not 
only teach, but could also produce the effect of spontaneous mimicry that was assumed to 
be the key to therapeutic abreaction.  The film narrates for the group in the film and also 
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for the group watching the film, the expected course of therapy in a feedback loop of 
teaching and triggers. In front of other patients, the performance of trauma is meant to 
teach spectating patients how to think about their conditions while also hoping to also 
trigger spontaneous emotional abreactions within the audience members. 
Naval psychiatrist Rome, who consulted on the creation of the Introduction to 
Combat Fatigue series, conducted several studies on patients’ reactions to watching the 
films in military group therapy sessions.  In a study published in 1945, he observed that 
subsequent to screening one of the Combat Fatigue films for patients in group therapy: 
72% of patients showed psychosomatic reactions such as: vomiting, 
sweating, tremors; 52% had startle reactions to war scenes; 86% said they 
are vividly reminded of their own combat experience; … and 45% were 
agitated for 2 days following screening.315 
Rome interprets these findings as evidence of the benefit of using film to trigger reactions 
in patients, claiming that: “this undercarriage of tension can be used readily to 
accomplish beneficial abreaction and constructive cathexis.”  He concludes that this 
effect is key to initiating the larger healing process, writing: “like drugs or other potent 
therapy, therapeutic films have the capacity for inciting a response whose benefit is 
proportional to the skill and judgment of the therapist.”316  These kinds of visible, 
measurable responses from patients as a result of watching similar performances on 
screen were encouraged by Rome and others, echoing the theory of a theatre of cure 
promoted in other official military psychiatric texts including the films discussed above: 
once a performance of trauma has been solicited from a patient, the therapist can 
effectively press forward with the treatment process.   
Another arena in which the concept of a theatre of cure was literalized was 
psychodrama.  Developed by Dr. Jacob L. Moreno, the practice is listed in several 
publications by military psychiatrists as an effective therapeutic tool, and is a practice 
that enjoyed widespread popularity in post war civilian US.317  Doctor Moreno’s 
therapeutic techniques combined elements of theatre and group therapy to allow patients 
to externalize and work through repressed inner processes, memories, and dialogues in 
                                               




improvised scenes where participants acted as themselves and/or their close relations 
while other participants took the other roles.  After gaining a fair amount of success and 
repute with his psychodramatic methods, Moreno began to experiment with integrating 
motion pictures into the process, and wrote essays in which he outlines how future 
developments in this area might be pursued.  In one of these essays, he proposed the 
creation of an entirely new genre of dramatic film, which he calls alternately therapeutic 
motion pictures, therapeutic film, or psychodramatic film.  These films would 
“approximate as far as possible the atmosphere of spontaneous acting, and … construct 
the film so that it gives the audience the illusion of direct communication with itself.”318  
He argues that in order to be successful the genre would need to employ either high-
functioning patients, or use actors trained exclusively for therapeutic films, who could be 
continually assisted in their performances by “suffering informants.”319  More important 
to the success of the finished film, however, would be the process of editing, which 
Moreno says would pinpoint moments of cathartic significance from many reels of film 
and splice them together into a sequence that could trigger therapeutic reactions from a 
broad audience.320 
Despite the considerable diversity of patients and afflictions coming out of 
combat, discourses such as these proposed that it was possible to achieve a standardizable 
trajectory of treatment that produced predictable outcomes.  The systematic use of film as 
a privileged and automated mode by which to solicit performances of trauma (watching 
the suffering of a character onscreen or in person and experiencing a mimetic reaction) 
seemed to hold great promise not only for making military psychiatry efficient but also 
for the expansion of the psychiatric profession more broadly.  The Introduction to 
Combat Fatigue series and a few other films were thus designed both to inform viewers 
about psychiatry and to act as cinematic triggers that could help to automate the theatre of 
cure and ensure predictable outcomes. Rome writes that:  
[The usefulness of audio visual aids to help to set a receptive emotional 
tone in large groups] was the hypothesis which prompted the Bureau of 
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Medicine and Surgery in 1943 to under take the production of a series of 
motion pictures for use in the psychiatric treatment program. Thus far 
eight films have been produced with the technical cooperation of the 
Training Films and Motion Picture Branch of the Bureau of Aeronautics. 
… Primarily, they were made to serve as a supplement to the established 
group psychotherapy program which operates in the general and special 
Naval hospitals.321 
Rome’s experience with developing and using these types of films therapeutically led 
him to conclude that they should “evoke an emotional reliving of personal experience” 
and “have a kind of generic validity,” recognizing that they can be “powerful tool[s] of 
evocation” that need to be crafted with care.322   
These kinds of studies allow us to see is that it was not simply a case of military 
psychiatrists sticking patients in a room with a screen and projector and hoping that 
watching a movie would calm or distract them.  Scenarios found in military psychiatric 
films were carefully crafted to produce specific, often highly wrought emotional 
outcomes from viewers with the belief that these were key to recovery.  Psychiatric 
experts who believed in film as a tool for automating clinical techniques studied patient-
viewers hoping to find ways to make these effects predictable and apply them to a wide 
range of cases.  What benefit patients received from watching film in these contexts is not 
possible to say, nor is it within the scope of study to ask.  What is more interesting is that 
some military psychiatrists believed that such films were effective, which justified their 
continued work in this vein.   
In a Bulletin of the US Army Medical Department, a short article on “An Army 
Neurosis Center” claims that “unequivocal results were obtained in desensitization [of 
neuropsychiatric patients] to combat stimuli through movies,” listing the Introduction to 
Combat Fatigue film as a particularly effective tool.323  The concept of “desensitization” 
was an institutionally specific elaboration of this work that will be explored more 
thoroughly below.  Beyond the initial triggering of a performance of trauma, films were 
in some cases screened over and over again to gradually lessen the intensity of response 
solicited from the viewer.  This technique and others were yet more iterations of film-
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therapy developed as a result of the curiosity and confidence in film’s power to influence 
and optimize the minds of its viewers.  
 
Subliminal 
Some military psychiatrists used more abstract styles of motion pictures to 
generate reactions from patients, and the ones with the most visible legacy (thanks partly 
to the identification of an existing print in the 1990s) are called “Auroratone” films.324  
Writing in 1946, psychiatrist Elias Katz describes Auroratone pictures as approximately 
30 minutes of changing prismatic colour patterns syncopated with slow, sad music.  He 
thought that the sound track, made up of songs like “Home on the Range” sung by Bing 
Crosby, and “Ave Maria,” produced a kind of subliminal nostalgic recognition in patients 
while the changing colour patterns soothed their conscious mind.325  Katz hypothesized 
that these effects evoked, without engaging directly, the painful subject of home, and 
observed that most patients became intensely absorbed in the films, noting that some with 
extremely compromised attention spans might still watch with rapt attention after 15 
viewings.326  He described results including: increasing attention spans, relaxation of the 
body and nervous habits; weeping; and increased openness to discussion, claiming that 
these cumulative effects open up pathways to patients’ “inner life” through auditory and 
visual channels, with “repeated exposures render[ing] them more accessible to positive 
psychotherapy.”327 
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Figure 25: Still from an Auroratone film set to the Bing Crosby song When the Organ Played “Oh Promise 
Me.” 
The most comprehensive historical account of these short films comes from 
media archivist Walter Forsberg who writes of the film-based technology: “Auroratone 
was the result of mechanical attempts by British-born Cecil Stokes to render music into 
projected colored images,” which he did by sending sound waves through a liquid 
chemical substrate mounted on a slide on a projector.328  Stokes, the inventor of the 
Auroratone films, was not a therapist himself but an enterprising entrepreneur whose 
search for a market for his pre-psychedelic films produced some interesting bridges 
between the worlds of entertainment and the military.  Forsberg writes that: 
Auroratone prints found their way into these experimental testing milieus 
thanks to the establishment of the Auroratone Foundation of America 
(AFA) in March of 1944.  A California state non-profit, the AFA’s stated 
mission was to discover, “new and improved methods of lessening mental 
and physical tensions in the shortest possible time, and in natural ways.”329 
With Bing Crosby as a shareholder and Director of Music Research Experiments, and 
Mary Pickford sitting on its board of members, Stokes worked to popularize his films by 
exploiting a number of different connections to services and industry to maximum 
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effect.330  He enlisted different groups in his efforts to distribute these films to new 
audiences with a keen eye on the large market of war veterans.  Forsberg writes that: 
“throughout the 1940s, women’s groups … sponsored fundraising efforts to finance the 
production of Auroratone film prints meant to treat returning war veterans.”331  Stokes 
also appealed directly to the Neuropsychiatric Division of the military to get these films 
in use, attested to by a letter to Stokes from Kenneth Appel, director of the Mental 
Hygiene branch of the Neuropsychiatry Division, thanking him for supplying them with 
Auroratone films.332  How extensively these films were used by official military 
psychiatrists is difficult to tell, though Forsberg’s research suggests that they likely 
enjoyed a fairly wide circuit touring institutions associated with the Veteran’s 
Asssociation.333   
Documents from the Neuropsychiatry files from the Surgeon General’s Office 
show that connections between military public relations and civilian social groups—such 
as is suggested by the circuit of Auroratone films within military psychiatry, Veteran’s 
Association centres, and women’s groups—were not uncommon.  A document published 
by the War Department’s public relations Bureau proposes the creation of a “Club 
Program” on the subject of the mental health of US soldiers for its Women’s Interests 
Section, suggesting that civilian women’s groups should be encouraged to organize club 
events to promote particular ideas on soldiers’ mental health.  The document is several 
pages and comes complete with suggested itineraries, topics, and supplemental materials 
to be presented at such events.  The document’s introduction frames the “Club Program” 
as a way to take advantage of the broad social reach of women’s clubs in order to spread 
the military’s particular understanding of mental health more broadly.  The club program 
that they suggest of course includes the screening of films and distribution of selected 
military reading material.334  Though this particular public relations move was more 
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about intertwining official military channels and more informal organizations like 
women’s groups in order to get a particular message out, it appears that in the case of 
Auroratone films and soldier treatment, these channels also served to bring materials in. 
 
Deconditioning or Desensitization 
On the other end of the spectrum from the subliminal soothing of Auroratone 
films were motion pictures that used actual war footage as a form of exposure therapy—a 
practice that was experimented with in several different hospitals.  One of the proponents 
of this treatment, military psychiatrist Lieutenant Commander Louis A. Schwartz writes 
in 1945:  
Most encouraging is the use of visio-auditory stimulation in the 
“deconditioning” process of combat experience….  Briefly, films of actual 
combat scenes, graded in order of intensity of stimulation are shown, 
followed or accompanied by a record of battle sounds.  The more 
innocuous sound films are introduced first, such as animated cartoons 
caricaturizing stupidity or neglect of weapons, films of ship-to-shore 
landings, and types of ordnance.  This is followed immediately by group 
discussion which reactivates the traumatic event in a shielded 
environment.  … [Later] actual combat films of bombings, strafings, and 
some captured Japanese films are shown with the battle sounds.335 
The patients’ reactions to these “deconditioning” sessions are described as including 
violent psychosomatic symptoms.  Schwartz writes that: “some actually flee from the 
scene, sweat, develop uncontrollable tremors, vomit, or exhibit severe vasomotor 
manifestations,”336 all of which he diagnoses as useful abreactions of emotion which can 
be treated further with sedation and/or talk therapy.     
Describing a similar film-based exposure therapy treatment in their work with 
soldiers, psychiatrists Leon Saul, Howard Rome, and Edwin Leuser trace the practice of 
deconditioning to techniques developed to train police horses to remain calm in traffic by 
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playing audio recordings of loud, jarring street noise in their stables.337  This principle of 
“desensitizing” animals to frightening stimuli is applied to the use of war films to treat 
soldiers returning with acute cases of combat fatigue.338  The psychiatrists write that, 
“[a]ttempts have … been made to decrease the startle reaction and the anxiety in men 
who have been incapacitated by combat fatigue, by exposing them to the mock battles 
used for training, and by showing them motion pictures.”339  In their description, early 
stages of treatment included films with no scenes of injury or death, yet as the treatment 
extended over several sessions (depending on the rate of the patient’s desensitization), the 
intensity of stimulus increased incrementally by adjusting the physical setting of the 
screening, control over the apparatus, and the graphic nature of the images themselves.340  
Early screenings in the desensitization process took place in a room with the doors open, 
window shades up, and no sound, gradually closing doors, pulling blinds, and giving 
patients the opportunity to increase the volume as they acclimated to the pictures.  The 
psychiatrist would introduce films containing scenes of fighting and gruesome casualties 
after the less graphic ones ceased to produce startle reactions.  Near the end of the article 
the psychiatrists make a point of noting that these latter-stage films were more disturbing 
than anything that patients might encounter in newsreels or other media outside the 
hospital.341   
Finding copies of the actual films used in this therapeutic practice is challenging 
as it is most likely that particular psychiatrists and/or institutions improvised their own 
materials, drawing on war footage that they had available to them through various 
channels.  Combing through the WWII military film records of the National Archives, 
however, has unearthed a few films that I believe to have been used in this context and 
made available to psychiatric practitioners through official military channels.  In the 
Navy Motion Picture Film Productions series, 1939-1947 at the National Archives, there 
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are three 5-minute films titled simply “Combat Psychiatric Casualties A,” “B,” and “C”.  
As film objects, they are curious: short black and white films of a naval battle with no 
dialogue that almost seem to be three separate sequences edited out of observational 
footage shot during a single naval battle.  The primary difference between them is that 
each film has been carefully edited to focus on a particular element of the action: the 
firing of the ship’s weaponry in one, the crew below deck operating this weaponry in 
another, and the ship’s on-deck crew preparing for the battle in the third.   Based largely 
on the films’ titles and descriptions I have read by military psychiatrists describing the 
use of desensitization films, I believe that these are examples of “deconditioning” or 
“desensitization” films distributed by the navy for use in psychiatric treatment.   
Each film begins with a title card identifying it as a “Confidential” US Navy 
training film and bearing the title: “Combat Psychiatric Casualties.”  They all document 
parts of a sea battle between a naval fleet and enemy fighter planes in a non-narrative 
observational style, and are all filmed from a ship engaged in the action.  Film “A” begins 
in the midst of the battle, with a few medium shots from the deck of the naval ship of 
heavy artillery firing at planes approaching in the distance.  The remainder of the short 
film consists primarily of medium shots of heavy artillery being fired interspersed with 
long shots from the deck of the planes being shot at and other naval fleet ships in the 
distance.  Loud diegetic booms and blasts from the artillery accompany this sequence, 
along with the ambient diegetic sound of planes.  There are a few shots of bombs being 
dropped from the planes into the ocean near the boat, and at one point it shows a nearby 
submarine that has been hit and is on fire.  There are a few people in this film, but they 
are only shown in the foreground operating the weapons machinery or looking through 
binoculars to instruct the gunners.  They are never shown speaking.  While the film’s 
action of planes and boats being shot and burning entails implicit casualties, there are no 
explicit images of human death.  The focus of the action in film “A” are the booms and 
blasts coming from the ship’s artillery, and this focus was likely intended to provoke 
startle reactions from patients watching.   
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Figure 26: Stills from Combat Psychiatric Casualties A  
Film “B” can be assumed to represent the same battle, but from the perspective of 
the munitions crew working below deck.  This 5 minute film consists entirely of medium 
shots of men assembling warheads, loading weapons, and closeups of the ship’s 
machinery and the warheads that they are working with.  At the beginning the film, a 
voice is heard in addition to the existing diegetic sound.  The voice is also diegetic as it 
represents a marine in the communications room of the ship narrating the battle 
happening above deck over a loudspeaker to the men who are stuck below.  It begins by 
saying: 
Now hear this, you will be kept informed of the progress of this action.  
As everyone above deck knows, we are part of a task force covering the 
landing of a large amphibious force.342  
The marine over the loudspeaker describes the planes coming in, dropping bombs, and 
being hit, saying things such as: “here comes another fighter; so long, I’m hitting the 
deck,” “they’ve got some men; some men are hurt, I’m afraid,” and “it was a sure hit, but 
we dodged it.”  The sound of planes diving and shell blasts can also be heard as the 
background sound-scape of the loudspeaker that the voice is heard through.  The visual 
action throughout remains focused on the men loading the weaponry below deck, 
however the faces of the men appear only as foreground, profile, or as part of the larger 
scene.  The primary focus is on the machines and the action of assembly.  This film may 
have been meant to trigger the anxiety of a number of different high-stress scenarios 
without yet bringing to attention the emotional reactions of the subjects seen on screen. 
                                               
342 Combat Psychiatric Casualties B (United States Navy, no date) 80 MN 3716 B; RG 




Figure 27: Stills from Combat Psychiatric Casualties B  
Curiously, while films “A” and “B” seem to be depicting the same timeline of the 
battle: one from above deck, the other from below, the third film in this series, film “C,” 
appears to take place sequentially just prior to the other two.  This film begins with a shot 
of the ship in mid-distance, interspersed with close-ups of the ship’s artillery.  There is no 
fighting action, so the artillery is silent and the ship is simply moving through the water.  
What distinguishes this third film is its focus on the ship’s crewmen who appear in 
medium and close-up shots performing their duties.  They are mostly shown looking out 
to sea through telescopes and binoculars, and the scenes are quiet and tense—the 
crewmen appear to be anticipating an attack.  Part way through the film, an alarm is heard 
and men are seen jumping to action: getting out of bunks; running naked from the 
showers; and manning stations.  The diegetic sound is of feet running, the alarm 
sounding, and ambient noise.  As the short film ends, there is a long shot looking out 
from the deck that shows seven fighter planes coming closer in formation followed by a 
series of medium shots of crewmen waiting on deck and at their stations with the sound 
of the oncoming planes in the background.  This last film gives much more screen time to 
the men on the ship, conveying a sense of the anxiety and tension of preparing and 
waiting for battle, which is heightened by the soundscape of nothing but waves, footfalls, 
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and for part of the film, an alarm bell.  While markedly less dramatic in battle action than 
the other two, this film brings human vulnerability to its scenario by allowing the camera 
and sound to focus on the feet, naked and yet-unarmed bodies, and faces of the crewmen 
who are about to be shelled by planes. 
 
Figure 28: Stills from Combat Psychiatric Casualties C  
There are no accompanying written documents with these films, so it is not 
possible to know for certain how they were used, and on what scale.  If it is true that 
these were films were used for desensitization treatments of “combat psychiatric 
casualties,” as the titles suggest, these three 5-minute films comprised of observational 
footage from a naval battle are a significant addition to our catalogue of known film uses 
by the military.  Considering the Navy’s particular interest in using film in the psychiatric 
element of warfare and their relative sophistication in developing films to do so (thanks 
largely to the work of naval psychiatrist Howard Rome) it is unsurprising that it was the 
Navy who would have made an effort to standardize this practice even further. 
Elias Katz’ surveys of film-based treatment techniques in military hospitals 
discussed in the above sections reveal that a number of different psychiatrists and 
hospitals were using desensitization practices, and that there was a significant overall 
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range in the kinds of films that were employed.  Katz cites one Army general hospital 
where a series of eight films “drawn from the training film library, was used for this 
combat desensitization program.”343  Among the films listed are both narrative and strict 
how-to style training films, including: Snafu, Machine Guns in Defence, Fire and 
Movement, Daylight Reconnaissance, Battlefield Sounds, Infantry Weapons and their 
Effects, Street Fighting, and the jewel of the Fighting Men series: Baptism of Fire.344  The 
psychiatrist administering this program reports that their combat desensitization program 
started with didactic training films such as Sounds of Battle, and progressed through to 
the character-focused Baptism of Fire, showing them to patients under sedation and 
varying the length of the combat scenes shown throughout the treatment process.345  The 
general principles underlying these film-desensitization processes are outlined in 
psychiatrist Lawrence Kubie’s contribution to the Manual of Military Neuropsychiatry, 
titled: “The Emergency Care and Treatment of the Acute War Neuroses.”  In it, Kubie 
details seven steps of general treatment for traumatized soldiers, from prolonged sleep to 
electroshock therapy.  Step 5 is desensitization, and while not referencing film directly, it 
is clear why film was such an attractive tool for fulfilling this stage of treatment.  Kubie 
writes that:  
[B]y leading men repeatedly through situations which mimic closely the 
sights, sounds, and smells of actual battle, it may be possible to desensitize 
them to the stress which lies ahead.  Similarly, once men have broken 
under that stress, it would seem reasonable to suppose that similar 
procedures could break down the links between these sights and smells 
and sounds and their superimposed terror-states, and thus return the 
soldier to his desensitized condition.346 
Once again the animating logic of using sensory stimuli to change a soldier’s mental state 
in the service of institutional goals is at work, and we come full circle from the morale 
building sensitization films developed for training soldiers at the beginning of their 
military careers to the neurosis treating desensitization films used to bring them back 
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either to fighting usefulness or to functionality as an American citizen once those careers 
were over. 
Using film as a tool to prepare the mind for the shock of combat, and again to 
undo the damage caused by shock after combat constitutes a family of audio-visual 
techniques that are still used in contemporary military psychiatry.  Media scholar Pasi 
Väliaho’s work on the Virtual Reality therapy program for military personnel with Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder reveals remarkable parallels with the desensitization films 
described above.  In contemporary treatments, Virtual Reality simulators are used to 
present patients with a generic environment representing the scene of their trauma.  As 
patients revisit these scenes again and again through the course of treatment, the 
environment become increasingly more specific as the therapist populates it with sights, 
sounds, smells, and even vibrations corresponding to their personal story.  Väliaho has 
written about how he sees this treatment operating in tandem with video games that are 
played before and during military service.  Video games begin the process of supplying 
images of combat to the mind in preparation for duty, and VR therapy continues this 
work post-combat.  Both technologies work to disarticulate images of combat from 
emotional responses, therefore freeing the mind from incapacitating stress so that it can 
work more effectively.347   
Psychiatrists wielding screens and projectors had initiated these kinds of 
techniques during WWII.  Working within an environment where film was already being 
put to use in training and forward psychiatry, psychiatrists applied film and techniques of 
visualization to modernizing therapeutic treatment.  Some psychiatrists envisioned these 
techniques as holding the key to therapy on a mass scale.  Lieutenant Commander 
Schwartz, who writes about his experimentations with deconditioning films in 1945, 
commends the technique for its speed, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness.  He suggests 
that, if taken up on a large scale, using films to automate treatment could eliminate the 
need to build veteran’s facilities in the future, and could even be used to treat “civilian 
‘war neurosis’” in cases where people’s symptoms arise from shared trauma.348  Film’s 
effectiveness in the military therapeutic context strengthened a conviction among some 
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ambitious psychiatrists (or at least gave them hope) that these practices could be 
effectively transposed into new contexts.  
 
4.3. Conclusion 
Film proved itself to be an exciting and powerful tool for military psychiatrists 
seeking both innovative methods to treat large numbers of soldiers with limited 
manpower and to expand the reach of the discipline.  When psychiatrists recognized the 
highly visual narcosynthesis treatment as a technique for effective and efficient field 
psychiatry, film provided the perfect medium for its dissemination, both promoting its 
growth by teaching narcosynthesis to new practitioners and inflecting its use by framing 
it in particular ways.  Narcosynthesis reliably solicited performances of trauma, which 
served as externally verifiable markers that a patient was on the road to recovery.  The 
visible, and therefore verifiable/quantifiable nature of these performances further 
supported the increasing medicalization of discourses about fear and the human mind that 
were taking shape in tandem with the expansion of the psychiatric discipline.  This 
chapter suggests that there was a further institutional benefit to narcosynthesis’ visibility 
in that it was interpreted as an implicit confirmation that treatment was working, thus 
fulfilling an obligation to the patient.   
Film also proved itself valuable to psychiatrists who were experimenting with 
techniques for automating therapeutic treatment.  As a privileged apparatus in 
desensitization and other therapies that solicited performances of trauma, film used 
images and sound to trigger fear and traumatic memories in patients.  Bypassing the more 
laborious methods of traditional talk therapy, these techniques similarly contributed to a 
disciplinary push to show that psychiatry could be a modern, medical practice that could 
apply standardized methods and achieve predictable results.  Watching patients watch 
films, military psychiatrists hoped that the effects of film viewing could be made 
predictable.  While this may appear to be a kind of textually-determined theory of 
spectatorship in the sense that it sought the right film “formula” to reproduce predictable 
results from viewers, looking at the kinds of experiments and procedures that were used 
reveals something more complicated at work.  In some cases, if films weren’t producing 
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desired effects, psychiatrists would give patients drugs and try again.  Or show the films 
over and over in different environmental circumstances, modulating dark and light, 
loudness, and freedom of mobility, for example.  In these clinical therapeutic studies 
psychiatrists repeatedly referred to films in terms of a stimulus—something used to 
provoke a memory, feeling, or fear, pre-existing within the mind of a viewer.  The ideal 
film formula was one that was generic enough to speak to many different people but 
specific enough that it triggered particular biographical memories from each viewer.   
Interestingly, this appears to be on the one hand, a theory of spectatorship that is 
extremely attuned to the subjectivity of viewers as uniquely biographical, and on the 
other hand, one that has no interest in their biographical subjectivity at all.  For the most 
part, while targeting subjective memories in order to do so, many of these films were 
ultimately articulating themselves not to the subject, but to their nervous systems.  
Particularly in desensitization-type experiments, clinical observation of viewers 
(sometimes further employing visual technologies such as infra-red cameras) quantified 
their fleeing, sweating, shaking, and vomiting as measures of the experiment’s success.  
While these techniques approached soldier’s minds as repositories of biographical 
information, they were seeking ways to automate clinical engagement with this 
information in order to produce relatively uniform results from viewers on a neurological 
level rather than biographical.  Experiments with film and narcosynthesis therefore 
sometimes figured the mind of the spectator as a media-like object in itself, whose 
memories could be retrieved, rewound, and affectively neutralized by pressing the right 
button (narcotic or cinematic). We will return to this discussion in the conclusion of this 
study. 
As the war ended and military psychiatrists began to refocus on civilian society 
and post-war rehabilitation, film continued to hold promise as a medium that could 
further expand and modernize the discipline.  The following chapter looks at how films 
made to teach civilians about military psychiatry and mental health worked to shape the 
discourse of these subjects beyond a military audience, and how a few prominent military 
psychiatrists leveraged these public conversations in order to petition federal support for 
a large, centralized psychiatric institution.  Films made about military psychiatry for 
civilian audiences further entrenched the narrative that psychiatry was not an arcane 
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practice reserved for “psychos,” but a necessary and useful discipline that was positioned 










Chapter 5. Framing the Shift From Soldier to Civilian 
5.1. From Soldier to Civilian 
The substantial military psychiatric apparatus that grew to address the needs of 
the war did not dissolve with the declaration of victory.  In psychiatric publications 
immediately after the war, much mention is made of the different kinds of roles that 
psychiatrists needed to play in both rehabilitating the returning soldiers—re-converting 
them into civilians—and the larger project of healing the society (more specifically, 
families) that had reared the suffering soldiers in the first place.  Articles appearing in 
The American Journal of Psychiatry, such as “Attitudes of Soldiers Returning from 
Overseas Service,” published in November of 1945, negotiated the role that psychiatrists 
should come to play in the rehabilitation of soldiers and the nation. 
In it, Major William Corwin, a prominent military psychiatrist, reflects on the 
data from “several thousands” of interviews with returning servicemen, concluding that:  
The returning soldier, apparently free from disabling neuropsychiatric 
symptoms, is found to contain a reservoir of anxiety-producing factors 
which modifies his outlook, and which provokes the development of 
resentment and hostility, particularly toward civilians and present social 
conditions.  … The immediate and more distant affects of these attitudes 
are of significance, and require programs designed to effect an adequate 
adjustment of the soldier to future military duties, and to post war needs 
for security and socio economic stability.349 
This particular article is interesting precisely because it is not describing soldiers who are 
under treatment for trauma (in fact the sole criteria for procuring interviewees for this 
particular study was that they not have a “neuropsychiatric” diagnosis).  Instead, it 
examines the attitudes of a more general population of returning servicemen, presumably 
healthy or at least undiagnosed.  In distinction from the texts looked at in the previous 
chapter that focused on the severely traumatized soldier, the study above is symptomatic 
of a larger trend during the period immediately after the war, where military psychiatrists 
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increasingly began to address issues pertaining to the re-socialization of the average 
soldier in addition to the ongoing concerns with veterans given neuropsychiatric 
diagnoses.   
The broadening of psychiatrists’ purview from the soldiers under critical care 
outward to include military personnel more generally was not understood as any kind of 
overreach—in fact it was fully in keeping with other key military psychiatric strategies 
including “morale building” (Ch 1) and “forward psychiatry” (Ch 2).  Psychiatric 
literature regularly described the military as a kind of organism in which all parts need to 
work harmoniously for the overall success of the whole.  The significant difference in the 
immediate post-war period was the impending dissolution of this organism and its 
eventual reabsorption by the larger social body.  This fact was not lost on military 
psychiatrists keen to maintain their professional relevance.  What is quoted above from 
Corwin captures two of the key issues that come up frequently in studies written during 
this transitional period: 1) that there is an important job to be accomplished in the 
“undoing” of the soldier mindset and any dangerous after-effects this might entail, and 2) 
that helping people to merge harmoniously into productive social/labour relations was 
essential for the economic well-being of the country at large.350 
In this latter phase of rehabilitation, the emphasis shifted from returning the 
soldier to duty toward a different kind of usefulness; and in the process, transferring the 
goal of therapeutics from wartime labour to civilian labour.  The new goal was often 
framed as getting soldiers back to work as civilians, or even more broadly, as 
rehabilitating the mental health of the nation for increased stability and productivity.  
Alongside this shifting emphasis from soldier to civilian was the popularization and 
proliferation of psychological and psychoanalytic discourses in film, radio, and 
television, prompted in part by the legitimization these disciplines had received from 
their institutionalization during the war efforts, which came together potently with a 
widespread discourse of anxiety about and empathy toward soldiers returning from 
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overseas with ominous sounding war neuroses.  In addition to the large numbers of 
returning soldiers bringing with them their own knowledge of mental health via military 
communications and psychiatric treatment, the repetition of these ideas and tropes in 
popular culture helped to foster a public openness to the role of the newly medicalized 
psychiatric discourse in spaces of everyday life such as the home, the school, and the 
workplace.   
The popular media was full of stories that responded to and stimulated the 
appetite for rehabilitation and popular psychiatry.  Psychiatrists John Griffin and William 
Line remark in 1946 that “[i]t is astonishing to note the number of current movies and 
radio programs which are based on psychiatric themes,”351 and William Menninger, head 
of military neuropsychiatry, boasted proudly about the media’s frequent visits to 
neuropsychiatry’s public relations department over and above those of other departments 
in the Surgeon General’s Office.352  Post war Hollywood turned out dozens of films with 
psychiatric themes including enduring classics like Spellbound (1945) and The Snake Pit 
(1948).  The psychiatric case-history genre became an increasingly popular staple that 
moved mental illness from “couch to screen,” often appearing first in newspapers or 
anthologies by psychoanalysts, and then adapted into films, radio, or television 
programs.353  The popularity of psychiatric themes in media generated a spectrum of 
discourses to which the military and military psychiatrists in particular were deeply 
invested in shaping. The use of film in other phases of military psychiatry explored in 
previous chapters not only set the precedent for disseminating psychiatric education and 
treatment widely, but their tactics and rhetoric continued to influence and contribute to 
the discourses framing the return of the soldier.  This helped to set the stage for 
psychiatrists to promote the feasibility of a program of nation-wide dissemination of 
mental health in the immediate post war period. 
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Cinematic representations of veterans and psychiatry in post war United States 
have been well mapped out by other studies, including William Friedman Fagelson’s 
dissertation on veteran films and masculinity in 1940s American Cinema, and the 
substantial literature on psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and cinema.354  This chapter takes a 
different approach by looking at some of the ways that films mediated the expansion of 
military psychiatry into post war public discourses about mental health, and the 
corresponding expansion of psychiatry into post war civil society.  It begins by looking at 
how films were used to facilitate veteran re-integration and rehabilitation, and then 
follows by mapping out how discourses about veterans and their mental health were 
negotiated in the two well-known military films, Let There Be Light (1945) and its 
subsequent re-make as Shades of Gray (1947).  Rather than presenting a close reading of 
either film, this chapter uses military documents, psychiatric texts, and disciplinary 
histories to contextualize the changing rhetorical framing of mental health from one film 
to the next. Within the larger context of film use by military psychiatry established in this 
dissertation, these two are re-framed, not (as they are commonly perceived) as the 
beginning of a public relations campaign to manage discourses of mental health and 
military labour in the public, but as the culmination of a much larger and well-developed 
film making and film-using apparatus that was built within the military-psychiatric 
institutions.  This approach decenters Huston’s authorship from the film’s analysis in 
order to show that both its message and the details of the film’s circulation within 
military settings (but not in public ones) were in keeping with particular institutional 
interests.  Finally, the chapter concludes by tracing the relationship between the 
successful promotion of mental health discourses such as those put forward in films such 
as Shades of Gray and “The Nation’s Mental Health,” and psychiatry’s post war 
institutionalization thanks to successful lobbying for ongoing federal support.  
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5.1.1. Showing Veterans Films 
Though it does not appear that any films were developed specifically for veterans 
from within the Neuropsychiatry Department itself, there are several documented cases of 
psychiatrists using films to try to acclimate returning soldiers to civilian life in various 
ways.  Newsreels and documentaries were sometimes screened for returning veterans to 
ease the transition home and soothe possible resentment for civilians.  In one case, the 
treatment and rehabilitation of prisoners of war incorporated the screening of 
documentary films on topics such as child welfare and the building trade as a 
“reorientation to present circumstances in this country,” following up screenings with 
group discussions.  Maxwell Jones and J. M. Tanner, the psychiatrists writing about this 
technique, also describe the screening of a film that documents the rehabilitation of 
physically injured soldiers (most likely Diary of a Sargeant (1945)—see below) in order 
to encourage “psychotherapeusis,” which the authors vaguely refer to as a “positive 
effect” attributed to watching recoveries on screen.355  At St. Elizabeth’s hospital, one of 
the largest and most important veteran’s hospitals for neuropsychiatric patients in the US, 
psychodrama techniques were used with patients to help prepare them for life as civilians.  
Patients would act out scenarios along with other patients, physicians, psychiatric social 
workers, and specially trained Red Cross helpers, allowing them to practice common 
experiences they might encounter upon their return home.  The article “Some Uses of 
Psychodrama at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital” published in 1945 in a special issue of the 
psychiatric journal Sociometry on the subject of group therapy, commends this approach 
for its ability to train patients for job interviews and to anticipate difficult scenarios that 
might arise in the workforce.356  And throughout the 40s and 50s, the US Veteran’s 
Administration produced a group of films called Psychotherapeutic Interviewing Series, 
though it is unclear whether their intended use was professional or therapeutic.  357 
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In cases such as the above, psychiatrists improvised with existing films or 
performative techniques and group discussion in order to work with soldiers on issues 
related to their return from service.  Other institutionally produced films also formed part 
of the veteran’s horizon of rehabilitation.  Two Signal Corps films were made on the 
subject of veterans adapting to lost limbs and the use of prosthetics.  The short black and 
white documentary film Meet McGonegal (1944) follows a World War I veteran with 
two prosthetic hands as he performs ordinary tasks throughout a day.  The narrator (who 
introduces himself as McGonegal’s neighbour) has an upbeat, “regular guy” tone, and he 
continually points out how easily McGonegal accomplishes all his daily tasks using all 
the same objects as anyone else (a razor, cutlery, his car, a typewriter, etc.).  Near the end 
of the film, McGonegal addresses the viewer himself with a can-do, no-nonsense tone, 
saying: “I can do practically anything anyone can do and there’s no reason why you fellas 
can’t do the same.”358  A year later, a second short film titled Diary of a Sergeant (1945), 
frames its rehabilitation story within a personal narrative of a sergeant who has both 
hands amputated.  Played by Army demolitions instructor Harold Russell who had lost 
his hands in a training accident, the film’s protagonist narrates his diary entries that 
chronicle his time in the hospital and after he returns home.359  Early in the film, the 
documentary Meet McGonegal is screened in the military hospital ward where the 
protagonist and other amputees are recovering.  After watching the documentary, the 
sergeant’s previously solemn tone becomes resolutely cheerful as he ambitiously tackles 
physiotherapy, learns to use his prosthetics, and is eventually shown back at home, 
dressing himself, going on a date, and registering for college.  In a chapter titled 
“Reconversion and the Veteran Film” in his dissertation on the veteran in 1940s 
American cinema, Fagelson discusses these “veteran training films,” among the group of 
films produced by the military and the Veterans Administration (VA) to help alert vets to 
common hurdles in their return to civilian life and how to make use of the services 
available to help them adjust.360  While the VA is a federal agency that provides 
healthcare and social services to eligible military veterans, their messages and rhetoric 
frequently overlapped with and echoed those put forward in military-made films.  
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Fagelson points out the explicitly cinematic teaching moment in Diary of a Sergeant 
when the protagonist finds the needed mental motivation and inspiration to embrace his 
therapy by watching Meet McGonegal within the film.  While these two films do not 
explicitly treat psychiatric subjects, their therapeutic narratives (Diary of a Sergeant in 
particular) present an object lesson along the same lines as Gene Kelley’s group therapy 
session in Combat Fatigue: Irritability (discussed in chapter 3).  In both Combat Fatigue: 
Irritability and Diary of a Sergeant a cathartic therapeutic benefit is attributed to the act 
of watching someone else’s rehabilitation onscreen. 
  
Figure 29: Still of McGonegal dressing himself in Meet McGonegal (1944) 
 
Figure 30: Still of amputee hospital ward screening of Meet McGonegal in the film Diary of a Sergeant 
(1945). 
Fagelson observes that a recurring theme in postwar films made for veterans by 
the Signal Corps and the VA is an exhortation to viewers to take personal responsibility 
for their own “readjustment to civilian life” by narratively reprising the theme of the 
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sceptical veteran whose negative attitude is eventually overcome.361  Fagelson sees this 
trope repeated in VA films such as Opportunity Knocks Again (1945), “Follow Me” 
Again (1945), Contact! (1946), The Road to Decision (1947), and Toward Independence 
(1947), and interprets their narratives as bearing the message: “the only thing standing 
between [maladjusted] veterans and their smooth reintegration is their willingness to 
accept help provided by the military and civilian agencies.”362  This transition is most 
often depicted in films by a narrative pattern where a now well-adjusted vet narrates his 
own progression from troubled to resolved in a voice-over while flashback scenes 
illustrate his transformation.  This structure sticks close to other military films in the 
therapeutic genre such as the Navy-produced Combat Fatigue (1944-1947) series of films 
that solicit the viewer’s personal identification with the protagonist as an insider who has 
been in their position and successfully navigated their way through to better times.363 
 
5.1.2. Management of Public Perception  
While films made on topics of veteran readjustment for soldiers accessing the 
VA’s services were not necessarily made to deal with psychiatric subjects specifically, 
other films used by the VA to train their workers and volunteers tackled psychiatric 
topics directly in order to coach them about how to understand and manage behavioural 
issues that might arise in interactions with veterans who came seeking their services.  A 
1947 article titled “The Neuropsychiatric Training Program of the Veteran’s 
Administration,” states: “we have prepared a number of film strips to use in their 
training—one to give some understanding of the neurotic and psychotic behaviour they 
encounter, another on how to handle it under the circumstances in which they operate and 
one to help them with their own emotional reactions to difficult contacts.”364  Continuing 
the general work of public relations and training done by so many military-made films, 
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moving images were also deemed a convenient, efficient and effective way of training 
civilians in non-military organizations how to understand the psychiatric concerns that 
may arise with returning veterans.   
While it is unremarkable that film was used to standardize training on issues 
pertaining to veteran behaviour, everyday uses such as these help to map out important 
continuities in the strategies deployed in films made to manage psychiatric knowledge 
within the military as they were replaced by films made to manage psychiatric knowledge 
across a wider public.  Military and VA-made films were a point of contact between 
military psychiatrists and their interest in civilian mental health, providing a medium for 
the dissemination of ideas to new publics.  The article cited above suggests that there is a 
general applicability of the information contained in films made for VA workers and 
volunteers, stating that: “those strips will be cut and rearranged for use with other lay 
groups.”365  Yet another article in the same issue of The American Journal of Psychiatry 
states that part of the role of the VA requires PR in order to effectively promote good 
mental health.  The authors suggest that this is accomplished by encouraging citizens to 
know about and to encourage the vets they know to use their services.  The article 
underlines the importance of “the education of the public in the prevention of psychiatric 
illness through publicizing the program of the Veteran’s Administration for those 
requiring treatment.”366  With these kinds of approaches to mental health, the issue of 
treating and preventing “psychiatric illness” continued to be framed as a problem that 
needed to be understood as the responsibility of the citizenry, but best managed with help 
from official institutions. 
There were also a handful of films that addressed the subject of “war neuroses” 
outright, made by the military and industry.  Like the forward psychiatry films made for 
military circulation, films made for the public encouraged empathy and accepting 
conditions as a normal reaction to military stressors, and they similarly emphasized that 
applying a psychiatric frame to understanding war neuroses could help to keep economic 
and/or manufacturing organisms functioning smoothly.  Films made by industry and 
insurance companies sought to introduce laymen and employers to “nervous conditions” 
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they might encounter while working with returned veterans.  Titles such as the Sperry 
Gyroscope Company’s The Veteran Returns to Work were intended to reduce 
misinformation about mental illness and demonstrate how co-workers and friends could 
make social adjustments to accommodate people’s suffering.367  The best-known example 
of these types of films is John Huston’s Let There Be Light (1946).  Commissioned by the 
War Department, the film was made to dispel public misinformation about the nature of 
combat fatigue and more specifically, to “convince prospective employers that they have 
nothing at all to fear in hiring one of these ex-GIs.”368   
Let There Be Light and its subsequent re-make as Shades of Gray (1948)(both 
produced by the US army) are interesting media objects that negotiated and managed 
competing narratives about returning soldiers’ mental health.  Both contain discourses 
that the military had already been disseminating throughout its military personnel during 
the war, but that were now being re-cast for a larger public forum.  Let There Be Light 
embraces the narrative that “any man would break down under the conditions of war,” 
echoing many of the forward psychiatry training films such as Psychiatric Casualties in 
the Combat Area (1944) and films in the Combat Fatigue series.  Shades of Gray, which 
ultimately came to represent the military’s official public position on mental health, 
maintained by contrast that war neuroses, while “activated” by the extreme circumstances 
of military service, were ultimately the manifestation of problems that were latent in 
soldiers before their entry into service.  In other words: their neuroses pre-existed their 
time in the military.  An examination of certain narrative elements of these films 
demonstrates the continuity between the techniques and discourses developed to teach 
military personnel about military psychiatry and their extension to civilian 
communications.  In film and media studies, there are many texts that examine Huston’s 
film and the surrounding debate over the military’s decision to suppress its release to the 
public.  This scholarship argues that Let there Be Light was suppressed because it did not 
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accord with the military’s views and that Shades of Gray was a  remake of the film in 
order to align it better with official institutional discourses.369  In order to add something 
new to this well-charted terrain, what follows is not focused on a close reading of either 
film, or on Huston as a notable film auteur but rather I will map both films onto an 
institutional framework of production and circulation networks within the climate of 
immediate post-war military psychiatry. This includes the numerous films the military 
had been making for several years that were a part of these frameworks. Within this 
context, both Let There Be Light and Shades of Gray (which was in fact in the works 
prior to the making of Let There Be Light) served as mouthpieces to promote instrumental 
understandings of psychiatry to different audiences: the civilian public for the first film, 
and military and medical personnel for the second. 
 
Let There Be Light and Shades of Gray 
In 1945 the War Department commissioned John Huston to produce a film for the 
public about veterans being treated in neuropsychiatric hospitals.  The initial directives 
given to him about the film’s subject were similar to those given for the production of 
other military psychiatric films: to counteract prejudices surrounding war neuroses.  Gary 
Edgerton’s essay on Huston’s trilogy of war documentaries cites documents contained in 
a military file on the production of Let There Be Light, showing that Huston was asked to 
produce a “film on the “Nervously Wounded (or Psychoneurotic),” and stating that it 
should:  
(1) point out what a small proportion [of veterans] fall into this category; 
(2) eliminate the stigma now attached to the psychoneurotic through 
explanation of the conditions of what it really is—thus to offset the 
exaggerated picture that has already been given to the public through the 
press, magazine and radio stories; and (3) explain that in many cases the 
reason that makes a psychoneurotic unsatisfactory for the Army is the very 
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reason for which this same person could be a real success in civilian 
life.370 
To this end, Let There Be Light is a documentary film that focuses on a small group of 
veterans who are admitted at the start, successfully rehabilitated throughout, and 
discharged by the end.  The film makes a point of highlighting the fact that the soldiers’ 
problems are the result of their harrowing experiences, and portrays its subjects as self-
possessed individuals with a profound desire to be perceived as normal—to “show people 
we can be just as good as anybody else.”371  What makes Huston’s film notably different 
from other military psychiatric films is the method that it uses to emphasize the 
normalness of its patient-subjects.  Rather than portraying a soldier with combat fatigue 
as a generic Joe-everyman, Huston’s subjects are given compelling biographical 
subjectivity by allowing them to recount their own unique experiences of war.  The 
individual intake interviews of patients near the beginning of the film give the viewer the 
sense that they are seeing subjects less as an example of a type of neurosis, and more as a 
document of a specific individual’s traumatic experience.  The length of the scenes that 
the film dedicates to each intake interview, along with the fact that there is no 
explanatory narration layered over these sequences, reinforces the primacy of the 
individuals’ stories over their ability to illustrate a particular cluster of symptoms.   
Another significant feature of this film is the way in which the scenes of 
abreactive therapy are presented. Long and observational, these scenes are done in single 
takes and have very little explanatory narration.  Two soldiers are shown being cured by 
narcosynthesis, one for an incapacitating stutter, and the other for an inability to walk. A 
third is shown being cured of amnesia via hypnotic therapy.  The long takes that allow 
the treatments to be illustrated in full and with little interjection from a narrator, place the 
curative power of abreactive therapy at the center of the film, much as it is in military 
psychiatric films such as Combat Exhaustion (1943) and Psychiatric Procedures in the 
Combat Area (1944).  Historian Alison Winter attributes Huston’s directorial focus on 
this treatment to his own personal interest in the cathartic power of abreactive therapy.  
She writes that  
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When Huston read about Pentothal and hypnosis, the information struck 
him with the power of ‘a religious experience,’ and he made hypnotic 
states central to his film.  He immersed himself in life at Mason General 
Hospital, even learning hypnotic techniques himself and standing in for 
the staff hypnotist when he was unavailable.372  
While Huston’s focus on abreactive therapy is very much in line with the celebrations of 
success that it received in other filmic treatments of military psychiatry, the film as a 
whole does not contextualize this success within the same rhetoric of mental health 
emphasized in most other military psychiatric texts.  There is a remarkable similarity 
between the nearly instantaneous recovery of a patient’s ability to walk in both Let There 
Be Light and Combat Exhaustion (discussed in chapter 3), though the latter film portrays 
the patient as a somewhat pitiful character whose trauma is the result of being hit by a 
clod of dirt and mistaking it for a shell.373  In Huston’s film, there is substantial screen 
time given to the patients to express their stories of combat, which impress upon the 
viewer the extremely distressing experiences the soldiers have undergone.  In this way, 
Let There Be Light echoes more closely the portrayal of abreactive therapy displayed in 
the surprisingly candid newsreel from 1944, Psychiatric Procedures in the Combat Area, 
which contains a long, uninterrupted scene of a soldier undergoing narcosynthesis (and 
also features long takes of soldiers speaking in psychiatric interviews, as does Let There 
Be Light).374  While the abreactive therapies portrayed in Huston’s film present the 
suffering of the patients candidly and with a sympathetic lens, all scenes of treatment in 
military psychiatric films constitute hearty endorsements of this practice.  In each scene, 
the calm, confident psychiatrist manages to cure the patients of their affliction efficiently, 
and ends with the grateful astonishment of the soldier. 
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Figure 31:Stills from the narcosynthesis scenes in Let There Be Light (1946) and Psychiatric Procedures in 
the Combat Area (1944) 
Huston’s personal interest in abreactive treatment may not have been the sole 
factor determining the way it is portrayed in his documentary.  Both Let There Be Light 
and Psychiatric Procedures in the Combat Area contain long, un-narrated scenes of 
narcosynthesis and frame the suffering of the patients as a result of the horrors of war, 
and this may be a reflection of the fact that John Appel, head of the Army Mental 
Hygiene branch, was the lead psychiatrist working in consultation on both films.375  C.A 
Morgan III’s article “From Let There Be Light to Shades of Gray: the construction of 
authoritative knowledge about combat fatigue (1945-48),” provides an excellent analysis 
of the changing rhetoric from one film to the other, noting in particular the 
“environmentalist” understanding of psychiatrists such as John Appel who was involved 
in overseeing both Psychiatric Procedures in the Combat Area and Let There Be Light.  
Morgan contrasts Appel’s “environmentalist” psychiatry with the “developmentalist” 
understandings of psychiatrists such as William Menninger, who was ultimately 
responsible for getting the film Shades of Gray through to production.  
“Environmentalist” psychiatrists believed that a person’s social environment (in this case, 
experiences of war trauma) was the most significant influence on mental health, whereas 
“developmentalist” psychiatrists were more concerned with early childhood influences, a 
debate we will return to below.376 
Although Let There Be Light was commissioned and fully supported by the Army, 
it was never released to the public as intended. While it continued to be available through 
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military circulation for several years after its release, it was eventually pulled even there 
and banned from exhibition until the 1980s.  It is well known that the official reason 
given by the military for the film’s suppression was to protect the identities of the 
patients appearing in it, though Huston maintains that all soldiers appearing in the film 
had enthusiastically signed releases granting permission to use footage of them in the 
film.377  It has also been suggested that the military wanted to avoid a false sense of 
expectation and possible litigations from veterans witnessing the “miraculous” cures 
depicted in the film.378  Huston himself thought that the film had threatened a certain 
image of heroic masculinity among the military officials responsible for cancelling its 
public release, stating: “they wanted to maintain the ‘warrior’ myth, which said that our 
American soldiers went to war and came back all the stronger for the experience.”379   
There are debates about what happened with this film, the most common story 
being that it was pulled after a few weeks of circulation within the military, and never 
shown again.  Analyses that focus primarily on Huston as a filmmaker and Let There Be 
Light as a unique film text emphasize this element of the film’s circulation.  While it 
certainly appears to be true that officials at the War Department decided that this film 
should not be screened publicly and made substantial efforts to make it so, focusing on 
Huston as the film’s director can lead to a glorification of Huston’s visionary rendering of 
military trauma at the expense of understanding the complex and sophisticated military 
psychiatric apparatus of which the film was a part.  Edgerton’s essay, for example, looks 
at documents associated with the film’s production that support the story of the film’s 
suppression by military officials, but without larger institutional context, he misjudges 
the military’s view of psychoneurosis as “unsophisticated” and “naive.”  As evidence of 
the military’s naiveté Edgerton cites a directive found in Let There Be Light’s production 
file that asks to acquire a print of the film Enchanted Cottage (1945) to be used as 
research on the topic of veterans and mental disturbance.  He concludes from this that the 
military knew so little about psychiatry that a schmaltzy Hollywood drama was 
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considered to be sufficient background research.380  To this he adds as evidence that 
William Menninger’s book on war neuroses was not published until a couple of years 
after Huston’s film was made.  It is misguided to imply that the director of the military’s 
neuropsychiatry division’s understanding of war neuroses did not mature fully until years 
after the war had ended (and after having been influenced by Huston’s film), and that 
watching Enchanted Cottage was a clear sign of ignorance.   Examining the breadth and 
scope of the Neuropsychiatric Department and their sophisticated communications 
apparatus renders these claims unpersuasive in supporting the assertion that the military 
was lacking for knowledge on a subject that had become a central pillar of their overall 
operational tactics.  Edgerton’s subsequent praise of Let There Be Light as a film that 
pioneered the progressive understanding that “a psychoneurotic impairment is no more 
disgraceful than a physical injury,”381 attributes this insight to the prophetic vision of 
Huston as a great auteur and his formal experimentation.  While praise for the film’s 
sensitivity and artistry is absolutely warranted, studies that privilege Huston’s authorship 
of the film over its institutional context make it harder to see the complex negotiations of 
information management at play in the film’s suppression.  Contextualizing the film 
within the larger military neuropsychiatric apparatus and debates among its key players 
can supply additional information about its significance and circulation. 
Reviews of the discipline of psychiatry and mental hygiene (the more common 
term used to describe studies and policies of preventative psychiatry) just after the war 
illustrate the feelings of importance and mobilization that the practical demands of war 
had offered to those working in psychiatry.  In particular, they reveal the broadly 
articulated reticence psychiatrists expressed about returning to the cloisters of universities 
and asylums.382  One survey explicitly states that the impressive gains achieved 
throughout the war should not be lost, nor should the talents of the people who achieved 
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them go unappreciated now that the war was over.383  Psychiatrists John Griffin and 
William Line, for example, called to adapt the gains achieved in military settings to the 
needs of civilian life by applying the “insights gained thru (sic) individual psychotherapy 
to the body politic,” noting an increasing public interest in embracing a more widespread 
application of mental hygiene practices.384  Examples such as these show that the 
professional psychiatric climate concurrent with the intended release of Let There Be 
Light had large stakes in portraying war neuroses as more than simply the products of 
acute trauma.  These stakes were not just theoretical; Senate deliberations on the postwar 
Neuropsychiatric Institute Act proposed in 1946 was tabling $18 million for psychiatric 
research and development.  The psychiatrists who lobbied and gave testimony in support 
of the act had significant motivation to convince their audience that neuroses were a 
result of childhood experiences and not warfare, and therefore needed to be recognized as 
an important issue not just of military, but of national concern.385   
The rhetorical structure underlying Let There Be Light—that neuroses were a 
product of war—was not in keeping with the ambitions of mental hygiene practitioners 
and psychiatrists after the war, nor did it suit the military’s desire to share some of the 
responsibility for war neuroses with the general population (particularly its mothers).  
Shades of Gray, on the other hand, both (generously) shared responsibility for neuroses 
with the nation’s mothers, and made the case that mental hygiene and psychiatry were 
crucial components to a healthy post war nation.  Famously a direct re-make of Let There 
Be Light using actors in place of soldiers, the film is in fact utterly different in structure, 
tone, message, and style.  And while it undoubtedly imports material from the interviews 
and treatments of soldiers in Let There Be Light, the idea for Shades of Gray had been in 
development prior to the production of Let There Be Light.  A proposal for a film 
provisionally titled “The Neuropsychiatric Problem in the Army,” which was eventually 
re-titled Shades of Gray, was approved for production in June of 1945.386   
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Shades of Gray is a carefully scripted educational film that combines stock 
footage, animated infographics, and acted dramatizations of case studies. It also contains 
very few direct quotations from Let There Be Light.  Its narrative leaves aside the 
unscripted interviews that provide the personal and graphic descriptions of traumatic 
combat experience structuring Huston’s film, replacing them with vignettes of characters 
meant to represent common soldier character-types whose afflictions are explained by the 
narrator.  Both films have the same goal of convincing their viewers that mental illness is 
a normal affliction.  But while Let There Be Light tries to de-stigmatize combat neuroses 
by showing their occurrence in relatable people who articulate their own experiences and 
suffering, Shades of Gray does so by invoking abstractions and types, suggesting that 
neuroses exist in everyone and on a spectrum of severity, much like physical aches or 
ailments: we are none of us black and white, but all “shades of gray.”  These and other 
differences constitute the latter film’s rhetorical repositioning of mental illness from the 
environmental result of military labour to the developmental consequence of child rearing 
and character development.  Before the film even begins, the main title card has “Shades 
of Gray” written in block letters that cast shadows of people behind them.  The shadows 
from left to right are of a series of figures roughly approximating a veteran’s timeline: a 
small child and a babe in arms appear on the left, followed by a man in uniform and a 
man in a business suit on the far right, establishing the rhetorical premise to follow.  
 
Figure 32: Title card for Shades of Gray (1948) 
After a few opening vignettes of soldiers in states of distress (a soldier in training 
who becomes too afraid to throw a grenade; a man in a mess hall who thinks his 
neighbours are whispering about him, etc.), the narrator goes on to explain that mental 
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illness begins and exists in the population at large, pointing out that it is from this 
(already compromised) pool that the military draws its men.  The narrator frames mental 
illness as beginning in childhood when he says over footage of soldiers marching that:  
Foundations of physical and mental health are laid in infancy.  …  The 
newborn baby has very little permanent immunity or resistance to disease, 
but in fighting and conquering infection, resistance is developed and 
strengthened.  It’s the same with mental disease.387   
The rest of the film structures itself around a fictional account of two soldiers: Bill Brown 
and Joe Smith.  Beginning with their childhood, it shows these two characters developing 
the mental constitution that will later shape their ability to cope with the stresses of war 
and military life; one well, and the other poorly.  While the film does not deny that 
“healthy men” also suffer from combat stresses, it continually places the origins of 
neuroses back to early childhood, resituating the responsibility for war neuroses from the 
experience of war to a problem whose source can be located in the mental health of 
foundational and highly gendered social institutions, and ultimately the nation.   
In the early scenes of Shades of Gray, Bill Brown and Joe Smith’s mothers are 
scrutinized to discern the impact of their parenting techniques on the children’s 
psychological development, placing them, rather than the military, at the centre of 
neurotic development.  In the “Training Films” file of the Neuropsychiatric Division, 
there are several scenarios for a film provisionally titled “Overall Psychiatric Picture in 
the Army,” or “The Neuropsychiatric Problem in the Army,” which formed the basis for 
Shades of Gray’s development.  One scenario in particular contains detailed case 
histories for the film’s protagonists Joe Smith and Bill Brown and the effects of their 
mothers’ parenting on their careers as soldiers.  It also includes an additional case history 
for a third character that never made it into the film: Jim Black.  Black’s reason for 
discharge would have been ongoing stomach troubles that the film treatment attributes to 
his difficult and unhappy family situation—specifically, his neurotic wife’s resentment 
over Black’s induction into the military.388  Adding Black’s proposed case history of 
neurosis due to the selfishness of a military wife to the completed film’s emphasis on 
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mothers, the story is even further reinforced that military neuroses are a gendered 
problem—that is feminine—originating in the wives and mothers of the civilian 
population.   
This framing of military neuroses was not one that the film plucked from thin air 
to help deflect military responsibility for the mental health of veterans.  Mental hygiene 
discourses from the same period often occupied themselves with women, emphasizing 
the key role they play not only in facilitating the successful reintegration and 
rehabilitation of returning vets, but more broadly in the production of psychologically 
healthy children in the first place.  Psychiatrists John Griffin and William Line’s 1946 
review, “Trends in Mental Hygiene,” sympathizes with studies that find fault with 
mothers on a case-by-case basis, and more broadly blames the “American emphasis on an 
over-sentimentalized and commercialized ‘Mother,’ with resultant emotional immaturity 
on the part of our younger generation.”389  By focusing on mothers as a source of neurotic 
development, Griffin and Line pin mental hygiene’s hopes for a rehabilitated nation on a 
new form of training and education for children.  They go so far as to draw a direct causal 
link between child rearing and war as such when they write that it is only with the proper 
training of children that one can hope to “banish the habits of unrealistic wishful thinking 
which has played an important part in causing repeated world wars.”390  The focus on 
mothers as the source of mental illness re-positioned the military’s vast numbers of 
neuropsychiatric casualties as a problem of the nation’s mental health.  Some psychiatric 
texts even implied or stated outright that national mental health in the US and other 
countries was a major factor precipitating the outbreak of World War II, thus giving 
psychiatrists and those working in mental hygiene a strategic role in the resolution of 
major domestic and international conflict.391  Shades of Gray’s rhetorical framing 
followed suit, arguing that mental health in the army was an issue of national concern.  
                                               
389 Griffin and Line, “Trends in Mental Hygiene,” 398. 
390 Ibid. 
391 See Griffin and Line “Trends in Mental Hygiene,” William Menninger “The Role of 
Psychiatry in the World Today” The American Journal of Psychiatry (TAJP) 104 no. 3 
(1947): 155-163, Francis J. Braceland “Psychiatric Lessons from World War II” TAJP 
103 no. 5 (1947): 587-593, and Samuel H. Kraines “Preventative Psychiatry” TAJP 104 
no. 4 (1947): 238-241, as a few examples among many others.  See also Ellen Herman’s 
book The Romance of American Psychology Chapter 3, “The Dilemmas of Democratic 
Morale.” 
195 
The expository opening title reels that precede the first scene state that: “The future 
mental health of the nation depends largely upon an understanding of those factors which 
shape the human being.”392  
While the discipline of psychiatry had much to gain from arguing for “the nation” 
as its new therapeutic domain, there were also very specific arguments made for the 
film’s production by the people in the Neuropsychiatry Division working on its 
production.  In one of the documents that work out the treatment for a film under the 
heading: “The Neuropsychiatric Problem in the Army,” head of the neuropsychiatry 
division, William Menninger, writes that:  
Almost half a million men have been discharged by the Army for 
neuropsychiatric reasons.  A large number of these men will have to be 
taken care of at enormous expense to the taxpayers of the nation.  Due to 
lack of understanding of this problem, it may be anticipated that criticism 
will be directed against the Army.  A number of distorted concepts have 
already developed, such as: “the Army created the problem of 
psychoneurosis,” “the Army is not doing enough about it,” “the Army 
should have screened out all the psychoneurotics.”  
The film could perform a valuable service by presenting an authentic 
picture of the total problem, particularly by showing the roots of this 
problem in the civilian public and by showing the procedures of the Army 
in meeting the neuropsychiatric problem.393 
The document goes on to acknowledge that the production of such a film would be a 
continuation of the communications strategy already in place to disseminate this 
interpretation of the “neuropsychiatric problem” amongst military personnel, stating that: 
The Surgeon General … considered the [neuropsychiatric] problem to be 
sufficiently significant and serious as to require interpretation by film to 
all officers of the Army.  The importance of this problem has not suddenly 
disappeared with the end of the war.394  
The financial burden of veterans returning with psychiatric problems was posed as a 
significant motivator for taking charge of the discourse around military mental health in 
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the public, and the Neuropsychiatry Division leveraged this factor to justify the cost of 
developing the proposed film.  The document cited above states that the estimated cost 
for producing the proposed film would be between 50 to 75 thousand dollars, arguing that 
this would be a very sound investment for the army considering the cost of medical care 
for neuropsychiatric patients.  Citing an average figure of $35,000 to care for a 
psychiatric patient in World War I, and adding to this the further cost of their loss of 
productivity to society, the document proposes that if the film were to produce a future 
improvement in the handling of such patients, it would “repay the cost of the film in short 
time.”395  While the language surrounding the actual financial benefit to the military is 
kept vague, the implication is that by “showing the roots of this problem in the civilian 
public,” arguments could further be made for sharing the fiscal responsibility outside the 
military institution. 
The documentation surrounding Shades of Gray’s production outlines clear 
reasons why the military and military psychiatrists would rather promote a discourse of 
mental health’s developmental origins over and above the environmental argument made 
implicitly by the war-battered vets depicted in Let There Be Light.  Despite this fact, the 
circulation of the two films actually overlapped institutionally.  The common story is that 
Let There Be Light was immediately pulled from circulation and replaced with Shades of 
Gray. But surveying “medical films” indexes listed in issues of the Bulletin of the US 
Army Medical Department and other official military publications reveals that both films 
appear in these indexes for several years after their completion.  While Let There Be 
Light was pulled from public circulation immediately, the film continued to be listed 
among the available medical films in a military bulletin from 1948; Shades of Gray is 
listed in a bulletin from 1949; and an issue of the Medical Bulletin of the European 
Command from 1952 lists both films as available for screening to authorized medical 
personnel.396  William Menninger’s contribution on “Education and Training” to the 
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military’s official publication, Neuropsychiatry in World War II, also lists both films 
among the visual aids available on the subject.397  The appearance of these two films 
side-by-side in multiple military directories substantiates the suspicion of scholars such 
as Edgerton and Morgan that a desire to protect the identities of the film’s protagonists 
was likely not the military’s chief reason for halting Let There Be Light’s public 
circulation.398  However the overlapping military circulation simultaneously complicates 
other common assumptions about the strictness of the ban that was placed upon the film. 
The popular idea that the film was aggressively suppressed because the military 
was absolutely opposed to the image Let There Be Light presented of a compromised 
military masculinity or the mental consequences of war is harder to substantiate given 
their willingness to show the film within military and select medical networks.399  This 
more complex circuit in which Let There Be Light was available for internal institutional 
distribution but not to the public, suggests that an executive decision was made that Let 
There Be Light’s version of the story of mental health was not the one best suited to 
managing the public’s understanding of mental health and military experience, but that it 
did serve other purposes.  One such purpose may have been fulfilled by the film’s 
enthusiastic promotion of the power of abreactive therapies that had been routinized 
during the war, furthering claims to the medical legitimacy and efficiency of psychiatric 
treatments for seriously afflicted patients. 
What the film Shades of Gray and the military documents precipitating its 
production make clear is precisely what kind of narrative the military was most interested 
in promoting to the general public.  Within this context, the details about exactly when 
and how Huston’s film was suppressed become somewhat less conspiratorially 
tantalizing.  Regardless of the reasons why Let there Be Light was ultimately pulled from 
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public circulation—whether there is some truth to the dubious claims that it was to 
protect the identities of the soldiers appearing in it or whether more powerful interests 
were at stake—what matters is that the type of narrative that Huston put forward was 
ultimately marginal to what was agreed upon by military psychiatric officials as the most 
useful way of framing mental health.  In this respect, Shades of Gray was not re-
inventing Huston’s narrative in an attempt to quickly cover up an embarrassing exposure, 
but re-packaging a very well established and institutionally useful story for a new public 
audience.  The continuity between the other films the military had already made on the 
subject, the rhetoric worked out carefully in the documents preceding Shades of Gray’s 
production, and the film itself, is very clear.  While military psychiatric filmmaking did 
not produce a strict homogeneity of ideas—as evidenced by rogue films such as Let 
There Be Light and Psychiatric Casualties in the Combat Area—there was a definite 
hegemony when it came to placing the might of military infrastructure and resources 
behind some rhetorical framings over others.  Shades of Gray displaced the etiology of 
“combat fatigue” from a product of war trauma to one of improper childrearing, thus 
subtly shifting back toward a pre-war orientation that helped to move some of the 
responsibility for distressed soldiers from the military to the Mother.400  Conveniently, 
what followed from this premise was the claim that psychiatry had a post war role to play 
in the re-adjustment of the American family.   
 
5.1.3. “The Nation’s Mental Health”:  Psychiatrists turn to civilians  
Aggressive campaigning for the importance of psychiatry gave rise to the 
educational communications strategies seen first in films made for forward psychiatry 
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and then in postwar mental health discourse management.  This campaigning initially 
formed part of the response to the desperate shortages of clinical professionals available 
to work with soldiers in the early years of the war.  Historian Ellen Herman writes in her 
study of psychology and psychiatry’s extraordinary growth during the post war years 
that:  
Personnel shortages gave psychiatrists the reason they needed to 
proselytize, which they did with missionary zeal.  Here was an opportunity 
to place general psychiatric principles at the centre of all medical 
education and practice and correct the woeful errors of doctors ignorant of 
psychological factors.401   
What exactly these factors were was an issue that was itself negotiated throughout this 
expansion of the discipline, manifest in the field’s own divisions and conflicts.  
Psychiatrists who hailed from a psychodynamic background understood environment, 
family, and social context to be central factors in the mental health of the patient—both 
“environmentalist” and “developmentalist” psychiatrists belonged to this school.  
Psychosomatic psychiatry located problems with mental health in physiological and 
neuroscientific issues.  While psychosomatic psychiatry had dominated the discipline 
prior to World War II. Thanks to their ability to target environmental issues in the 
efficient treatment of soldiers, the psychodynamic school of thought achieved 
institutional ascendancy in the military during the war.  In the wartime context, 
psychosomatic psychiatry had fewer techniques to offer for mass treatment. Although 
lobotomies and electroshock therapy continued to be extremely popular forms of 
treatment both during and after the war, showing that both schools continued to co-exist 
with overlapping techniques.402    
Psychodynamic psychiatrists leveraged their advantage in institutional power as 
an opportunity to promote psychiatry’s ability to offer a corrective to medicine’s ever-
increasing technical specialization.  In fact, three of the American Psychiatry 
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Association’s five presidents between 1945 and 1950 were leading psychodynamic 
military psychiatrists, including William Menninger, who had served as head of the 
military’s Neuropsychiatry Department.  By taking into consideration the broader 
influences likely to affect a patient’s mental health, psychodynamic psychiatry made not 
just the mind, but its social substrate, its area of expertise.403  The growing institutional 
power of the discipline more generally provided proselytizing psychiatrists with a 
mouthpiece for their views on the relationship between mental health and the human 
environment, enabling the promotion of a kind of “psychiatric activism.”  Some military 
psychiatrists in the immediate post war period sought to innovate community psychiatry 
that worked with the principles that health and illness were not “fixed states,” but were 
deeply influenced by the environment in which they emerged.404  It was largely thanks to 
the military careers of psychiatrists that such ideas could be promoted to the public in 
films such as Let There Be Light and Shades of Gray, and that they could continue to 
influence the expansion of the discipline into more social and civilian domains after the 
war.  
An example of a film text that bridged psychiatry’s wartime and postwar interests 
is an episode of the popular didactic short film series, “The March of Time,” produced on 
the subject of “The Nation’s Mental Health” in 1951.  The 18-minute movie widely 
distributed to commercial movie theaters is a concise iteration of all the key themes and 
arguments made in military mental health films examined in previous chapters, but re-
packaged for a civilian audience by a commercial publisher.  “The Nation’s Mental 
Health” begins by establishing the link between the military and mental health by 
opening with footage of men walking into a US Army building, followed by a medium 
shot from over the shoulder of a military agent at a classifying desk, stamping files with 
either a large “accepted,” or “rejected” stamp.  The narrator explains: 
Many are being rejected.  Easy to detect are the physical ills disqualifying 
a man, less so are the problems of the mind, yet they are grave.  Turned 
back into society among the seven million Americans suffering from some 
                                               
403 Herman, The Romance of American Psychology, 91.  
404 Ibid., 96. 
201 
form of mental health.  Mental illness has become America’s number one 
health problem.405 
The short film then shifts to focus on mental health in the general population and 
progress being made in its treatment.  Mirroring arguments made in films examined in 
chapter 2, “The Nation’s Mental Health” sets up a rhetorical argument that pits outdated 
methods and associations (insane asylums) against images of modern psychiatric and 
mental health infrastructure.  Footage of female inmates in an asylum is shown while the 
narrator says gravely: “Insanity—for each state to figure out as best they could.  
Institutionalization made things worse until all hope of recovery vanished.”  The scene 
then cuts to footage showing the erection of a vast modern facility, while the narrator 
continues: 
Congress passed the National Mental Health Act … to increase scientific 
knowledge of mental health and illness.  There is not enough public 
understanding of the importance of mental health.406   
The film links this pioneering work back to psychiatrists in the military by showing 
footage of director of Neuropsychiatry William Menninger at his (newly expanded) 
civilian clinic and then cutting to clips from Let There Be Light while the narrator praises 
the Veteran’s Administration for “bring[ing] disturbed patients back to reality.”  The film 
then contains a segment consisting of brief scenes showing many of the different methods 
and treatments explored throughout this study, including: a clinical psychologist 
administering a client tests and asking him questions about early childhood; a woman 
being prepared to receive electroshock therapy; an operating room during brain surgery; a 
patient undergoing chemical narcosis for abreaction therapy; a studio with a set and 
audience for drama therapy; and art and occupational therapy.  This sequence highlights 
the diversity and breadth of psychiatric treatments, making a further case for the 
discipline’s scientific modernization and against its status as an arcane treatment for the 
very rich or the very disturbed.   
The last part of the short film begins by echoing the logic used in military films 
examined in chapter 2 that argue for practicing preventative psychiatry close to combat 
zones in order to catch problems before they become more difficult to treat.  The narrator 
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makes the case that psychiatrists should become directors of community mental health 
clinics, saying that: “at the community level, the clinic deals with mental health 
problems, which though minor at the outset, may develop into major disorders.”407  As 
evidence, the film presents a dramatized case study of a teen who has stolen money from 
her mother and a babysitting client.  After taking a Thematic Apperception Test and 
being interviewed by a psychiatrist, it is uncovered that family issues are at the root of 
her behaviour and her parents are convinced to give her more affection.  The narrator 
informs us that: “understanding brought harmony to the Warren household.”  The film’s 
final scene reiterates that good mental health occurs at the level of the community/family 
by showing footage of a father helping his son build a model, interspersed with that of a 
mother baking with her daughters.  The narrator sums up that: “in the last analysis, a 
healthy mental state is fostered by the understanding and cooperation of the parents of the 
nation.”408   
“The Nation’s Mental Health” both promotes an image of psychiatry as a modern 
science that can increase social/familial harmony and references its growth in the military 
context.  In a chapter reviewing the impact of World War II on mental health practices in 
America, historian Gerald Grob writes that after the war, psychiatrists 
[M]aintained that their specialty possessed the knowledge and techniques 
to identify appropriate and environmental changes that presumably could 
optimize mental as well as physical health. “Good mental health or well-
being,” wrote [psychiatrist] Henry W. Brosin in spelling out the 
implications of the military experience for American society, “is a 
commodity which can be created under favorable circumstances.”409 
The institutional pressure the military had placed on the psychiatric discipline to produce 
an ostensibly reliable product and providing the discipline with resources to do so, 
generated a confidence that the “commodity” of instrumentally useful mental health 
could be sold to new populations.  Not only had military psychiatry generated the 
methods and resources to sell “good mental health,” but it had also produced a sizable 
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new cohort of psychiatric professionals who were invested in the success of this kind of 
message.   
In 1940, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) had 2,295 total registered 
members, two thirds of whom worked in psychiatric hospitals or asylums. During the 
war, an additional 2,400 medical physicians began to work as psychiatrists to meet 
wartime demands, doubling the professionals dedicated to this task and radically 
changing their patient base from asylum residents to a much wider spectrum of the 
population.410  By sharp contrast with the 67% of APA members who had worked in 
psychiatric asylums before 1940, by 1957, only 17% of their 10,000 members held this 
kind of job.  The astonishing growth in post war membership—some 8300—largely 
migrated to jobs that interacted with a broad cross-section of the public.  Rather than 
working with the severely disabled, post-war psychiatrists worked predominantly in 
community clinics, education, government posts, medical schools, private practices, or as 
consultants for industry and manufacturing, bringing with them tools and information 
gleaned in their military careers.411   
As military psychiatrist Frances J Braceland wrote in 1947 in an article titled 
“Psychiatric Lessons from World War II,” industrial psychiatry had much to gain from 
what military psychiatry had accomplished.  He wrote that industry would surely benefit 
“by an examination of the statistics of military service in which literally hundreds of 
thousands of men between definite age groups were under medical observation.”  The 
potential value of this lesson was not lost on industry.  Companies including the Ford 
Foundation, Coca-Cola, General Electric, and Standard Oil helped to sponsor the 
Columbia Project, which sought to analyze the psychiatric records of the 20 million men 
who had been examined during the war.  Sociologist Nikolas Rose writes that: “The 
Columbia Project aimed to make a systematic analysis of these wartime personnel 
records in order to investigate the nation’s human resources as a basis for future planning, 
not only of the armed forces but also of the nation as a whole.”412  In addition to their 
newly normalized status as administrators of the nation’s mental health, the wartime 
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work of military psychiatrists helped to further cement the role of the social sciences in 
the management of human resources throughout American industry.  
This thoroughgoing change to the disciplinary makeup was facilitated via the 
techniques tested and refined by the military psychiatric apparatus during the war, such as 
mobilizing media to change understandings of the discipline and its possible functions.  
The establishment of a military psychiatry division in the Surgeon General’s Office with 
an active Public Relations officer during the war had established networks through which 
the ideas promulgated in the films examined in this study found their way into the 
explosion of popular culture and news media treating psychiatric topics.  In an address to 
a graduating class of military-trained psychiatrists given in 1945, William Menninger 
boasted about the 
[W]ell-trodden path to our little division in the Surgeon General’s Office 
by writers from magazines and newspapers, from radio stations and 
motion-picture producers.  Our Public Relations officer has told me that 
except for special drives … neuropsychiatry probably receives more 
newspaper column space, and he receives more inquiries about it than any 
other branch of the Surgeon General’s Office.413 
Using media to sensitize the viewing public to ideas about mental health that 
subsequently supported desired changes to mental health policy was a model carried over 
from their experience during the war.  In 1946, the newly established National Institute 
for Mental Health—a federally supported institute that nationalized (formerly state-
based) mental health policy and acted as a centralized body for coordinating and funding 
psychiatric research—took charge of the “Publications and Reports” sector of the 
Military’s Neuropsychiatry division.  This sector “disseminat[ed] information about 
mental illness and its prevention. … produc[ing] films, exhibits, study kits, catalogues 
and printed materials for use by the public,” and became a popular source for 
communications material.414  Among the projects supported by the National Institute for 
Mental Health was the establishment of the Mental Health Film Board, ensuring the 
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enduring place of film within the new institution’s operations.415  The board was itself 
populated by some of the key players in pioneering film use in military psychiatry, 
including Leon J. Saul, Kenneth Appel, and head of the Navy’s psychiatry department, 
Howard Rome.416  Many mental health films were produced under their supervision with 
films such as Angry Boy (1951), Farewell to Childhood (1951), and Fears of Children 
(1952), continuing to promulgate the idea that childhood and the family unit is the key 
location to building the foundations for a mentally healthy society.417   
Publicly vocal military psychiatrists had been instrumental to the establishment of 
the National Institute of Mental Health immediately after the war, in part by articulating a 
correlation between the need to secure substantial federal funding for research and 
development and the health of the nation at large.  Menninger himself wrote that: 
“national mental health … could be purchased if that were our aim,” linking financial 
support for psychiatry to a vaguely articulated promise of stability and productivity.418  
As historian Ellen Herman observes, psychiatry’s expansion and innovations during the 
war had given military psychiatrists a feeling of being “custodians of a vital social 
resource—mental health—without which economic prosperity, democratic decision 
making, and intergroup harmony were implausible, perhaps impossible.”419  With such a 
resource at stake, aggressive lobbying took place at the federal level and  
[C]onsensus that augmenting clinical funding was tantamount to 
improving national well-being would shortly be displayed on the floor of 
US congress, where government officials debated the details of a federally 
sponsored mental health effort that became the National Mental Health 
Act of 1946.420   
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The signing of the Mental Health Act created substantial governmental support for the 
discipline, and the subsequent creation of the National Institute of Mental Health 
furthered its ongoing centralization.  A far cry from the once-marginal discipline 
practiced by a few psychoanalysts and psychiatrists for the wealthy and people 
incarcerated in asylums, mental health via psychiatry was now entrenched as a serious 
medical practice with a National Institute to co-ordinate research and policy.  In “The 
Nation’s Mental Health,” episode of The March of Time, a sequence described above 
concisely summarizes this achievement.  When the narrator says: “Insanity—for each 
state to figure out as best they could.  Institutionalization made things worse until all hope 
of recovery vanished,”421 over footage of inmates in an asylum, the film is referencing the 
pre-existing lack of a centralized federal institution governing psychiatric hospitals and 
mental health policy.  The scene then cuts to footage of the National Institute for Mental 
Health complex being built, while the narrator says: “Congress passed the National 
Mental Health Act … to increase scientific knowledge of mental health and illness.”422 
Thanks in part to precisely this ability to mobilize communications promoting their 
discipline, psychiatric professionals were able to establish policies and powerful state 
institutions in order to facilitate their shifting disciplinary concern from the chronically ill 
to include “all of human society.”423 
Herman credits the war with inspiring military psychiatrists as to the possible 
scope and scale of their work, writing that 
[W]ar on a mass scale was probably the only thing that could have made 
clinical treatment possible on a mass scale. …  By acquainting huge 
numbers of ordinary people with professional healing and emotional self-
management for the first time, it served as a foundation for the “growth 
industry” of the postwar years and lengthened the menu of services 
available to a rapidly expanding consumer market.424 
Both the “acquaintance of huge numbers of people with professional healing” and the 
“menu of services available” were intimately tied to the military’s wartime filmmaking 
initiatives and their innovations with visual technologies.  The savvy use of film and 
                                               
421 The March of Time, “The Nation’s Mental Health” 17.3, Time Inc, April 1951. 
422 Ibid. 
423 Grob, The Mad Among Us, 211. 
424 Ibid. 
207 
other communications technologies to manage discourses about mental health and argue 
for its importance was applied after the war as well.  Illustrated by the sequence of scenes 
depicting a variety of modern psychiatric methods in “The Nation’s Mental Health,” we 
see film being used to demystify information about psychiatric techniques, to 
demonstrate the “menu of services,” and to show everyday people benefiting from them.  
In both the wartime and post war context, prodigious institutional expansions of the 
discipline corresponded with such communications initiatives: such as the doubling of 
psychiatric professionals via military training, and the establishment of the National 
Institute of Mental Health.  As we saw in Chapter 3, one of the most significant 
expansions of therapeutic technique was itself dependent upon psychiatry’s ability to sell 
itself as modern and efficient, employing film and other visual technologies in order to 
substantiate such claims.   
 
5.2. Conclusion 
Visual and moving image technologies played an essential role in the expansion 
and modernization of military psychiatry, and subsequently, its expansion and 
modernization within a much larger social field in the post war era.  Not only were films 
used by a variety of businesses and institutions as part of their veteran re-integration 
programs, but films were used to negotiate and debate the terms in which psychiatry 
would be understood by, and continue to expand into, civilian society.  Situating films 
such as Let There Be Light and Shades of Gray within a disciplinary/institutional context 
rather than merely attending to their auterist or propagandistic qualities allows us to see 
them articulating arguments of great consequence to the professional interests of 
psychiatrists within competing schools of thought.  The psychodynamic school of 
psychiatry, which rose to prominence in the military context, set its sights on developing 
infrastructure to implement large-scale community based psychiatric practice in the post 
war era.  Within the psychodynamic school, the psychiatrists who ascribed to a belief in 
the “developmental” origins of neuroses (illustrated by the film Shades of Gray), as 
opposed to the “environmentalist” argument (championed by Let There Be Light), had a 
particular vested interest in identifying the American family as a site needing therapeutic 
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aid.  Their savvy use of film and media, honed during the war, continued to be a tool with 
which to craft public messages that were in synch with ambitious institutional goals, and 
to a degree, reflect the debates across its different constituencies.  Let There Be Light’s 
suppression and Shades of Gray’s dissemination in public discourse also continued 
military PR’s persistent avoidance of stating outright that war in itself is what pushes the 
limits of mental health. 
This chapter has argued that film use continued to play an important role in the 
growth of the psychiatric discipline and its reorientation from the soldier to the American 
family after the war.  Placing this argument within the larger context elaborated by this 
study allows us to chart the use of film and visual technologies in the expansion of 
psychiatry in military operations and how this in turn furthered the discipline’s larger 
historical reorientation away from mental illness and toward mental health.  As a tool for 
modernization, film in military psychiatry was used to try to optimize labour—of 
psychiatrists themselves, and ultimately of all military personnel.  In the post war context 
psychiatry became a particularly powerful discipline, and films used to argue for its 
modernity, an argument that was in turn leveraged toward federal support and formal 
institutionalization within government.  Psychiatry’s ability to keep particular populations 
productive continued to be a pillar of rhetorical arguments for the discipline’s critical role 
in society.  In both cases, modernization brought with it improved practical methods and 
increased empathy for the normalcy and validity of mental disorders, while 
simultaneously structuring networks of institutional power and communicating ideas 
about mental health that served them.  Film was an essential mode through which 
military psychiatry became mainstream.  Understanding critically the way that this 
technique of visualization operated helps us to better understand the kind of discursive 




Conclusion: Adapting the Pictures within the Mind 
 
Films and techniques of visualization applied to psychiatric goals helped 
psychiatry to modernize in the military context.  They helped psychiatry to become a 
discipline capable of administering to an institution comprised of millions of personnel 
by offering systems of selection and categorization, and by teaching what psychiatry was 
and how viewers ought to apply its ideas to their self-management.  Films and techniques 
of visualization were also used in the service of research and experimentation that tried to 
make the human mind more amenable to intervention in order to try to heal people more 
efficiently.  Above all else, the military psychiatric apparatus applied these techniques in 
order to make military labour more efficient and win the war. 
The perceived successes of the psy sciences in managing minds and men during 
World War II had opened terrain for their expansion.  Historian Ellen Herman writes that 
psychiatrists and psychologists proudly declared that their disciplines had been “key to 
winning the war,” citing examples such as the triumphs of psychological warfare 
overseas and the maintenance of US soldiers’ mental health in combat.425  Military 
psychiatrists “took pains to show exactly how their work furthered collective aims, and in 
the process, pushed work designed to install mental hygiene and health far beyond its 
initial, clinical uses.”426  In a 1946 issue of The American Journal of Psychiatry, military 
psychiatrist Eli Ginzberg argues for vague yet weighty reasons to secure the gains made 
by psychiatry during the war, writing: “The place of psychiatry in military medicine must 
be made secure so that it can discharge its very great responsibilities in war and 
peace.”427  Lofty claims about the psy sciences’ capacity to help stabilize post war society 
were common and not limited to the military context.  The Psychologist’s Peace 
Manifesto was a document signed by over two thousand members of the American 
Psychological Association that proclaimed: “an enduring peace can be attained if the 
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human sciences are utilized by our statesmen and peace makers.”428  The term Pax 
Medica was sometimes used to describe the vision of a medically engineered peace that 
could be brought about by the proper cultivation of mental health and hygiene.  William 
Menninger, former director of neuropsychiatry for the military who became president of 
the American Psychiatric Association after the war, wrote an article in 1947 on “The 
Rôle of Psychiatry in the World Today,” in which he claims that: “to promote world 
peace means to ensure peace of mind to the people of the world…and healthy 
mindedness would be the basis of decent social life on this planet.”429  Pieces such as 
these positioned the psy sciences as key to rebuilding a healthy, functional society in the 
aftermath of world war.   
To map all of the ways that the growth and modernization of psychiatry in the US 
military during World War II enabled it to expand into new territories is far beyond the 
scope of this project, and strays too far from its focus on film and techniques of 
visualization.430  But it is interesting to note how managing the mental health of the 
military’s labour force positioned the psy sciences to do the same for industry.  Donald 
McKinnon, one of the psychologists heading the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
(precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency), went on to institutionalize the OSS 
selection procedures (among them versions of Rorschach and image interpretation tests) 
at the Institute of Personality Assessment and Research at the University of California 
with the goal of “developing techniques to identify the personality characteristics which 
make for successful and happy adjustment to modern industrial society.”431  And 
psychiatrist CC Burlingame writes in a 1947 issue of The American Journal of Psychiatry 
that: “many of the most important problems of contemporary society fall within the 
purview of industrial psychiatry.”  He discusses the use of psychodrama and role-playing 
techniques to train supervisors in conflict resolution, citing “disturbances of emotional 
adjustment,” and “unresolved issues,” among factors leading to union grievances and 
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strikes.432  While not all roads led directly from military psychiatry to industrial 
psychiatry, the tools, techniques, and scope achieved in administering to the mental 
health of millions of soldiers made indelible marks on the discipline.  Many psychiatrists 
saw their discipline as positioned to tend to the minds of the masses and help other 
institutions to reach goals of efficiency and productivity.  
Film and visual technologies had been crucial to this modernization.  They 
disseminated psychiatric ideas to new audiences, helped to standardize procedures, and 
often acted as a tool for therapeutic mechanization.  Psychiatrists had used onscreen 
images in an array of techniques aimed at curing soldiers quickly and producing 
institutionally beneficial behaviours.  Howard Rome, one of the military’s most 
ambitious experimenters with motion pictures, praised film’s ability to use images to 
make information more compelling and accessible, stating that: “with care and perfection 
[motion pictures] should do for medicine what the graphic arts have done for book 
publishing—enlarge its field, increase its depth and make it less mysterious for a good 
many people.”433  It is significant, though not surprising, that film was used to promote 
psychiatry and manage its key discourses within a military context.  As we saw in 
chapters 2 and 4, such films worked to set the terms of mental health and identify how 
populations should pursue it.  Rome had also noted film’s capacity to act as a tool for 
modernizing the discipline’s practices, as we have discussed in chapters 1 and 3.  Rome 
notes that: “Deconditioning to sounds and sights—peek views of experiences yet to be 
lived through and analyses of typical past performance—are some of the possibilities that 
lend themselves to accurate motion picture portrayal.”434  Images seen by the eyes were 
understood to have a privileged relationship with the images inside the mind of viewers, 
compelling them to behave in desired ways, including, as Rome indicates, training films 
to inoculate soldiers’ minds to fear and desensitization films to bring repressed fears to 
the surface for therapeutic treatment. 
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Understanding or pinning down a “film theory” that was held or developed by 
military psychiatrists is challenging.  The ways that film was used varied widely from 
one practitioner to another, and as we have seen throughout this study, even single films 
were polysemic, often being used for training in one instance, and therapy in another.  A 
spirit of enterprise and experimentation linked many uses of moving image technology, 
as illustrated by strange examples that left aside images entirely such as Flicker Fusion 
Therapy, a test that was used to measure a subject’s anxiety levels with a portable movie 
projector and a device that could control the frequency of breaks interrupting the 
projector’s light source.  This technology was most commonly used in military hospitals 
and ostensibly helped to diagnose the severity of combat fatigue and other war neuroses 
by measuring the subject’s ability to perceive interruptions in the projected light.435  
Another strange clinical device incorporating film projection technology is described in a 
1946 issue of The American Journal of Psychiatry in an article descriptively titled: “An 
Improved Instrument for the Determination of Changes in the Pain Threshold Caused by 
Drugs.”  The instrument was a device built with a projector bulb to emit a “screen” of 
light onto a subject’s forehead, with the intensity of the light causing the pain that the 
drugs were trying to mitigate.436   
More enduring in our cultural imagination than many of the examples discussed 
in this study are post war experiments that incorporated moving images into social 
experiments or attempts at mind control.  Military testing of LSD and other drugs on 
soldiers in the 1960s were filmed in order to analyze their results, leaving us with bizarre 
recordings of soldiers on surveillance cameras struggling to answer researchers’ 
questions, giggling through failed marching drills, or communing with nature during 
combat simulation.437  Famous psychology researchers such as Kurt Lewin and Stanley 
                                               
435 Herbert E. Krugman, “Flicker fusion frequency as a function of anxiety reaction; an 
exploratory study,” Psychosomatic Medicine 4 (1947): 269. 
436 Fredrick B. Flinn and A.S. Chaikelis “An Improved Instrument for the Determination 
of Changes in the Pain Threshold Caused by Drugs” The American Journal of Psychiatry 
103, no. 3 (1946): 349. 
437 Raffi Katchadourian has compiled an impressive collection of materials from the 
psychochemical weapons testing at Edgewood Arsenal research facility, published as a 
series of short articles and videos for the New Yorker titled “Secrets of Edgewood.”  
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/secrets-of-edgewood accessed Oct 15, 
2018. 
213 
Milgram brought social science to popular audiences with their filmed experiments on 
social behaviours of children in environments of varying disciplinary control and adult 
test subjects’ willingness to inflict (imagined) pain on others under the direction of expert 
authority.  Infamous former military psychiatrist, Dr. Ewen Cameron, began his 
immediate post war career, as many did, in industrial psychiatry where he advised on 
personnel management techniques and wrote typologies of the childhood factors he 
believed to shape the kinds of people who file grievances in the workplace.438  He 
eventually became a CIA-funded researcher at McGill University, developing a 
psychiatric treatment he called “psychic driving” that used sensory deprivation in 
combination with audio loops on continuous playback that were meant to either trigger 
past traumatic experiences or to “reprogram” patients’ thoughts by “penetrating defences; 
eliciting hitherto impossible material; and setting up a dynamic implant.”439  His theory 
was that if one could find a way to bypass a person’s cognitive control over their own 
mind, that their mind could then be implanted with messages from an external source.  
Cameron’s “therapy” eventually integrated large doses of LSD and electroshock 
treatment as “depatterning” tools to help clear a patient’s mind in preparation for psychic 
driving.  His techniques were both funded and adopted by the CIA as part of mind control 
and torture projects pursued under the code name MK-ULTRA.440 
Psychic driving in particular represents a more insidious extreme of post war 
research that finds fore bearers in psychiatric experimentation with communications 
technologies.  I mention it here because sensational and morbid mind experiments are the 
kinds of visions often conjured in the cultural imaginary by the terms “military,” 
“psychiatry,” and “media.”  Popular culture fascinations with dystopian mind control and 
brainwashing as represented in films like Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), The 
Manchurian Candidate (1962), and Clockwork Orange (1971), give voice to popular 
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fears surrounding the uses of media and psy science experimentation in the hands of 
powerful authoritarian institutions or governments.441  Experiments like psychic driving, 
while they certainly do occur (and their cruelty should not be overlooked), represent a 
marginal application of such technological experimentation.  As this study has shown, the 
most common applications were a lot more mundane, resulting most often in things like 
large-scale inkblot testing and didactic documentaries about mental health and military 
best practices.   
An interesting connection between the banal and the bizarre applications of media 
and techniques of visualization in the military psychiatric apparatus is that they often 
operated with a conception of the human mind as a kind of media technology in itself.  
The mind in all cases was figured as something that records and stores 
memory/experiences that can be accessed and manipulated by experts in order to achieve 
particular ends.442  Media scholar Charles Acland writes in his history of popular 
discourses on subliminal influence and media that, “as new concepts of mind were taking 
root, innovations in media provoked new understandings of, and new ways to think about 
the workings of minds.”443  While Acland is referring specifically to fears expressed in 
popular discourse surrounding the emergence of new media, experts, too, have leaned on 
media metaphors as a way of framing new approaches to the human mind.  
The various forms of expert experimentation with media to optimize minds 
engender interesting theoretical and methodological overlaps.  Techniques of 
visualization such as image interpretation tests and narcosynthesis approached the mind 
as a repository of information that could be summoned by pushing the right visual (and/or 
narcotic) “button.”  This “button” would either result in an “x ray” revealing a latent 
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neurosis, or the rewinding of the mind’s “film” to find repressed trauma.  Using 
desensitization films in exposure therapy, training films as inoculation, and didactic films 
to teach patients how to act in therapeutic contexts, all relied on the principle that an 
externally supplied image, via film, could be used to generate useful images inside the 
minds of its viewers.  Whether it generated images of combat that could act as a surrogate 
experience in order to train the brain to respond more effectively to the shock of future 
experiences, an image of combat that could dredge up repressed memory images of 
trauma to be treated with therapy, or an image of someone performing trauma in order to 
visualize for a viewer what their own process of treatment ought to look like.  In the 
sense that these films worked to stimulate the production of useful images inside the 
minds of their viewers, they prefigured contemporary neuroscientific models of mind.  As 
we will examine in more detail below, contemporary neuroscience understands the mind 
as something that doesn’t merely observe the world, its images, or other stimuli “as they 
are,” but in effect, the mind continuously incorporates external stimuli into the creation of 
a private “film reel.”444  The mind in this model is something like the director, the 
archivist, and the projectionist in a 24-hour movie theatre that plays films only for itself.  
The models of mind presupposed by WWII military psychiatrists may not be exactly the 
same in all the different applications listed above, but their orientation toward using 
images-as-stimuli have significant similarities with contemporary uses of media in 
military psychiatry.  In all cases, the institutional question remains the same: how do you 
get the mind to create the most useful pictures? 
The use of Virtual Reality (VR) as a technology to help habituate military 
personnel to frightening stimuli in the treatment of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) is a practice that began in the Vietnam War.445  As with WWII experiments with 
films in exposure therapy, the underlying principle of VR therapy is one of “habituation,” 
or the ability to desensitize patients to the fear of particular stimuli. Military psychiatrist 
Dr. Robert N. McLay who works extensively with this treatment, sums up habituation 
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saying:  “If you are around something long enough and nothing bad happens, your brain 
gets used to it.”446  As with the film desensitization practice used in WWII, the VR 
simulations start out generic and unthreatening: with a therapist present, the patient will 
put on the machinery and find themselves in a stock scene from Iraq or Afghanistan—
walking down a city street; driving through a desert in a Humvee, etc.—where nothing 
out of the ordinary is happening.447  The patient is then asked to re-tell their most 
traumatic memory over and over throughout the sessions with the therapist gradually 
adding details to the VR world in order to match the story.  The therapist operates a 
console in order to populate the patient’s VR with new visuals, sounds of explosions or 
gunfire, vibrations, and smells such as blood, gunpowder, or diesel exhaust.448  McLay’s 
partner, Dr. Jeff Pyne, describes the process saying: “The use of the VR machine means 
that [the psychiatrist] can control the environment so the patients can’t avoid their fears.  
You can push them until they have to apply the skill or ability to relax and habituate.”449   
Media scholar Pasi Väliaho’s critical work on the Virtual Iraq therapy program 
sees the use of VR in fear habituation as occurring within a larger technological 
assemblage that works on managing soldiers’ fear neurologically.  This assemblage 
includes first person shooter and war-based video games—such as the game Full 
Spectrum Warrior from which the visual world of the Virtual Iraq program was originally 
derived—played prior to military training and again as a form of stress-management 
during and after active duty.450  Väliaho views the use of VR images and first person 
shooter games as a form of habituation, but understands this habituation crit ically as 
something needed to train and retain people to work in the affectively repugnant 
circumstances required of them in a combat military context.  He proposes that the 
images used in VR treatment form a cycle of habituation that begins with the video 
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games that acclimatize players to the experiences of war before they engage in combat 
and are then used to desensitize them once they leave it.   
Väliaho writes that the “traumatic reality of war becomes a question of affective 
habituation … while the reality of images in this process becomes a matter of biology and 
the evolution of the species, instead of being anthropological and communicative.”451  He 
is referring here to the language used by researchers to talk about how VR therapy works, 
in particular neurobiological/evolutionary discourses that frame the traumatized mind not 
as a biographical product of the individual subject, but as a series of fight or flight actions 
being performed by a nervous system in a dysfunctional state of emergency.452  Väliaho 
points out that contemporary neuroscience understands the mind to function 
“autopoetically,” working continually with images generated from within itself as a 
“closed, self-referential, and self-activating system” that “emulates reality” with 
“intrinsic images instead of faithfully ‘representing’ the external world.”453  Significant 
here is the way that VR therapies are understood to be interfacing with the endogenous 
images of the mind.  The tailored scenarios that a therapist programs into a VR treatment 
system have “less to do with working on patients’ personal memories … than with 
experimenting on and directing the foldings, recurrences, and stratifications of neural 
circuts.”454   
Playing combat video games begin the process of “stress inoculation training” by 
habituating soldiers’ minds to images of generically threatening scenarios meant to 
trigger “affective and motor responses based on the nervous system’s drive for self 
preservation.”455  Much like the Fighting Men series of training films shown to soldiers in 
WWII, these images are articulated to the nervous system first, and the cognitive mind, 
second.  Games and VR therapies, according to this theory, work with the brain’s 
functioning as an image-producer by providing more-or-less generic images that in turn 
populate the mind with images of threat and danger.  These are meant to result in 
institutionally useful “affective and motor” responses from the brain and nervous system.    
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While the WWII military psychiatrists examined here did not theorize their 
experiments with making minds generate useful images inside themselves as 
contemporary neuroscience has, when we look at the spectrum of films and techniques of 
visualization that they employed, we can see some remarkable parallels.  Together these 
practices formed a family of techniques of visualization that deployed still, moving, and 
performed images in order to provoke different effects and habituation in the service of 
institutional goals.  The visuality of combat video games not only train the nervous 
system of players to react to threatening situations in particular ways, but they populate 
the mind with visualizations of what threat looks like and what kind of environments it is 
likely to occur in.  This creates not only affective knowledge, but social and ontological 
knowledge as well.  Similarly, Virtual Iraq therapy simulators recall the mind’s memory 
images in order to name fears and classify them as no longer threatening (though a 
taxonomy of who and what is a threat “in the world” remains intact).  Writing on 
visuality as a discursive process, Nicholas Mirzoeff, using Foucault, claims that 
visualization corrals the visual in service of authority, creating classifications and 
hierarchies that then appear as natural or given.456  The techniques of visualization used 
in military psychiatry inevitably participate in the creation and naturalization of 
institutionally useful hierarchies by creating, organizing, and naming images inside the 
mind.  But we cannot forget that this naming and organizing of images refers back to 
people and places in the world, whose own lives are profoundly shaped by their 
classification by a powerful military.  My point is that within these visual-therapeutic 
modes, the condition of war itself and its effects on people can never be adequately 
critiqued as the actual source of the problem.  These modes are beholden to military 
logic: they organize the stimuli of war as things the mind ought to adapt to.  Within the 
historical development of these particular models of the mind, war was not a hindrance.  
Rather, the models and discourses were themselves enabled and shaped by war, in turn 
crafting war as something the mind could make normal. 
More interesting perhaps than asking how such visual techniques work on the 
mind (which cannot escape a framework of effects and optimization), is asking how using 
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such techniques have helped to engender enduring understandings of psychiatry’s broader 
social role.  As we constantly adapt media technologies to the demands of our world (or 
adapt our world to the capacity of our media technologies), so have we expected the mind 
to adapt to the conditions it finds itself in.  Psychiatry’s dramatic growth within a strict 
military setting linked this science of the mind to institutional demands to adapt millions 
of people to hostile situations.  Military psychiatry, for the most part, structured itself 
around the question of how to help patients adapt to their environment, not to help them 
question why their environment was making them sick.  If media are tools that we can 
endlessly adapt to meet our needs, perhaps they are not the best models for mind.  This is 
of course, a rhetorical, and not a technophobic proposition.  Our environments and our 
interconnections with media inevitably shape our imaginations and explanatory 
frameworks.  But what if the equation was flipped, and rather than trying to adapt minds 
to the environment, the mind’s mysteries, its limits, its ruptures, were used as tools to 
question and adapt our environments.  The discipline of psychiatry is ideally positioned 
to make these kinds of interventions on a social level—helping to map out what kinds of 
environments, stressors, demands, and technological practices are at odds with the 
healthy functioning of the mind.   
Historian Miya Tokumitsu has written on the relationship between a 
commercialized rhetoric of self-care and the rampant anxiety experienced under 
contemporary neoliberalism.  She points out that in a time where the rise of workplace-
instituted wellness programs is often paired with increasing levels of worker precarity, 
the social causes of much mental illness continues to be obscured by the highly individual 
methods on offer to treat them (namely therapy and pharmaceuticals).457  While 
psychiatrists certainly can and sometimes do frame the problems of their patients within 
the structural inequities of larger society, the discipline has historically offered solutions 
that are meant to be pursued as personal betterment.  Framing therapy as personal 
betterment tends to serve commerce or institutions that profit from exploitation by 
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keeping people focused on themselves as the source of mental health problems and their 
solutions.  Understanding the rhetoric and techniques that evolved as psychiatry was put 
to work in the service of institutional management helps us to better understand the 
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